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FLEXIBILITY IN CONTRACTING: 
INTRODUCTION

 
 
By Thomas D. Barton
*
 
 
“Flexibility” in contracting is typically conceived from two quite different, and seemingly 
opposed, perspectives. For those who approach contracts from a legal perspective, flexibility 
is regarded suspiciously: It threatens to undermine some foundational assumptions about why 
contracts are made and the role of the law in safeguarding those purposes. But for those who 
approach contracts from a more business-oriented perspective, especially the longer term 
agreements that typify modern supply contracts and complex projects, flexibility is viewed as 
an essential ingredient for success. Modern business relationships can scarcely function 
without parties being able to accommodate themselves to inevitable changes during the 
lifetime of the contract. 
 
The two groups have not always communicated well. Too often their dialogue may have 
resembled the imagined conversation that begins the first Chapter in this book (Flexibility 
and Stability in Contracts, by Thomas D. Barton, Helena Haapio, and Tatiana Borisova). In 
that fanciful conversation, the beginning assumptions of the two speakers diverge so 
powerfully concerning the purposes and functions of contracts that it is difficult for the 
speakers to find common ground. In reality, the stand-off between the two perspectives are 
contracts that are drafted by lawyers—largely attempting to suppress flexibility—but that are 
implemented by business parties, who attempt to find ways to smuggle in more flexible 
arrangements. The lawyer-drafted written agreement may contain a variety of conditions, 
promises, and stipulated remedies that seek predictability and control. But the implementing 
business parties routinely avoid resorting to formal legal procedures to enforce their rights; 
they prefer to negotiate an accommodation that continues the deal and the underlying 
commercial relationships. 
 
This friction between the legal/certainty/control perspective and the 
business/flexibility/accommodation perspective has endured for many years. Parties routinely 
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invest considerable time and money in creating a contract that seeks to specify precise legal 
rights, duties, and remedies, but then avoid using those rights—resorting to them as a last 
alternative. 
 
Perhaps this syndrome of parties equipping themselves with legal rights, but then often 
behaving as though those rights do not exist, is economically efficient. Perhaps without the 
clarity of the legally-based contract provisions, the parties would not have a common 
platform from which even to begin negotiations in the event of a dispute. So the clash of the 
two perspectives toward flexibility in contracting may, paradoxically, contribute to a healthy, 
efficient system when the two perspectives are kept in reasonable balance. But we cannot 
help but wonder: how much more efficient and functional might contracts be if both 
perspectives were acknowledged and appropriately included in the written contract itself? 
And, if both perspectives were to be written into the agreement, what would such clauses 
say? 
 
We cannot answer these questions without empirical investigation of specific contract and 
project applications, and without interviewing the lawyers and business parties involved in 
modern contracting. That need was the impetus for the formation of the multi-national, multi-
disciplinary study group that was formed through the generous support of the Finnish 
Cultural Foundation and led by Professor Soili Nystén-Haarala. Over a two-year period, 
Professor Nystén-Haarala periodically convened a group of lawyers and scholars from 
several countries in Europe, the United Kingdom, Russia, Asia, and the USA. Their collective 
task was to consider and study the idea of flexibility of contracts. Participants from different 
countries were encouraged to collaborate, so as to open up the original perspectives from 
which they first approached the idea of contractual flexibility. Some undertook interview 
projects, some designed empirical surveys, and some approached the questions analytically 
rather than empirically. 
 
The results were surprising, but highly enlightening and suggestive of the need for much 
more study of these issues. First, not everyone interpreted alike the meaning of the concept 
“flexibility.” Second, some people reported on legal, economic, social, or psychological 
barriers to greater flexibility. But third, some found the opposite: ways in which the law or 
even language may actually promote flexibility in the operation or interpretation of contracts. 
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Perhaps these disparate meanings and findings were inevitable, given the reality of the long-
standing struggle for supremacy between the two basic perspectives toward contract 
flexibility. Both perspectives reflect legitimate economic and psychological principles and 
needs. Furthermore, the work of the study group demonstrates that attitudes to flexibility in 
contracting reflect different cultural and professional backgrounds and values. Relatively 
informal contracting behavior emphasizing loyalty may be normative in Finland; re-
interpreted and embraced as traditional guanxi in China; viewed as risky and idealistic in the 
individualistic U.S.A; and theoretically desirable but bureaucratically almost impossible in 
Russia. 
 
In the end, each Chapter in this book may be viewed as contributing to an understanding of 
both flexibility and stability in contracts: why each is important, and how both may be 
achieved simultaneously. Solutions may be advanced in a number of different ways. They 
may appear inside the contracts themselves, through better design and through clauses that 
mandate stronger collaboration between the parties. Solutions may also be achieved through 
better communication between those who draft contracts and those who perform them, as in 
complex projects or supply contracts. Flexibility with stability may also be furthered through 
simplifying national or EU laws, so as to enable more party autonomy; or through its 
opposite: developing or liberalizing the infrastructure of contract law in countries like China 
or Russia. Different methods for packaging or transferring contracts can also help, as in 
movements toward marketing “branded” contracts or traditional assignment of contract rights 
to third parties. Finally, a blended combination of flexibility and stability has been found 
through interpreting the meanings of words themselves. 
 
The first chapter, Flexibility and Stability, was introduced above. It imagines a dialogue 
between holders of the clashing perspectives about flexibility; the chapter then acknowledges 
the legitimacy of each perspective, and offers recommendations for promoting better 
communication and contract functionality through visualization and collaboration. 
 
Following that overview, Flexible Contracting in Software Project Business: What We Can 
Learn from Agile Methods in the Software Industry by Jouko Nuottila, Jaakko Kujala, and 
Soili Nystén-Haarala offers a closer look at these tensions in the context of project 
management. Project management entails ongoing decision-making—sometimes hundreds of 
decisions—during the course of completing a substantial project. This chapter first introduces 
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the evolution of models that are used to understand the dynamics of successful project 
development. It then suggests the implications of that evolution for both project management 
and the legal contracts that accompany projects. A contract created at the outset of a complex 
project cannot realistically specify responses to the many contingencies that may arise. 
Successful contracts must create a framework that is stable enough to respect overall 
expectations, but flexible enough to work pragmatically. Employing interviews with software 
executives and technical personnel, this chapter examines how to achieve that balance, 
emphasizing the importance of trust and cooperation among project partners in implementing 
an agile approach to project development. 
 
In the third chapter, Flexibility in Contracts and Contractual Practice: Empirical Study in 
China, Yanan Zhang and Riitta Ahtonen begin by pointing us toward economic theories that 
are useful in analyzing flexibility in contracting. That theory informs the design of an 
empirical study undertaken in China, through interviews of both lawyers and managers 
operating inside homegrown Chinese companies and also in China divisions of European 
companies. The collected results constitute a snapshot of one moment in the thoughtful 
commercial development of a nation. In that picture, we can find room for optimism: that 
most lawyers and business managers intuit the need for balancing clarity and legal rules with 
the maintenance of personal relationships. We see also a government exploring what 
practices may be best received within Chinese traditions, but simultaneously enable a future 
tied to international trade. 
 
Not every legal initiative, however, constructively promotes either flexibility or stability. 
Sometimes either the laws themselves or the people administering those laws can stifle 
innovation or efforts to incorporate particular rules to guide particular commercial 
relationships. For example, Hans-Werner Moritz and Maximilian Kuhn in Legal Implications 
of Flexibility in Business Contracting from the German Perspective suggest that both German 
national laws and various EU initiatives actually constrain traditional freedom of contract and 
flexibility through limiting the use of choice of law clauses. And in The Interplay of 
Flexibility and Rigidity in Russian Business Contracting: The Formal and Informal 
Framework in Contracting by Soili Nystén-Haarala, Elena Bogdanova, Alexander Kondakov, 
and Olga Makarova, the authors remind us that regulations will always be enforced by 
judicial or executive branch officials who exercise discretion. Those officials may see their 
roles as facilitating business arrangements, using their discretion wisely to intervene where 
Introduction 
5 
one party may be unfairly exploitative of the other. But conversely, those same officials may 
come to see their discretion as an opportunity to wield power with ego-boosting arbitrariness. 
Even worse, enforcement officials may be corrupt, extracting bribes to overlook regulations 
that might otherwise stifle commercial dealings. 
 
As The Interplay of Flexibility and Rigidity in Russian Business Contracting chapter 
underscores, contracting as well as the law in general will be influenced by the social 
environment in which it operates. Even more broadly, linguistic and cultural traditions frame 
basic understandings of the meanings of laws: both the words themselves and the nature of 
human interaction. Flexibility flows inherently from different languages—even where one 
might expect that legal professionals speak a certain common language, given their similar 
professional training and exposure to fundamental legal concepts. Not all lawyers mean the 
same thing when addressing the same words or concepts, which can introduce either a 
healthy flexibility, or confusion and mistrust. That point is expertly documented in the multi-
national comparison of Achieving Flexibility in Contracting by Using Vague Terms in 
International Business Contracts: A Comparative Approach from the Perspective of Common 
Law, German, Polish, and Chinese Law, by Joanna Grzybek, Tina de Vries, and Yanan 
Zhang. 
 
The inherent flexibility of language is complemented in international contracting by cultural 
differences that bring contrasting attitudes about trust, loyalty, and the importance of human 
relationships in commercial dealings. These underlying social and moral expectations about 
people are explored in two chapters: Petra Sund-Norrgård, Antti Kolehmainen, and Onerva-
Aulikki Suhonen in The Principle of Loyalty and Flexibility in Contracts; and Taina 
Savolainen and Mirjami Ikonen, Trust as Intellectual Capital in Pursuing Flexibility in 
Business Contracting. The Principle of Loyalty suggests that if human relational norms are 
widely understood and accepted within a culture, the judiciary may override explicit contract 
language to the contrary. Doing so, paradoxically, may actually stabilize contracting 
relationships by bringing in tacitly understood norms that cannot be overridden by contract 
disclaimers. So also with Trust as Intellectual Capital: the authors explore the concept of 
trust among parties to a contract as a non-legal device to find a balance between the 
perspectives of control and flexibility. 
 
Thomas D. Barton 
6 
Sometimes the parties to a transaction can find needed flexibility or system stability through 
third parties, rather than through their own interactions or contract language. The simple 
devices of extending credit instead of demanding immediate payment; or permitting a party 
to liquidate a long-term resource or periodic stream of income; or to delegate a duty that has 
become onerous to a third party, all can bring enormous flexibility into commercial dealings. 
In Flexibility in Assignment of Contractual Rights: Assignment of Account Receivables, 
Lingyun Gao reminds us of the rich history and usefulness of these devices. She describes 
legal vehicles for obtaining commercial financing through third parties, and analyzes their 
reception in modern Chinese law. Such third-party, post-contract devices must be taken into 
account when attempting to understand and assess the overall flexibility of a contracting 
system. 
 
The book concludes with Promoting Contract Flexibility through Trademarks: ‘Branded’ 
Intellectual Property Licensing Practices, by Nari Lee and Thomas D. Barton. This chapter 
points toward a possible future source of flexibility: development of alternative contracts for 
licenses or other transactions that are created and sold under what may become familiar brand 
names, as one would buy soap powder. Flexibility in the contracting relationship would be 
through the marketplace itself—and the alternative substantive terms that could be 
represented in the competing brands of contracts. Such flexibility may also offer stability to 
the system, by democratizing contract formation. In a world of increasing standardization of 
contracts and decreasing comprehension of those agreements—especially by consumers who 
may “click through” the “I agree” buttons of a contract without reading a word of the terms—
the ability to rely on, and demand, a trusted name in contracting may bring into better balance 
the bargaining power between one-off purchasing consumers and the far more sophisticated 
companies that draft and replicate standardized agreements for those consumers to sign. 
 
This book arrives at a significant historical moment. As the importance of contracting grows 
in a globalized economy that relies increasingly on human connection rather than national 
power, designing a contracting system that is flexible, stable, and fair becomes paramount. 
The entire study group wishes to express our gratitude to the Finnish Cultural Foundation for 
enabling its work; to Soili Nystén-Haarala for her insight and effective leadership; and to 
Yanan Zhang for her competent and friendly style in organizing events and paper submission. 
We are delighted to share the results of our study and encourage the reader’s communication 
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Flexibility and Stability in Contracts
 
THOMAS D. BARTON,
1
 HELENA HAAPIO,
2
 TATIANA BORISOVA
3
 
 
“Flexibility” and “stability” can have strongly diverging relationships in the minds of those who deal 
with commercial contracts.  For some, flexibility fights stability.  “Flexibility” in their minds is 
synonymous with confusion, inefficiency, disruption, and lawsuits—and therefore with higher costs 
and lesser profits. For others, however, flexibility is a source of stability, prompting communications 
that lead to broader understanding of needs, capabilities, opportunities, and trust. 
 
Both perspectives are understandable, and each may be valid.  The wrong sort of flexibility in a 
contract may lead to higher costs and frustration; the right sort of flexibility may enable better 
commercial relationships.  The goal is to find ways to enhance positive flexibility, without 
introducing disruption and potentially extortionate renegotiation of contract terms.  The first step 
toward providing stronger flexibility together with stronger stability is to consider flexibility (and 
contracts generally) not exclusively in legal terms, but instead as patterns of communications among 
various people involved in commercial exchange.   
 
This article explores collaboration and visualization as promising tools for enhancing contract 
flexibility even while enhancing stability.  Better collaboration seeks stronger communication among 
the contracting parties, their lawyers, and those who will implement the contract.  The flexibility 
introduced could rebalance and better integrate the commercial, personal, and business relationships 
that comprise a contract.   Visualization techniques enable those stronger communication patterns.  By 
using graphic images in the various documents that comprise and support contracting, the process of 
creating those documents becomes more inclusive.  Furthermore, the substance of contracting goals, 
terms, and underlying assumptions becomes more transparent and usable to broader segments of the 
commercial community.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Imagine two business people having a conversation about contracts. Chris begins by saying, 
“I do not understand this idea of bringing flexibility to contracts. The whole notion seems 
contradictory. For me, the point of making a contract is to bring predictability to a future that 
seems full of uncertainty and risk. If I want my business to change along with circumstances, 
why should I make a contract in the first place?”  
 
Kim replies, “In my business, contracts are not necessarily about trying to lock in some 
vision of the future. Whatever vision I can imagine right now is likely to be incomplete or 
even wrong. And so if I create some artificial permanency, think of all the opportunities I will 
have lost if I cannot adapt to the changes I did not anticipate. I need to invest in commercial 
relationships: to build networks of contracting partners who I can trust and grow with. I can 
do that best by making contracts now that are flexible and collaborative.” 
 
“But how can you count on making a profit with an arrangement like that,” responds Chris. 
“How can you possibly set a price in the contract if you don’t know what your duties will be? 
And how can your production or delivery teams know how to plan and implement their 
responsibilities if the contract isn’t clear?”  
 
“I am not talking about making contracts that are ambiguous or incomplete,” says Kim. “I 
agree that the wrong kind of ‘flexibility’ can lead to instability or confusion, and therefore 
higher transaction costs and quality control problems. I don’t want to abandon clarity; not at 
all. I want contracts to be more clear, and to more people. I want to understand my contracts 
thoroughly, and I want all of my engineers and sales people to understand them as well. Like 
you, I don’t want ambiguity either in language or legal rights; but I do want contracts that are 
flexible in positive ways.”  
 
Kim continues, “I want my contracts to be resilient to challenges, and to enable me to seize 
opportunities as they come along. I want my contracts to help me identify how I can improve 
my product, my service, and my strategic planning.  If my contracts set up the right sort of 
ongoing communication, internally and externally, I can get the sort of information I need for 
quality control and potential innovation.  Getting my contracting partners to supply this 
Flexibility and Stability in Contracts 
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feedback is far more realistic and honest than trying to foresee the future.  
 
“No way,” says Chris. “You are just asking for trouble. Once we get a contract signed, I want 
to put it in a drawer and forget about it. The best contract is one we never have to read or 
even hear about. After it is made, a contract is just a fail-safe for the lawyers if we get sued. 
Talking about a contract while it is being implemented—especially inviting feedback from 
the other party—just invites whining. Or even worse, it opens me up to exploitation. There is 
no profit in listening to problems—if I invite that, our buyers will just want us to shave 
prices.  So I tell my lawyer, ‘make sure that litigation will not hurt us. Shift every risk we can 
to the other side, and make sure to include any disclaimers or other protections the law can 
give me. Make contracts as tough and absolute as we can get away with. That way, people 
will know they can’t mess with us.’ I need bulletproof legal protection and I expect my 
lawyer to provide it.”  
 
“My contractual counterparts are spread across the globe,” says Kim. “I cannot trust that the 
law will really be that certain in resolving our contract disputes, no matter how strongly we 
try to write the contract. We cannot always predict what the applicable law will be, nor what 
that law will specify once we determine which law will govern. And even if we can manage 
to prevail legally, trying to enforce a judgment in a foreign country is an expensive 
nightmare. Worse, at the end of an unreliable effort toward legal solution, we might be left 
with a terminated contract and poisoned relationships.” 
 
Kim continues: “My contracts are often interdependent. I cannot afford to view any contract 
in complete isolation. I need webs of exchange that can expand and shrink as new 
opportunities arise, maybe even in the middle of implementing an initial contract. So I would 
not want to sue a counterpart over most disagreements, just to achieve some short-term gain 
or personal vindication. If circumstances change—which we fully expect and hope to steer in 
a way that is profitable for us—then we will adapt to whatever reasonable needs of our 
contractual partners that can help make this happen. I need for my lawyer to design 
something that does not get in the way of what I want to accomplish by artificially freezing 
the future, or turning my counterparts into antagonists the first time a problem arises. I need a 
contract that is open-minded about changed circumstances, and one that alerts me well in 
advance of needed adjustments." 
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“Sorry,” concludes Chris, “you just don’t live in the real world.” 
  
Which speaker is right? The first speaker’s (Chris’) concerns about flexibility seem familiar 
and somehow prudent. But the second speaker’s (Kim’s) goals also seem plausible, even if 
untraditional, and in the long run perhaps more productive. Can both speakers be “right,” at 
some level? If so--if both perspectives are legitimate--could we craft contracts that satisfy 
both speakers? 
 
We believe that each speaker presents a point of view that must be taken seriously—legally, 
economically, and psychologically. Although we clearly favor the approach of Kim, the 
views of Chris are heartfelt and will not change overnight. We believe that contracts will not 
realize their full potential for generating value until both perspectives are better understood, 
and taken into account in the design of contract processes and documents. For example, does 
Chris really want “inflexibility” as such? Is that the real interest of business people, or is the 
real interest something deeper? Does Chris seem to demand rigidity only because 
“flexibility” shows up as synonymous with confusion, inefficiency, disruption, and 
lawsuits—and therefore with higher costs and lesser profits?  
 
What if we were able, without causing any of those costly disruptions, to find a way to 
provide the positive sort of flexibility that Kim wants: flexibility that prompts 
communications that are clear, transparent, comprehensible, and participatory, and that lead 
to broad understanding of needs, capabilities, opportunities, and trust. Would Chris still 
resist? Most business people want relationships that are more flexible.  In a poll taken among 
the members of the International Association for Contract and Commercial Management 
(IACCM), nearly 90% said that “flexibility and greater agility” are important for their 
contracts.
4
 Managers also want (at least sometimes) relationships that are more trusting and 
personal.
5
 
 
Such data reveal that “flexibility versus inflexibility” is not the underlying issue. The basic 
task is to create contracts that provide frameworks by which businesses can realize the best 
                                                 
4
 IACCM Poll (2011) http://contract-matters.com/2011/09/21/stuck-in-a-negotiation-rut/, last visited 
August 18, 2014. 
5
  Macaulay, Stewart (2004) “Freedom from Contract: Solutions in Search of a Problem?” 2004 
Wisconsin Law Review 777, at pp. 790–795. 
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possible exchange and relationships, and which enable the strongest growth and innovation. 
Lawyers and others who construct contract documents and processes should realize that some 
sources of flexibility are undesirable: they are antagonist to achieving basic economic and 
strategic goals.  Drafting contracts ambiguously, so that the parties cannot understand their 
rights and responsibilities, leads to the sort of disruption and disputation which Chris fears. 
Other sources of flexibility, however, actually promote economic and strategic goals. Initial 
entitlements, roles, and requirements must be clear. If they are not, then trouble will 
predictably arise, slowing down deliveries and payments and endangering relationships and 
trust. If a dispute arises, any negotiation about the dispute will be made more difficult 
because the parties will not know who must buy out whom.
6
  
 
We should not think of flexibility in contracts exclusively in legal terms.  That is primarily 
how Chris thinks of flexibility:  “I either have my rights, or I don’t; any source of ‘flexibility’ 
endangers my rights.”  But flexibility in contracting can be better understood as Kim does:  as 
patterns of communications among various people that could be more diverse and enabling.  
Making legal rights fuzzy is not flexibility; it is just confusion and an invitation to start 
arguments.  Opening out understanding and communication among all those who work with 
and through contracts is positive flexibility. 
  
Contracts designers need to develop processes and documents that imagine goals beyond 
securing legal rights and duties, even while they do not lessen basic security. Lawyers and 
other contract crafters must be open to the possibility that if they focus exclusively on legal 
rules, they will not see the potential for positive flexibility.  
 
 
2. The Role of Lawyers 
 
We are not alone in calling for lawyers to be more mindful of the prospects for positive 
flexibility in contracting, and to be more supportive of the broader understanding of 
contracting that is represented by Kim. George Dent, for example, writes about the 
emergence of new kinds of contracts and strategic alliances, and how each of those 
                                                 
6
  Calabresi, Guido and Melamed, A. Douglas (1972) “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral”, 85 Harvard Law Review 1089, at pp. 1093–1096. 
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movements suggests the need for greater collaboration and contract flexibility. Lawyers 
should, says Dent, become “enterprise architects.” 7 He identifies the futility of relying on 
legal liability to ensure compliance, for example, in contracts for the sale of goods or 
services:  
 
Many …deals entail a requirement or expectation of extensive future dealings. Even in a 
single sale of goods the parties must often collaborate on delivery, installation, operation, 
and maintenance after the closing. Further, the parties often envision future intercourse 
between themselves (sometimes formalized in a long-term or “relational” contract) and with 
others, so they want to establish trust and cooperation and burnish their reputations. 
 
In contracts for services (which now comprise most economic activity), collaboration is 
even more important. The services rendered and the cooperation needed are often so 
complex that contract terms can only vaguely sketch the parties' duties. Proving a breach in 
court, then, may be impossible absent flagrant misconduct so that litigation is of little value 
in enforcing reasonable expectations. In many service and long-term sales contracts, the 
parties also expect to modify terms before the agreement expires. Given the impossibility of 
drafting and enforcing precise performance obligations, the parties often employ indirect 
solutions, like fair and efficient exit and termination arrangements.
8
 
 
As with service contracts, strategic alliances also flourish through better understanding, 
collaboration, and adaptability. Dent identifies the need for structures that enable that 
flexibility. He also identifies, however, the challenge of avoiding the unnecessary costs, 
frustration, resentment, and possible opportunism when contracts are unclear about the rights 
and duties of the parties: 
 
In joint ventures and other strategic alliances (such as licenses, dealerships, and franchises), 
the parties' collaboration after the closing is the whole purpose of the deal. Written terms, 
then, are even less useful than in service and long-term sales contracts. A writing can fix 
some measurable ancillary duties, such as how much money a party will contribute and what 
personnel it will second to the venture. The primary duty, however, cannot be precisely 
defined; it must often be described in such vague terms as “best efforts.”  
 
                                                 
7
 Dent, George W. (2009) “Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects”, 64 Business Lawyer 279. 
8
  Id., at pp. 289–290. 
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The limited utility of the writing does not mean, however, that drafting is easier or less 
important or that the lawyers' role is less significant--quite the contrary. … 
 
Alliances often last for many years. In setting the scope of the venture, the parties do not 
want a fixed plan but flexibility to handle unexpected contingencies. If a venture is defined 
too broadly, it could include activity that a partner could pursue (more) profitably alone or 
with a third party. If it is too narrow, one party may appropriate the knowhow of its partner, 
hence denying the partner the fruits of its efforts. Vague contract terms may preserve 
flexibility but foster uncertainty about who owns opportunities that arise out of the venture 
or that come to one partner from an outsider. Parties in an alliance often start small and see 
what happens; if the venture prospers, they expand it. Lawyers must craft a structure to suit 
the alliance through various stages or, at least, not pose undue difficulties when modification 
of the venture is needed.
9
 
  
The needs for positive flexibility are not confined to contracts for the sales of goods or 
services, or to strategic alliances. In their study of lawyer practice in the “Silicon Valley” 
centered in Palo Alto, California, legal historian Lawrence Friedman and others identify how 
successful lawyers draft contracts that are better suited to the evolving needs of their clients: 
 
Congruence of Legal and Business Styles. The claim that the legal style of [Silicon Valley] 
practitioners suits the clients' styles of doing business is one of the most intriguing, if also 
one of the hardest to pin down. We have been told by some local lawyers, for example, that 
the typical venture financing document is shorter than its New York City counterparts…. Its 
language is more general. It does not try to spell out contingency plans for every 
conceivable event that could go wrong, but assumes that the parties will be able to cooperate 
sufficiently to work out flexible adjustments to changing circumstances. Such deals have the 
‘high-trust’ or ‘relational’ character that sociologists of law and business attribute to 
communities of traders or firms engaged in long-term ongoing relations.
10
  
                                                 
9
  Id., at pp. 290–291. 
10
 Friedman, Lawrence M., Gordon, Robert W., Pirie, Sophie, and Whately, Edwin (1989) “Law, 
Lawyers, and Legal Practice in Silicon Valley: A Preliminary Report”, 64 Indiana Law Journal 555, 
at p. 563. 
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More generally, Friedman, et.al. describe the strongly pragmatic approach of these lawyers, 
and the two-way communications that enable a style of lawyering that the authors dub 
“Facilitative Law”: 
 
Facilitative Law. The Silicon Valley lawyer not only works with engineers, he thinks of 
himself as a kind of engineer—a legal engineer. His job is not just counseling or advising on 
what the law is; his job is to solve problems: to take a principle, a task and ‘engineer’ it 
legally, showing how it can be done, or be done best. It is not his job to say something can't 
be done, but to show how it can be done. In his view, the New York or Boston lawyer lacks 
this facility, this attitude, or has it to a lesser degree…  
 
[Quoting one of these lawyers:] “I think the most interesting legal problems are the ones 
where a client comes in with a new technology or a new problem and there is no form book 
to go and change the dates and names. You really have to stare at the ceiling and say, ‘Gee, 
if I were in this business, what would be the asset I would want to protect, and how would I 
commercialize it, and what would have to be the legal form of protection, and what would 
the documents have to look like, so that commerce wouldn't be impeded every time you 
wanted to make a sale?’ . . .”11 
 
The metaphors employed by Dent (“enterprise architects”) and Friedman (“engineers”) to 
describe the activist role of these lawyers are consistent with our emphasis on the need to 
design for positive flexibility. Lawyers must consciously imagine contract structures that will 
promote full understanding of the purposes and provisions of a contract, and that will put the 
right people together for the right sorts of conversations and feedback. Lawyers as proactive 
designers will find ways to promote understanding and productive communication. Those are 
the qualities that will advance positive flexibility without bringing in the effects of negative 
flexibility.  
 
Chris above concluded the fanciful conversation at the outset of this chapter by accusing Kim 
of not living in the “real world.” For a growing number of observers, however, the real world 
is moving in Kim’s direction. New attitudes are unfolding about the relationship between 
legal frameworks and business methods and goals. More and more, legal frameworks will be 
judged by their effectiveness in facilitating and guiding business cooperation rather than as 
                                                 
11
 Id., at pp. 562–563. 
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mere formal expressions or memorials of past business decisions.  
In the sections below, two methods are highlighted for advancing positive flexibility. The 
first is “collaborative contracting” which promotes communication, cooperation, and trust 
between the parties to a contract, but also between the parties and the lawyers who may be 
responsible for its drafting or negotiation. The second is “visualization,” which strongly 
promotes both clarity and understanding among all those who are affected by a contract. Both 
collaboration and visualization are important to achieving positive flexibility. All of the 
people who participate in contracting must communicate better with one another, at each 
stage of the contracting process. But fully understanding both the goals of the contract and 
the particulars of responsibilities under the contract are preconditions for those 
communications being positive and productive. 
 
3. Collaboration  
 
The emphasis on collaboration—among the parties to the contract, between the lawyer and 
business client, and within the various functions and departments of a company that must 
plan, craft, negotiate, and implement contracts—reflects the need to reverse some historical 
trends. Those trends are most visible if one views contracts not as mere documents, and not 
as isolated transactions. If one instead sees contracting as comprised of three relationships—
an exchange relationship, a set of personal relationships, and a legal relationship—then two 
patterns emerge.  
 
The first pattern is that the three relationships seem less connected now than they were in an 
earlier era and simpler economy. When contracts primarily involved face-to-face transactions 
about animals, crops, or land, the relationships integrated almost spontaneously. The 
economic exchange was easily understandable, and likely informed by physical examination 
of the animal or land being traded or by the community reputation of a person whose services 
were being hired. The personal relationship may have been ongoing—the parties may have 
already known one another, or been part of families that interacted in various ways. Finally, 
the legal relationship was not complex. The consideration was paid, and the ownership 
transferred; or the service was performed in a workmanlike fashion, and the fee then became 
due. The three relationships comprising contracts overlapped significantly, and almost 
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naturally, as in Figure 1 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
As the economy gradually modernized, however, exchange became more complex, less 
personal, and more dominated by legal professionals and their language. The result was that 
the three relationships of contracting began to drift apart.  
 
Further, a second trend appeared: the legal circle became proportionately larger than the other 
two circles. Contracts took on greater formality, and the surrounding legal concepts 
elaborated. The result is that contracts became longer, and with denser, legal language; and 
when that happened the document became less accessible to the parties who were engaged in 
the economic exchange. The personal relationship may also have become harder to maintain, 
as one of the effects of a strictly legal relationship is that the parties are assumed to operate 
“at arm’s length.” 
 
Exchange 
Relationship 
Personal 
Relationship 
Legal 
Relationship 
Figure 1:  Contracting as Overlapping, 
Integrated Relationships 
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When the three relationships of contracting are well-balanced and the overlaps are 
significant, communication and trust are easier to establish. Where the relationships are 
disconnected, and especially where the legal circle looms large over the others, 
communication becomes more difficult. Contract law may be characterized as creating a 
“smart” system in which users (i.e., business people or others needing to create or implement 
contracts) have a marginal role on the outskirts of an elaborate system that is operated by 
experts (i.e. lawyers and judges) and comprised of complex internal workings that are 
inaccessible by the users.
12
 Users become dependent on experts to translate the users’ needs 
into a narrow sort of input for which the system is designed. The effect of such a system is to 
neglect or even de-value non-legal concepts or communications.  
 
The communications structure of contract law, in other words, privileges legal ideas and 
vocabulary. That helps to explain why contracts become almost unreadable to those who are 
not legally trained and therefore tend to be neglected by the business user.  More ominously 
the exclusive, specialist qualities of legal discourse tend to discourage general non-legal 
communications about matters that are specified in the contract. Indeed, contracts frequently 
contain a “merger” or “entire agreement” clause that formally disqualifies any significance 
for conversations that take place prior to the signing of the agreement, like the following:  
                                                 
12
 Lessig, Lawrence (2001) The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World.  
New York:  Random House (pp. 26–34). 
Economic 
Relationship 
Personal 
Relationship 
Legal 
Relationship 
Figure 2:  Contracting as Disconnected, 
Legally Dominated Relationships 
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This instrument contains the only agreement of the parties relating to the subject matter and 
correctly sets forth the rights, duties, and obligations of each to the other in connection with 
it as of this date. Any prior agreements, promises, negotiations or representations not 
expressly set forth in this Agreement are of no force or effect. 
 
“Collaboration” is therefore a conscious effort to introduce stronger communications into 
contracting. The formality of this effort and some of the structures that it recommends are 
reactions against the current influences that tend to discourage or narrowly channel 
conversations about contracting.  
 
Bringing the three relationships of contracting closer together, and with better balance, is not 
easy for either lawyers or business managers. For lawyers, collaboration requires first that 
they de-emphasize legal rules to some extent, in favor of harnessing the power of economic 
and personal relationships. Healthy economic and personal relationships need not rely solely 
on legal rights. Where lawyers work toward making the economic and personal relationships 
stronger, therefore, the burden of dealing with risks does not fall exclusively on airtight legal 
language in the contract.  
 
Lawyers should therefore embrace the value of non-legal communication. That in turn 
requires that the lawyers learn much more about the economic exchanges that are the subject 
of the contracts. They should treat their clients more like partners who are capable of 
contributing significantly to the success of the lawyer’s efforts. It also means that lawyers 
should make far greater effort to make their contracts readable by non-lawyers, a topic 
addressed further in the “Visualization” section below.  
 
For managers, collaboration requires first that they not abdicate too much responsibility for 
formal contract processes to their lawyers. As suggested above, the relationship should be 
one of a partnership, and not one in which the manager looks after all “business” aspects of 
the contract while the lawyer is in charge of the “legal” aspects. Those categories are not 
pristine.  More importantly, conceiving the categories as strongly distinct is one reason that 
the economic exchange and legal circles have drifted apart. Lawyers and managers should 
understand each other’s worlds as fully as possible.  
 
Managers should also understand the worlds of their employees and any subcontractors. 
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Managers should flatten hierarchies that, for example, prevent production or sales personnel 
from making suggestions about the terms of prospective contracts or the implementation of 
existing contracts.  
 
Finally, managers should invest time in talking with contractual counterparts about contract 
goals, risks, and implementation. In many cases managers should not be reluctant to share 
information about the economic or strategic interests that prompt willingness to enter into a 
contract. The underlying interests of a company do not give away negotiation strategies—it 
does not mean that a manager invites exploitation. Instead, managers should explain the 
broader interests of their company as a prelude to negotiating the contract.  
 
Informing the other side about the basic goals for the exchange, rather than insisting solely on 
particular clauses, introduces a positive flexibility: by knowing the underlying interests the 
other side may be able to devise ways to satisfy those interests in novel, more efficient ways. 
If so, both parties have benefitted. Even without such breakthroughs, educating the other side 
of a negotiation about one’s underlying interests will help maintain cordial personal 
relationships in the event that the negotiations break down. Both parties will better 
understand the basic constraints or intensity of certain needs, thus preventing anger and 
resentment if a deal cannot be struck.    
 
A contract designed to prompt the positive flexibility of collaboration would consciously 
follow certain principles or values. Forrest S. Mosten, an expert advisor about collaboration 
in the context of divorce, lists some of those attributes:  
 
 Respect and dignity for the other party and other professionals 
 
 Direct and open communication with the other party and professionals 
 
 Voluntary and full disclosure of relevant information and documents 
necessary to make agreements 
 
 Use of interest-based negotiation to try to meet the needs of both parties.13 
 
                                                 
13
 Mosten, Forrest S. (2009) Collaborative Divorce Handbook: Helping Families Without Going to 
Court. San Franscisco: Jossey-Bass (p. 21). 
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What sorts of clauses might appear in a collaborative contract? In a preamble, collaborators 
might pledge any of the following:
14
  
 
 to improve the quality of information they share, focusing from the beginning 
on their underlying interests and the risks they perceive;  
 
 to work toward clauses that share risks in a balanced way, striving for 
maximal realization of both parties’ interests;15 
 
 to communicate in regularly scheduled meetings about the progress and 
quality of performances; 
 
 when needed, to cooperate and perhaps even provide affirmative assistance 
toward another party’s performance of its contractual duties; 
  
 to work toward understanding and accommodating the needs of one another in 
response to changes, and to be open to modifying terms where conditions 
suggest the need for adjustment; and 
   
 in the event of a dispute, to negotiate in good faith and to seek mediation and 
other alternative dispute resolution methods where initial efforts at negotiation 
fail.
16
  
 
This list prompts at least three caveats.
17
 First, consultation entails time and expense, and 
some items on the list may not be deemed efficient for some contracts.
18
 That said, every 
contract builds a personal relationship, for better or worse. Sometimes what may appear to be 
unnecessary conversations, given the small dollar value of a particular contract, will be a 
worthwhile investment that leads to more significant future ties. 
                                                 
14
 This list first appeared in Barton, Thomas D. (2012) “Collaborative Contracting as 
Proactive/Preventive Law”, in Berger-Walliser, Gerlinde and Ostergaard, Kim (eds.) (2012) Proactive 
Law in a Business Environment. Copenhagen: Djof  (p. 125–126) 
15
 If one party consistently forces the other to accept unbalanced risks, the subordinated party may 
eventually be forced into breach–at which point both parties very likely lose value. Accepting a 
balanced sharing of the risks throughout the contract, even where opportunistic rent-seeking is 
possible, may well produce the best results over the life of a contract (or relationship).  Crawford, 
Jacqui and Cummins, Tim (2010) Collaborative Contracting:  Is It Achievable?, Webinar conducted 
under the auspices of the International Association of Contract and Commercial Management 
(IACCM), https://www.iaccm.com/resources/?id=3446&cb=1408349619 / 
https://www.iaccm.com/resources/download.php?f=Ask_The_Expert_Recording-
Jacqui_Crawford-April10.mp3  
16
 Macaulay, supra note 5, at pp. 784–788 
17
 See Barton, supra note 14, at pp. 126–127. 
18
 Id. 
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Second, some of the provisions suggested above may not be legally enforceable.
19
 This does 
not necessarily undermine their value, however, toward prompting useful conversations. 
Although initial legal entitlements should be as clear as possible, using non-legal language to 
expand beyond legal certitude can be a step toward positive flexibility. Finally, could 
collaborative language give room for exploitative behavior? 
20
 Are such provisions naïve? 
Recall that most managers say they want relationships that are more trusting and personal.
21
 
We should take them at their word. 
 
 
4. Visualization 
 
In contexts from cell phones to automobiles, from field guides to instruction manuals, 
“usability and user-experience are considered important dimensions of quality. Not so in 
contract drafting.” 22 As noted above, contracts evolved to carry a strong focus on “legal 
quality” and enforceability. Yet “[w]hile clients want their agreements to be enforceable, they 
also want contracts that enable them to achieve their business goals.”23  Business decision 
makers have long complained about contracts being overly legalistic and difficult to work 
with. There is often a wide gap between deal-making and deal-drafting; managers drive the 
former, while lawyers drive the latter. Lawyers’ drafting easily alienates clients, including the 
executives and domain experts whose contributions would be crucial to the success of those 
contracts. But if clients disengage too much from the process, there is a danger that, echoing 
the title of a book chapter by Professor Deepak Malhotra, a great deal ends up with a terrible 
contract: “Great Deal, Terrible Contract”.24  
 
As noted in the “Collaboration” section above, it is crucial that the people who participate in 
contracting communicate well with one another, at each stage of the contracting process.  In 
                                                 
19
 Id. 
20
 Id. 
21
 Macaulay, supra note 5, at pp. 790–795. 
22
 Haapio, Helena (2013) “Designing Readable Contracts:  Goodbye to Legal Writing—Welcome to 
Information Design and Visualization,” in IRIS 2013 Proceeding, IRIS 2013 at p. 447. 
23
 Id. 
24 Malhotra, Deepak. (2012) “Great Deal, Terrible Contract: The Case for Negotiator Involvement in 
the Contracting Phase” in  Goldman, Barry M. & Shapiro, Debra. L. (eds.) (2012) The Psychology of 
Negotiations in the 21st Century Workplace. New Challenges and New Solutions New York: 
Routledge (pp. 363–398).  For a more general discussion of the topic, see Haapio, supra note 22 and 
Haapio, Helena (2013) Next Generation Contracts. A Paradigm Shift. Helsinki: Lexpert. 
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complex contracts covering complex projects, for example in information and 
communication technology (ICT), equipment supply, or construction, a number of business 
managers and domain experts participate in writing and reading contracts in addition to legal 
professionals. At the writing stage, these often include technical experts who contribute to 
scope, specifications, requirements documents, testing and approval processes, as well as 
output and performance definitions. Beyond legal and technical terms, contracts often contain 
sophisticated financial terms and project-related timelines and procedures: hence finance and 
HR departments might also be involved. The backbone of a contract is hardly ever made from 
scratch but compiled using forms, templates, or clause libraries. While these are typically 
designed by lawyers, deal-specific information is required from other professionals, mostly 
business managers and engineers.
 25
 During negotiations, meetings are arranged and changes 
made to the contract, again activating lawyers, business managers, technical experts, and 
engineers on both sides. Once made and signed, contracts need to be implemented, and 
project managers and operational teams take over. The contents of the contract need to be 
translated into action. In order for businesses to reach their goals, contract-related 
communication must be effective.
26
 
 
This chapter makes the point that visualization can promote both clarity and understanding 
among those who are affected by a contract and advance positive flexibility. What do we 
mean by visualization and how exactly can it be used in the context of contracting processes 
and documents? What can visualization do that traditional contract (or legal) writing cannot?  
 
Visualization – adding icons, tables, charts and images to supplement text – is a core part of 
information design. Information design applies graphic design principles to information in 
order to communicate the information more effectively. It is the process of identifying, 
selecting, organizing, composing, and presenting information to an audience so that it can be 
used efficiently and effectively by that audience to achieve a specific purpose.
27
  
                                                 
25
 Argyres, Nicholas and Mayer, Kyle J. (2007) “Contract Design as a Firm Capability: An Integration 
of Learning and Transaction Cost Perspectives”, 32 Academy of Management Review, at pp. 1060–
1077. 
26
 Passera, Stefania and Haapio, Helena (2013) “Transforming Contracts from Legal Rules to User-
centered Communication Tools: a Human-Information Interaction Challenge.” Communication 
Design Quarterly Review, , Vol. I, Issue III, pp. 38–45, available at http://sigdoc.acm.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/CDQ-April-1-3-FINAL.pdf. 
27
 Hayhoe, George F. (2012) “Telling the Future of Information Design”, 1 Communication Design 
Quarterly Review 23. http://sigdoc.acm.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/CDQR_1-1_Fall2012.pdf. 
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The ultimate goal of information design and visualization is clear communication and 
enabling users to interact with the information. The selection of methods used is based on 
what is best suited to express the particular information at hand, to the particular user group, 
in a particular context. For easier reading, more prominence needs to be given to what is 
more relevant to the user.
28
 Text alone can seldom provide prominence or salience to a piece 
of information. Visualizations can be used to do this, to make sure that the most important 
points are not lost.  
 
Visualization puts the user—in our case the business people and the client —in the center. 
For clients, the core of contract design should be securing the performance the parties expect, 
not just a contract. It is not enough to know how to write well; one should also learn to 
engage others in the process, elicit information, and communicate the core message 
effectively to the different readers. If we take the goal of contracts as communication tools 
seriously, the contract drafter’s job changes from merely drafting a clear, enforceable contract 
(along with appendices) to designing communication with multiple user groups and varying 
information needs.
29
  
 
In just one example of how complex information can be far more effectively communicated, 
consider Figure 3 below.  It sets out graphically the gradual transfer of ownership—together 
with particular business and legal risks, rights, and duties—over a 15 year contractual 
relationship between a supplier and purchaser of equipment.
30
  “The delivery process of 
complex industrial machinery is lengthy, and different responsibilities change hands from 
supplier to purchaser in different moments in time.  A multiple timeline can help summarize 
this, providing a clear summary to the key persons involved. A higher level of awareness, in 
return, not only prevents misunderstandings, but also provides better insights for effective 
risk and change management.”31 
 
                                                 
28
 Albers, Michael J. (2007) “Information Salience and Interpreting Information” in SIGDOC '07 
Proceedings of the 25th annual ACM International Conference on Design of Communication, 22–24 
October, El Paso, Texas. New York:  ACM, pp. 80–86.  
29
 See Haapio, Helena (2013) Next Generation Contracts. A Paradigm Shift, supra note 22, pp. 63–68. 
30
  This chart first appeared in Haapio, Helena, Passera, Stefania, and Barton, Thomas D. (2013) 
“Innovating Contract Practices:  Merging Contract Design with Information Design”, in Proceedings 
of the 2013 IACCM Academic Forum on Integrating Law and Contract Management:  Proactive, 
Preventive and Strategic Approaches, Ridgefield, CT:  IACCM at p. 43. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
By analyzing and advocating the conscious introduction of flexibility into contracting, this 
article challenges some deeply-rooted assumptions about how we think and act in the law and 
business.  Industrial-era production methods and institutions imagine stability and progress to 
be achieved by constructing machines that operate predictably and consistently.  A world of 
perfect design is one that needs no tinkering or repair:  a need is perceived; a method is 
imagined for satisfying that need; power is harnessed that is sufficient to sweep aside 
obstacles to that method; and the machine is set in motion to replicate standardized outcomes.  
Ideally, no further human input is required; tinkering evidences flaws in design or the 
breakdown in operation. 
 
And so it is imagined to be with traditional contract processes and documents: Identify a 
need; imagine transactions to satisfy the need; create a contract that, aided by the power of 
the law, will replicate and secure those transactions with machine-like performance.  No need 
to consult the contract after its expert creation: doing so is evidence of breakdown.  To solicit 
broad participation and communication in the formation or implementation of a contract is to 
Figure 3. Multiple timelines showing the transfer of ownership and the allocation 
of risk, costs and responsibilities between parties (© 2012. Aalto University. 
Image by Stefania Passera. Used with permission.) 
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insert amateurism, confusion, and uncertainty.  That is the real world, says Chris. 
 
But flexibility, in contracting as well as in decision-making, marketing, product design, 
planning, and probably every other aspect of business, is increasingly seen as a virtue rather 
than a weakness.  Contracts backed by the power of the state were imagined to be capable of 
constructing an impervious future.  But in a world of constantly accelerating change and 
crumbling borders, the law may no longer have the power to decree the future.  Progressive 
businesses may not want that anyway.  They understand that the future is neither pre-destined 
nor inexorable.
32
  It is folly to believe we can fully predict it, and dangerous to attempt to 
fully construct it.  Uncertainty is best managed through constant feedback and small 
adjustments.
33
  That is best achieved from setting up processes that connect, not separate.  
Innovation comes from imagining and embracing alternative futures, not from suppressing 
them.  Imagination is advanced by sharing ideas and interests, not by efforts toward secrecy 
or obfuscation.  Visualization carries values about effective communication, which is the 
foundation of collaborative relationships, which in turn enable innovation, efficiency, and 
trust.  As noted among Silicon Valley lawyers and their clients, the most technologically 
innovative industries demonstrate the most collaborative and flexible attitude to contracting.  
Kim seems to have the backing of recent history, and hopefully of the future.  
  
Finally, though, it bears repeating that the perspective of Chris, relying on the law to provide 
stable expectations, is not only legitimate but in some ways vital.  The legal theorist Niklas 
Luhmann understood law as a social process toward stabilizing normative expectations,
34
 
which in turn enables just those small adjustments that help cope with change.  Clearly stated 
legal rights in a contract provide a helpful foundation of party expectations.  Those 
expectations become more secure and more accurate when the parties talk forthrightly and 
cooperatively. 
 
 
 
                                                 
32
  Popper, Karl (2013, first published in 1957) The Poverty of Historicism. London, NY: Routledge.  
33
  Id., at section 20–21 (at pp. 58–70).  
34
  Luhmann, Niklas (1985) A Sociological Theory of Law, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, at pp. 
40–73; see also Barton, Thomas D. (1986) “Expectations, Institutions, and Meanings:  A Review of 
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Flexible Contracting in Software Project Business: 
What We Can Learn from Agile Methods in the Software Industry 
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A contract between project parties defines agreements and actions for coordination, safeguarding, and 
adaptation during a project lifecycle.
4
 Traditionally, literature has viewed contracts in a very legal 
oriented manner, where documents are designed by lawyers to protect different parties against risks 
and to get commitments from others; commitments that the law will enforce at the court in the worst 
case scenario.
5
 This view is challenged by the agile approach in the software industry. Agile methods 
started to evolve in the early 1980s and the main principles were introduced in the Agile Manifesto in 
2001.
6
 After a decade these practices are commonly used in software development to increase 
flexibility and minimize negative impacts of changes in software projects. In project business, which 
is characterized by fierce competition, increasingly complex project networks, and unstable project 
environments, there is an increasing demand for proactive coordination and flexible adaptation for 
changes.
7
 In this research, we investigated agile methods in the software industry and gained 
understanding on how the agile approach is used to maximize co-created value in the project and to 
increase flexibility in project contracting. Flexible contracting may work as an innovative tool for 
collaboration among project parties, potentially enabling dynamic project management and 
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contingency planning in various types of projects. This research presents our empirical findings from 
the software industry and facilitates discussion on how flexible contracting could be applied in project 
business beyond software development. 
 
1. Introduction 
   
The traditional view on contracts in project management research is that a contract defines 
agreements and actions for coordination, safeguarding, and adaptation during a project 
lifecycle.
8
 In addition, legal scholars view contracts in a very legal oriented manner, where 
documents are designed by lawyers to protect different parties against risks and to get 
commitments from others; commitments that the law will enforce in court in the worst case 
scenario.
9
 Because of these safeguarding oriented views on contracting, there is fundamental 
rigidity built into both project contracting processes and project contracts. Contracting parties 
must expend significant effort and resources to specifically define project artifacts and 
deliverables before signing the contract. There are also formal change management 
procedures involved in project management in order to adapt to required changes during the 
project implementation phase. 
 
This type of formal, legal-centric contracting process and clunky, bureaucratic approach to 
project change management might work well with less complex projects, where the targeted 
result can be clearly and precisely defined, but many projects require a more flexible 
approach to be able to maximize co-creational value. For example, agile software 
development projects, where the aspired end-result cannot be precisely defined beforehand, 
tend to require increased flexibility to be able to maximise the created value. Our earlier 
research discovered that the demand for proactive coordination and flexible adaptation to 
changes by project parties is increasing, particularly in the context of project business 
characterized by complexity and uncertainty.
10
 This is the case in agile software projects, 
which focus on cooperation with a customer, continuous re-defining of requirements, 
accepting the fact of constant changes in the project. Agile projects need flexibility to manage 
uncertainty, especially in the early phases of the project lifecycle when there is not enough 
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information regarding the detailed specifications of the project scope and implementation of 
project work. In our earlier research we suggested that in software business there are two 
fundamentally different approaches to implementing flexibility in the contracting process and 
in the project contract: (a) postponing the decisions until there is adequate information for 
decision making; or (b) making decisions that allow flexible adaptation to changes during the 
project lifecycle.
11
 
 
In this research we collected data from several industry professionals having extensive 
experience in agile software projects in order to study contracting practices and change 
management in those projects. We wanted to deepen our understanding on (RQ1) what are 
the salient characteristics of a project contracting process and project contracts when applying 
agile development methods. Furthermore, we wanted to empirically find out (RQ2) how agile 
software projects implement flexible approaches into project contracting and project 
contracts. 
 
 
2. Agile Software Projects 
 
The software development processes have evolved radically from traditional waterfall and 
spiral models which were suitable for traditional project management approaches, to today’s 
agile and flexible development methods.
12
 
 
The waterfall model was the first systematic and sequential approach to software 
development (Figure 1). It defined different project tasks in separate, isolated stages. It was a 
systematic approach to software development but at the same time it was rigid as it prevented 
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simultaneous activities and a previous stage was always to be completed first before a 
following one was possible to get started. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A waterfall model. 
 
The waterfall model was often ineffective and inflexible. The product requirements were 
assumed to be known in the beginning of a project, there was a lot of documentation involved 
and the change management was bureaucratic and slow.
13
 The model also had practical 
project management problems. For example, the product testing was done in the test phase as 
a whole. All the errors found in testing were then fixed after the test phase was over. Source 
code changes during the error fixing then possibly introduced new errors in software which 
were only found in the next round of testing and this could lead to a cycle of many loops 
between the code phase and the test phase thus increasing costs and delaying the project.
14
 
Because of these challenges with the waterfall model, a spiral model was developed.
15
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The spiral model started to change software development into an iterative and more 
responsive direction. It divided a software project into smaller cycles, each cycle basically 
having all the phases introduced in the waterfall model. Initial assumptions and software 
architectural choices could be revisited after completing each cycle. The spiral model made 
software development more responsive to changes and it also involved customer more often 
enabling better interaction with the customer. 
 
The evolution towards agile methods started in the early 1980s. As an example, one of the 
most popular agile methods, Scrum, was introduced in the late 1980s.
16
 By 2001 several agile 
methods were used in the industry, and practitioners working with these methods agreed and 
signed the Manifesto for Agile Software Development.
17
 It listed the main principles of agile 
methods in four value statements: 
 
 individuals and interactions should prevail over processes and tools, 
 working software prevails over comprehensive documentation, 
 customer collaboration over contract negotiation, and 
 responding to change over following a plan. 
 
These statements demonstrated the fundamental change in the mindsets within software 
engineering. They introduced, facilitated and promoted more open, dynamic and flexible 
approaches for software project management and cooperation with customers.
18
 The agile 
development model is presented in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. An agile development model. 
 
A product backlog is a list of feature requirements which is regularly updated with the 
customer. It also contains information on priorities and work effort estimates of those 
requirements. A sprint is a period of implementation which usually lasts a couple of weeks. 
After each sprint, some product features are implemented completely and they can be 
integrated in the product increment. Finally, after several iterations of sprints, the final 
product release will be completed. 
 
The agile development model, which emphasizes customer collaboration over contract 
negotiation, challenges not only the traditional project management but also the traditional 
contracting process which must evolve to increase the flexibility of contracting to match  the 
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agile principles.
19
 The ideas of flexibility have also emerged in contract law from the 1980’s 
onwards. Contracts have been explained as developing gradually
20
 and contracting parties 
have started to be required to act in good faith and take the other party’s interests into 
consideration, at least to some extent (cf. Sund et al. in this volume). However, the change of 
paradigm has not been easy: research has documented many challenges in executing agile 
software projects successfully.
21
 In addition to increased cooperation with customers, agile 
practices have been stated to encourage change rather than discourage it, by having focus on 
responding to change rather than on following a plan.
22
 A valid question from the project 
business perspective is whether the understanding of the current contracting processes and 
project contracts is flexible enough to support the dynamic co-operation during the project 
execution.
23
 Change mechanisms are seen as important contract terms, and yet they are most 
often absent from contract documents.
24
 Empirical studies show a tendency to write hard and 
inflexible contract documents and bend the formal rules with oral changes.
25
 
 
 
3. Contracting in Project Business 
 
The nature of procurement within project business differs from the nature of industrial 
purchasing management—transactions which are more compatible with the traditional 
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contract law approach. It is important to understand the differences in the depth of the 
business relationships of these two procurement approaches. Industrial purchasing 
transactions can be considered as routine transactions compared to transactions and contracts 
in a more complex project business environment.
26
 Breaches of contract, which contract law 
deals with, can similarly be more easily defined in connection with transactions. In project 
business it is crucial to have a climate of trust in a mutually motivating, cooperative 
relationship between the contracting parties. A trusting, collaborative relationship is required: 
 
 to get all project participants to work towards project objectives27 and to reach those 
objectives successfully;
28
 
 to overcome possible misunderstandings and disagreements during the project and to 
be able to resolve disputes without litigation;
29
 and 
 to develop cooperative norms over the course of an extended exchange relationship,30 
to identify additional value creation and business opportunities during the project
31
 
and to identify and maintain future business prospects.
32
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Some of these features of successful business relationship were already recognized in the 
1960s by Macaulay,
33
 who emphasized relational aspects of running business. Macaulay 
talked about deals that run in parallel or sometimes in contrary with the traditional written 
contracts. Deals
34
 are commitments taken seriously in almost all situations by business 
people. Even if deals were not legally binding, they are often so respected that contract and 
contract law are almost unnecessary because of the many effective non-legal sanctions. Two 
norms are widely accepted by business people: (a) Commitments are to be honored, one does 
not welsh on a deal; and (b) one ought to produce a good product and stand behind it. These 
norms influence the behavior of contracting parties because both parties would like to operate 
successfully in the future and because they are concerned about their general business 
reputation in the market.
35
 
 
While considering contracts from a project business perspective, which include contractual 
relations much more extensively than discrete transactions for the exchange of goods, it is 
important to note that business relations and agreements exist everywhere in various forms 
and shapes. According to Macneil
36
 all contracts have relational elements, which, however, 
vary depending on the type and function of the contract. As Macneil
37
 mentioned when he 
studied economic relations under classical, neoclassical and relational contract law: “Were we 
to push far in the direction of contractual relations, we would come to the firm itself, since a 
firm is, in significant ways, nothing more than a very complex bundle of contractual 
relations”.  
 
Contrary to the need for trustful relations and flexibility in project business, mainstream legal 
studies have focused on anticipating all contingencies and including them in contracts. 
Contracts have been treated as complete agreements which should include all the potential 
solutions for contingencies that a reasonable person should have foreseen. Because of this, 
there is an emerging need to develop good, well-functioning and profitable contracts 
contributing to business cooperation instead of only safeguarding. Some legal scholars have 
started to move beyond the legal centralist approach and view contracts as not only 
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documents written for potential disputes in court but more as a tool for business 
cooperation.
38
 This proactive law movement attempts to find and develop multidisciplinary 
approaches for research on business contracting.
39
 Typically, proactive law not only 
empirically studies how things are but also aims to contribute to better contracting in 
business.
40
 Proactive law approaches contracts from a wider perspective, recognizing that 
contracts must be aligned with the subsequent business model and that the processes of the 
contracting parties have to be coordinated.
41
 The contract document is seen as a tool for 
cooperation, where every person or team implementing it can find guidelines and 
instructions. The tool can also be adjusted to first account for contingencies and then to signal 
the changes to those who implement it. The proactive contracting approach is well aligned 
with the recent discussion in the project management literature about the role of contracts in 
supporting the business of a project-based firm. 
 
 
3.1 Contracting Process and Contract Elements 
 
The project marketing literature describes the following steps in the project lifecycle: search, 
preparation, bidding, negotiation, implementation and transition.
42
 In the beginning there is a 
business prospect on a seller side and a search for getting a problem solved on a buyer side. 
In the first contact of the project, contracting parties can see an option to create value 
together. First commitments are made during the first contact. The seller might commit to 
send more information about the products, references, and technical specifications. The buyer 
might commit to send more details on future plans and information on requirements of a 
project in question. Specification and marketing material related to the offer create 
expectations for the customer about the functionality of products and services provided by the 
supplier. From a business perspective, this can be considered as a commitment to include 
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such functionality and features in the project. Psychologically, initial commitments are 
already made at this point. From a business perspective, it may be difficult to withdraw from 
the contracting process after psychological commitments have been created; this is especially 
true for the supplier.
43
 When a more detailed discussion is started, companies enter into the 
bidding and a negotiation phase.
44
 
 
As negotiations go further, psychologically binding commitments by individuals and 
organizations are getting stronger. In the bidding phase, the customer usually conducts 
tendering among several suppliers and receives formal offers from suppliers. The customer 
continues with a shortlist of suppliers and continues negotiating with them until the customer 
makes a decision and selects one supplier. However, customers often ask for binding 
proposals in the tender phase, which means that the customer can accept them without 
modifications, and these can be considered as binding contracts.
45
 During the negotiations the 
business case and value creation models are getting clearer, legally binding agreements are 
completed, and finally a contract is signed. During the implementation phase, modifications 
to the project contract are made and agreed between the parties. In the transition phase, the 
project is accepted, the guarantee period starts and responsibility for the delivered system is 
transferred to the customer. Even in contract law, the legally binding effect of a contract can 
nowadays be seen as developing gradually during the negotiation process.
46
 This idea 
contradicts with the earlier need to find a clear starting point for contractual liability, such as 
the signing of the final document. These new approaches in legal studies, however, tend to 
blur the decision-making of judges in courts.
47
 
 
As discussed earlier, agile methods have changed the linear view of the contracting process in 
the software industry. For example, a requirement specification is not usually completed 
before the project starts and it is changed many times during the project. Also, agile methods 
promote “continual refinement of the product and project practices” and this means that 
project parties continuously seek for better project practices which might mean changes to the 
originally agreed conventions. Thus the agile approach means that the contracting process 
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includes refinement and re-evaluation, and contracts can also be renegotiated during the 
implementation phase. This continuous and dynamic renegotiation in the contracting process 
is illustrated in Figure 3.
48
 The default rules of contract law do not grasp the idea of 
continuous renegotiation. Although decision-making in courts can involve requirements for 
loyalty between contracting parties, changes are better made within the private autonomy of 
the contracting parties. Constant changes require trust between cooperative parties. Disputes 
are better solved and settled without courts or any law-driven tri-partial dispute settlement 
method. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Contracting process in project business and the idea of 
renegotiation practices required by agile development methods. 
 
 
4. Methodology 
 
Our empirical study is based on 5 semi-structured interviews with experienced professionals 
who have been involved in utilizing agile methods in software development for several years 
and who have been working with software development projects up to two decades. The 
informants are all from Finland, but their experience is from several companies in 
international software business and they are experienced in working with international 
software development projects. The information about the informants is presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1. List of informants. 
Informant occupation Experience 
(years) 
Interview 
duration 
No. of 
interviewers 
CEO of SW company + 20 105 minutes 2 researchers 
Chief SW Architect + 15 95 minutes 1 researcher 
Technical Lead of SW + 10 29 minutes 1 researcher 
SW Sales Manager + 15 57 minutes 2 researchers 
Managing Director of SW company + 10 104 minutes 2 researchers 
 
The semi-structured interviews were used to gain insights into informants’ experience on 
agile methods and their thoughts regarding impact of agile methods on flexibility in software 
projects. Four interviews were recorded and transcribed for analysis, one was transcribed 
during the interview and the transcription was reviewed with the informant immediately after 
the interview. The transcriptions were then taken into computer assisted qualitative data 
analysis software which was used to code the research data to identify emerging patterns of 
key concepts and issues and facilitate the data analysis. 
 
 
5. Empirical Findings on Agile Software Projects 
 
5.1. RQ1: Salient characteristics of a project contracting process and project contracts when 
applying agile development methods 
 
Based on the research data, a signed contract in agile software projects is usually a 
framework agreement or a framework contract between the project parties on project 
practicalities and governance, main responsibilities and price (per hour). It defines a mutually 
agreeable goal for the project and might include a high-level definition of the product to be 
created in the project.  However, in many cases, the negotiations concerning the detailed 
scope of the product, project deliveries and services continue afterwards. Project parties work 
together on defining the requirements and features of the SW product and services and the 
contract can also be completed with supplements. This kind of contractual behaviour utilizing 
a frame agreement and supplements was demonstrated well in the interview with the CEO 
SW Company: 
 
“In this case with our customer, it was a frame agreement which was signed. In the frame 
agreement we don’t yet agree on what is going to be done, who is going to do it or when. In 
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the frame agreement we agree on confidentiality issues, possible recruiting issues, IPR 
issues, how payments are done and this kind of [issue]. Then we separately have an order for 
work specifically.” 
 
“In the frame agreement it is also agreed how to proceed in a case of dispute. In this case it 
was agreed that arbitration will be held in Helsinki.” 
 
“There were also some sanctions for us specified in the frame contract in case of our failure 
to meet the contract obligations.” 
 
“In some frame contracts we have a clause which says that as a vendor we must guarantee 
the availability of agreed resources, this is quite normal in software project contracts.” 
 
“In the contract there is always a list of responsibilities the customer must commit to. 
Participation in weekly meetings is listed there too.” 
 
The agile methods promote continuous collaboration between the project parties and this 
requires frequent interaction to make decisions at the most optimal moment. Based on the 
research data, project parties continue to work together towards product specification after 
signing a framework contract. So they basically define the detailed scope of the project and 
product requirements after the project implementation phase is started. The agile methods 
enable project parties to continuously redefine project deliveries and services and to agree on 
required changes to maximize the value created in the project. This flexible approach to 
changes was clearly highlighted in the interviews: 
 
 “In agile (model), the changes and new requirements are mentally accepted; the 
organization has the culture of accepting changes and new requirements. This mindset 
makes the organization flexible and fast to react to changes.” – Chief SW Architect 
 
“The agile methods have had a big impact in SW sales processes and SW development. 
Nowadays the intention is to get the development started as soon as possible. Earlier there 
was a target to create very detailed specifications before the project start[s] but now with 
agile methods it is important to get the real product development (programming) ongoing 
faster.” – SW Sales Manager 
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“The project was going very well and it was agile. There was a rough specification of 
application and we defined the details every week as it is done in agile development process. 
The customer understood that for this kind of a project the traditional waterfall model does 
not work. So, it was going very well...” – Technical Lead of SW 
 
“In my opinion, the customer is the owner of the product. During the weekly meetings we 
learn more about the customer’s ideas and wishes for the product. Many times [the] 
customer is saying that we would like to have this kind of a feature done like this. But then 
when you ask more about an original problem this feature would solve, you realize that it 
can be implemented in an easier way with less development time. Usually when you discuss 
with the customer about it they are fine with a suggested development idea so it is very 
interactive discussion with the customer in those planning meetings…” – CEO of SW 
Company 
 
Traditional project management literature suggests that there are several types of 
uncertainties and changes in project requirements or project environment which create the 
most severe source of risk in reaching the project goals.
49
 Uncertainty may arise from 
multiple sources, such as the basis of estimates, design and logistics, objectives and priorities, 
and uncertainty about fundamental relationships between the project parties.
50
 While 
approaches based on the traditional project planning can address a part of the uncertainty, 
traditional project management techniques cannot address every aspect of it.
51
 In practice 
there are always issues that cannot be foreseen, or issues that remain unknown until there is 
enough information cumulatively collected during the project. This is especially the case with 
new software development, in which the related project is unique in a much wider sense than 
is typical in more traditional industries. The agile methods have recognized this fact and the 
agile approach agrees that there certainly are major important issues in software projects that 
are beneficial to solve later during the project. Hence, flexibility in the contracting process is 
also required to overcome the challenges caused by uncertainty in the project. Based on the 
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research data, it is obvious that agile development methods set evolving requirements for the 
project contracting process and project contracts: 
 
 In agile software development projects, the project contract continues to evolve after 
signing the project contract (which usually seems to be a frame agreement or a frame 
contract). Traditionally signing the contract has been seen as an end of the negotiation 
phase and as a start of the implementation phase. In agile projects, however, the 
contract is complemented by contract supplements, and product scope and 
requirement related issues are continuously renegotiated in the meetings between the 
project participants after each pre-set period of implementation (called sprint). 
 To be able to respond to demands for increased flexibility in agile software 
development projects, the project contracting process needs to reach actively over the 
negotiation phase and project signing to cover the project implementation phase with 
actions needed. Traditionally, a simplified project contracting process included two 
sets of actions: (a) prepare and commit before signing the contract; and (b) execute 
and exit after signing the contract.
52
 In agile projects, negotiations continue during the 
implementation phase of the project and this requires continued attention and actions 
in the project contracting process. 
 
Evolving requirements for the project contracting process and project contracts can be 
demonstrated by combining the agile development model (Figure 2) and the model of the 
project contracting process (Figure 3). Based on the research data, the illustration of the 
dynamics between the development model and the project contracting process is presented in 
Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. The dynamics between the agile development model and the 
project contracting process. The illustration recognizes the renegotiation 
practices and flexibility required by agile development methods. 
 
The implementation phase starts based on the knowledge and mutual understanding 
developed during the negotiation phase. Implementation is done in sprints, which usually last 
a couple of weeks each. After each sprint, project parties review the result of previous sprint 
and agree on new requirements and changes to the existing ones. They also agree on the goals 
of the next sprint and on the detailed requirements to be implemented. After each sprint, the 
completed features and software components are released. In project management terms, they 
are delivered and the parties move into the transition phase. Figure 4 presents the iterative 
characteristics of agile methods and highlights flexibility and change adaptiveness included. 
 
In addition to the previously presented impact on project contracts and contracting processes, 
agile methods also challenge contracting parties to truly collaborate. Only by continuously 
working together can they run a complicated project, maximize the co-creational value in the 
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project, and develop a high-quality software product. This challenge for a mental change was 
also demonstrated in the interviews: 
 
“As a buyer, if you know your requirements exactly, then the agile model is not needed. 
This rarely is the case, so then the agile model is a good solution for purchasing SW. In the 
agile model it is important for the customer and the vendor to discuss continuously because 
then the customer can influence the priority order of requirements and understand the 
development cost of each requirement.” – Chief SW Architect 
 
“Some organizations see agile methods only as a tool in the software development process 
and they can’t utilize [the] agile approach successfully. Agile methods are more like a 
mindset, the whole philosophy of value creation must change when you start to use agile 
methods. To be able to utilize the full potential of agile methods for increasing flexibility 
and enhance value creation, you need to understand the agile mindset. The customer is in the 
core of value creation; in the process of value creation, project parties create value together 
iteratively in minor pieces inside a major project. For some larger organizations this type of 
an ideology is strange, they just don’t understand it.” – Managing Director of SW Company 
 
It is evident, based on our research, that utilizing agile methods to increase flexibility in 
project business requires changes also in project contracting and the project management 
approach. And this requires efforts and contribution from all project parties; both the buyer 
and the vendor must be able to commit to new project governance mechanism to support the 
agile approach. It is also important for business lawyers to understand that the agile approach 
virtually lengthens the negotiation phase of the project. Project parties voluntarily leave 
negotiable items open for later phases in order to avoid bad decisions and to maximize co-
created value in the project. 
 
 
5.2. RQ2: How agile software projects implement flexible approaches into project 
contracting and project contracts 
 
The hypothesis for the second research question based on our earlier research was that in 
software business there are two fundamentally different approaches to implementing 
flexibility in the contracting process and in the project contract: (a) postponing the decisions 
until there is adequate information for decision making or (b) making decisions that allow 
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flexible adaptation to changes during the project lifecycle.
53
 We analysed the research data to 
see if there is evidence to support the hypothesis. 
 
One of the stated values of the original agile manifesto is “responding to change over 
following a plan”. It identifies a challenge of complex projects involving unique technology 
solutions. It is impossible to know all the influencing details in the beginning of the project 
and it is also very difficult to specify all the requirements and specifications for the project 
start. Because of this, agile methods take changes as natural and inevitable incidents and 
project parties prepare for this mentally and by promoting fluent change mechanisms. This 
approach was demonstrated in the interviews too: 
 
“[The] waterfall model is based on an idea that you can define all the requirements at once 
and based on those requirements you can design the whole SW architecture and the required 
work beforehand. In reality, it is extremely difficult to have such an understanding of a large 
and complex system at once. Also, customers do not know all the requirements beforehand; 
they do not have time and patience to do such a demanding planning work. Also they do not 
know all the requirements beforehand but they identify new and changed requirements 
during the SW planning when they see some plans and maybe prototypes.” – Chief SW 
Architect 
 
“There were changes all the time in the project. As almost always is the case in the real 
projects like this. The original specification is always an initial one and you work to get it 
more detailed during the project and together with the customer you specify the application 
week by week until the customer is happy with it.” – Technical Lead of SW 
 
We analysed the research data in more detail to identify concrete examples of how flexibility 
is implemented in agile projects. The findings are presented in table 2. 
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Table 2. Flexibility in agile development projects. 
Postpone decisions to reach adequate 
information 
Allow flexible adaptation to changes 
a1. Detailed list of features for each software 
release decided during the project 
implementation phase 
b1. The list of features for each software 
release can be changed based on a priority 
change, technical reasons etc. 
a2. Customer can influence on project 
personnel during the project 
b2. Customer is allowed to set new 
requirements and change the old ones in 
the meetings after each sprint 
a3. Product specification in details is done 
incrementally during the project 
implementation phase 
 
In agile SW projects, project parties agree on a goal for the project and on a high-level 
definition of the product to be created in the project. They basically agree on a mutually 
acceptable direction of the project. But they leave the detailed list of features and technical 
choices open to be decided during the implementation phase of the project (a1). In this way, 
the features and order of their implementation can be decided when there is enough 
information on the priorities and related technology (a3). This approach reduces the detailed 
planning work allocated to the features which are dropped out of the product plans later. It 
also enables collaborative learning by project parties and enables better decision making at 
the later stages.
54
 Based on our research on agile projects, the customer retains the possibility 
of influencing project resourcing (a2). The customer can make decisions or at least strongly 
influence the decision on the project personnel during the project. We consider also this to be 
one form of flexibility during the project. 
 
One of the value statements of the agile manifesto was “responding to change over following 
a plan”.55 Concrete implementation of this value was obvious in our research. Software is 
usually made available on several iterative releases. In an agile approach, the content of those 
releases can be flexibly changed, based on changes in priorities or in the technology 
environment (b1). The customer is also allowed to set new requirements during the whole 
project, and the change requests are considered to be a part of the normal routine of the 
implementation phase (b2). Based on the research data, the value principles of agile methods 
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are used in practice in SW projects. They are used to get projects started earlier, to make 
contract negotiations easier, to increase collaboration, to increase flexibility and to manage 
uncertainty. These findings support the idea that a project contract needs to provide a flexible 
governance structure that allows adaptations to the contract through mutual agreement and 
enables early identification of problem situations and dealing with such situations in a 
cooperative fashion.
56
 In agile projects, continuous communication between project parties 
facilitates cooperation and efficient change management to maximize co-creational value. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The emergence of the agile development model has radically changed internal dynamics of 
software development projects. It has also challenged the traditional view of project 
management and project contracting. In this research we wanted to discover the salient 
characteristics of the project contracting process and project contracts when applying agile 
development methods. Furthermore, we wanted to understand how agile software projects 
implement flexible approaches into project contracting and project contracts. We found some 
interesting results to our research questions, and invite additional research and discussions on 
these topics. Although the empirical data used in the research was limited, we think that the 
research provides important findings to be used as a basis for further research. 
 
Based on this research, project parties utilizing agile methods define the detailed scope of the 
project and product requirements after the project implementation phase is started. They 
continuously redefine project deliveries and services and agree on required changes to 
maximize the value created in the project. Similarly, the project contract continues to evolve 
during the implementation phase. The original signed contract is complemented by contract 
supplements, and continuously renegotiated in the meetings between the project participants. 
Traditionally, a simplified project contracting process is divided into two phases: prepare and 
commit before signing the contract; and execute and exit after signing the contract. In agile 
projects, negotiations continue during the implementation phase of the project and this 
requires continued attention and actions in the project contracting process. It is important for 
business lawyers to understand that an agile approach lengthens the negotiation phase of the 
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project. Project parties voluntarily leave negotiable items open for later phases in order to 
avoid bad decisions and to maximize co-created value in the project. This finding also opens 
an interesting research question on the role of a business lawyer in agile projects, especially 
in the implementation phase. Also, another interesting question is the roles of individuals 
participating in the suggested renegotiations during the implementation phase of agile 
projects, and the formal or informal authority of these roles in negotiations, decision making 
and in the contracting process. 
 
Many software projects produce a unique and novel solution. Thus, it is impossible to know 
all the influencing details in the beginning of the project and it is difficult to specify all the 
requirements at the beginning of a project. To cope with this fact, agile projects take changes 
as natural and inevitable, and project parties prepare for this mentally by promoting fluent 
change mechanisms. They leave the detailed list of features and technical choices open to be 
decided during the implementation phase of the project. The features and order of their 
implementation is decided when there is enough information on the priorities and related 
technology. The customer is also allowed to set new requirements during the whole project, 
and the change requests are considered to be a part of the normal routine of the 
implementation phase. This flexibility created by an agile approach, as well as the continuous 
communication between project parties, facilitates cooperation and efficient change 
management to maximize co-creational value. However, this kind of flexible contracting 
demands trust and cooperative norms between project parties. Thus, trust, communication 
and cultural issues between the project parties should be further researched in the context of 
flexible contracting and the agile project. Flexible contracting and agile project management 
is a fruitful area for multidisciplinary research, especially because the industries in project 
businesses seem to be evolving in that direction. 
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Flexibility in Contracts and Contractual Practice: 
Empirical Study in China 
 
YANAN ZHANG,1 RIITTA AHTONEN2 
 
The aim of the research is to examine how companies prepare for changes in business environment 
and networks in international business contracts; and how flexibility is introduced and adopted in the 
context of multi-cultural business. Our primary method is to interview managers, and lawyers who 
have experience in complex international business projects. The research mainly focuses on three 
different industries: construction business, information technology, and industrial equipment and 
maintenance services (e.g. automation systems). Thirteen interviews in China are conducted; then 
interview data are transcribed and analysed. Several findings emerge from analysis of the interviews. 
Firstly, most interviewees recognize the necessity of flexibility in long-term international contracts in 
order to deal with uncertainty and to solve disputes. Secondly, lawyers prefer rigid contract clauses 
and formal enforcement mechanisms and managers prefer good personal relations and informal 
enforcement mechanisms to respond to the changes of circumstances. Thirdly, the preventive and 
proactive approach, especially its role in preventing and resolving disputes between business partners, 
is widely recognized by Chinese mangers and lawyers. Empirical study on the topic in other countries 
is encouraged, so as to enable us to compare contracting practices of companies in similar industries 
in different countries. Managers and lawyers are advised to adopt a more cooperative attitude towards 
each other, and to establish more interactive and effective communication channels. Empirical study 
on this topic is rarely done. It is important both to the academic and business community to know how 
flexibility is approached and dealt with in contract and practice in China.  
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Research background 
 
With over thirty years’ economic reforms and development, especially after being a member 
of the WTO, China has undergone significant changes and started to play an important role in 
international trade. According to A.T. Kearney’s 2012 FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) 
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Confidence Index, China is ranked top as the most attractive destination for FDI in the world. 
The EU and China consider each other as an important economic partner. Business 
transactions between European countries and China are increasing.  
 
Being a big developing country, China has a different social and legal system. China 
considers itself a social system with Chinese Characteristics. Accordingly, the Chinese legal 
system is labelled as “a social system of laws with Chinese Characteristics”.3 By the end of 
2010, China has established a comprehensive modern legal system with the Constitution as 
the head and civil, commercial laws and several other branches as the mainstay. The new 
Contract law, which unified China’s previous contract laws, came into effect on 1 Oct. 1999. 
This more advanced and systematic contract law is at the core of China’s socialist market 
economy, and plays an essential role in fostering transactions.4  
 
However, the Chinese legal system is criticized on grounds that a consistently enforced legal 
framework is absent owing to the lack of both professional competence and independence 
from political interference. Judicial corruption worsens the problem.5 In addition, centuries of 
philosophical, political, and cultural traditions can be barriers to enforcement of new laws; 
hence the sanctity of contract and contractual enforcement in China are questionable.6  
 
It has long been observed that Guanxi (relations or connections), are important factors when 
doing business with Chinese partners. 7  Conventional institutional analysis indicates that 
emerging economies will transition from personal connections to rule-based institutions; but 
if laws are not enforced in a consistent manner, legal institutions do not create the level of 
                                                          
3
 Information Office of the State Council of PRC, White Paper “Socialist System of Laws with 
Chinese Characteristics”, Oct. 2011, Beijing, available at  
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cede/det/zt/zgzfbps/t872739.htm>, accessed 12 Sep. 2014. 
4  Zhai, Yuanjin (2009) “Chinese Contract Law and the Economic Reform”,Transition Studies 
Review,Vol. 16 (pp. 429–437).  
5
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(pp. 280-282 and 295-298). 
6 Pattison, Patricia and Herron Daniel (2003) “The Mountains are High and the Emperor is Far Away: 
Sanctity of Contract in China”,American Business Law Journal, Vol. 40, (pp. 460 and 509). 
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stability and certainty necessary for supporting the use of contracts.8 A theory of governance 
introducing two modes of economic governance (relation-based vs. rule-based) is proposed 
and also the application of such theory is extended to explain strategic management and 
international business.9  
 
However, the use of contract is still prevalent in China, although the Chinese legal system is 
relatively weak.10 One possible reason for this paradoxical phenomenon is the claim that 
relational governance, a social institution, provides contractual assurance. Empirical study 
findings broadly support the idea that relational governance functions supplement weak 
formal enforcement, thus promoting the use of the contracts in China.11 
 
Three main concepts are used in the paper: long-term contracts, projects and relational 
contracts. The choice of which different concept to use at any given point depends on both 
theory and particular factual circumstances.  
Long-term contracts cover contracts with a series of successive performances during a long 
time period, or contracts involving complex projects that include planning, designing, 
manufacturing, installing and maintaining the objects of transactions. Long-term contracts 
differ from spot-contracts by having a longer time dimension between the promise and 
performance. The long time dimension and the complexity of contracts make it difficult for 
the contract parties to foresee all probable changes of circumstances and prepare for the risks 
ex ante in the contract. 
Macneil (1978) has classified contracts into three types: classical, neoclassical and relational 
contracts.
12
 Compared with discrete contracts, relational contracts are longer in term, are 
                                                          
8
 North, Douglass C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; North, Douglass C. (1992) “Institutions and Economic 
Theory”, The American Economist, Vol. 36, No.1 (pp. 3–6). 
9
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Governance and Contractual Assurance”. Conference paper, available at 
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more difficult to articulate clearly and fully at the outset (and thus typically include open 
terms, reservations of discretion, and dispute resolution mechanisms), and involve greater 
interdependence both between the parties and between the parties and others interested in the 
transaction.
13
 In relational contracts the disputes are resolved by private ordering with mutual 
renegotiations and mutual future planning in order to maintain a win-win situation between 
the parties.  
 
1.2 Changes of circumstances and flexibility in international business 
 
Nowadays international business environments change quickly; high uncertainty and 
unexpected circumstances are prevalent in international projects. This presents challenges to 
international business companies involved in complex long-term contractual relationships.  
Some scholars argue that flexibility is needed to deal with changes of circumstances and 
uncertainty in businesses.14 Because of the difficulties in dealing with the uncertainty of the 
future the parties must find a way to secure commitment if the circumstances change 
unexpectedly during the contractual relationship. When perfect contracting is impossible and 
if third-party enforcement is costly for the parties, parties seek alternative institutional 
mechanisms to solve commitment problems. 
 
Under such situations, companies will have to require the skills of flexible adaptation to 
changing circumstances. However, a multi-case study showed that while flexibility is 
frequently called for in projects, it was rarely prepared for.15 Another study demonstrated that 
the link of flexibility to contracts is often through relational methods, considering personal 
relationships between contracting parties or negotiation power and skills.16 A co-operative 
attitude is indeed essential for dealing with contingencies in long-term contracts; otherwise, 
                                                          
13
 Spieldel, Richard (2000) “The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts”, 
Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 94 (p. 823). 
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 Olsson, Nils O.E. (2006) “Management of Flexibility in Projects”, International Journal of Project 
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formal provisions on flexibility will not work effectively.17 
 
In international business contexts, cultural issues are also an important factor. “Contractual 
culture” emphasizing contracting parties’ relations, understandings, and values may have a 
great effect on parties’ contractual relationship. 18  Different “contracting cultures” may 
indicate a barrier for flexibility. Project managers from different cultures but working in the 
same project team may bring multiple and divergent systems of project structures and 
boundaries for dealing with unexpected events.19 This study further illustrated the highly 
different approaches that Finnish and Chinese project managers adopted. The Finnish one 
placed reliance on formal structures and contracts; while the Chinese one emphasised social 
structures and networks.20 Such differences can add to the difficulty of cooperating with 
changes of circumstances in an international project.  
 
1.3 Research aim, questions, originality and methodology 
 
The aims of the research are to examine how companies prepare for changes of 
circumstances in international long-term business transactions, and how flexibility is 
introduced and adopted in such contractual relationships.  
 
The main research questions of interest are as follows: is flexibility needed and why is it 
important? How do contract partners deal with changes of circumstances in contracts and 
contractual practice? How have contract partners resolved their disputes in contract 
implementation?  How is flexibility reflected in long-term contracting?  
A recent literature review on the topic of empirical studies of contracts spanning several 
disciplines (mostly law, economics, and management) found that eight categories of 
empirical questions have been addressed.21 But empirical questions on the topic of flexibility 
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 Campbell, David and Harris, Donald (2005) “Flexibility in Long-Term Contractual Relationships: 
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in contracts have not been conducted. Such empirical study on this topic in China is rarely 
done. We consider that it is important both to the academic and business community to know 
how flexibility is approached and dealt with in contracts and practice in China. 
 
In this research, we approach “contract” as a dynamic process (including contract 
negotiation, formation, implementation and so forth), not just a static contract document or 
contract law.22 Thus, the empirical study examines not only contract documents, but also 
contractual practice; questions covered different phrases that a project can be in, such as 
preparation stage, contract drafting, and contract implementation.  
 
The research is meant to be qualitative research. The primary research method is semi-
structured interview. In Chapter 4 about interview data analysis, we employ content analysis 
and thematic analysis as main methods. In Chapter 5, we also use economic analysis. 
  
2. Research Theoretical Background 
 
We consider that it is proper to employ new institutional economic analysis of contracts and 
relational contract theory to explain long-term contract issues, and use these approaches as 
theoretical bases of the research. To analyse how international companies located in China 
prepare for changes of circumstances and how flexibility is reflected in contracts and 
contractual practise we use economic analysis and relational contract theory. The choice of 
how an economic organization arranges its operational and production functions is strongly 
influenced by the political, cultural and legal framework of the society where the company is 
located. These decisions can be analyzed with the tools of economic theory.23 
 
Relational contract theory appreciates the context of the exchange, and focuses on the 
necessity and desirability of trust, mutual responsibility and connection.
24
 Therefore, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Law and Economics Series, No. 12-02, avaiable at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1998483>, accessed 19 June 2013. 
22
 Nystén-Haarala, Soili and Lee, Nari and Lehto, Jukka (2010), note 16 above.  
23
 Matthews, R. C. O. (1986) “The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of Growth”. Economic 
Journal, Vol. 96 (pp. 903–918). 
24
 Feinman, Jay (2000) “Relational Contract Theory in Context”. Northwestern University Law 
Review, Vol. 94 (p. 737). 
Flexibility in Contracts and Contractual Practice: Empirical Study in China 
61 
relational contract theory is a valuable approach to contracting with Chinese partners. But an 
economic view argues relational contracting in China is becoming relatively more costly, 
considering the elements of diseconomy of scale and its undermining of the development of 
arm-length transactions and formal institutions.
25
  
 
2.1. Transaction costs economics and incomplete contracts theories 
 
Transaction costs economics (TCE) is one of the dominant frameworks for analyzing 
contractual and governance structures associated with the economic exchange. According to 
TCE the choice of the right governance structure depends on the costs of transacting business. 
TCE holds that allocating scarce resources in the market is not frictionless, but there is 
always a cost to the exchange process.
26
  
The costs of concluding a contract can be divided into ex ante and ex post transaction costs.
27
 
Ex ante transaction costs arise from the costs of drafting, negotiating and safeguarding an 
agreement. Ex post costs of contracting include maladaptation costs, haggling costs, the setup 
and running costs of resolving the disputes and the bonding costs of effecting secure 
commitments. Ex ante and ex post costs are interdependent so that the more carefully and 
completely a contract is drafted, the higher are the ex ante costs and the lower are the ex post 
costs and vice versa.  
According to the theory of incomplete contracts all contracts remain more or less incomplete. 
If the parties wrote a complete contract, which would specify a course of action contingent on 
every possible future state of the world, ex ante transaction costs would rise very high.
28
 
Another reason for incomplete contracts is bounded rationality. Because of the limits of 
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human cognition people lack knowledge, foresight and the skill to accurately predict and plan 
for all the possible contingencies that may arise in the future. In addition, people cannot 
accurately describe actions and states of the world in the contract--especially on matters in 
which they have little prior experience.
29
  
Rational contracting parties may optimise ex ante and ex post transaction costs by leaving 
contracts incomplete. The parties may leave the contract incomplete also because of high 
enforcement costs. Enforcement costs can be high, if the parties do not trust the public 
enforcement system. Another reason for high enforcement costs is that the uncertain states of 
the world can be difficult to verify in court.
30
  
Incomplete contracts have obvious advantages over fully specified contracts, because they 
bring flexibility in contracting. The parties can renegotiate and reassess their initial 
responsibilities only if an unanticipated change of circumstances arises. Ex ante costs are 
unnecessary because unlikely events can typically be prepared for at lower costs after the 
relevant information is revealed.
31
 
There are also disadvantages connected with incomplete contracts. An incomplete contract 
may induce one of the parties to opportunistic behaviour, which may manifest itself in moral 
hazard, shirking and other forms of strategic behaviour.
32
  Once a contract is concluded a 
change of circumstances may offer one party an opportunity to behave strategically by 
stealing a larger share of the common profit than was originally agreed in the contract. For 
example, the promisee may turn down renegotiations and instead ask the court to enforce the 
contract, if a change of circumstances makes it more profitable for him to do so.  
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2.2. New institutional economics theory 
 
In the New Institutional Economics (NIE) the social analysis of economic organizations is 
divided in two categories: “institutional environment” and “institutional arrangements”.33  
Institutional environment consists of formal and informal rules of the society. Formal rules, 
like the constitution, laws and property rights structure the legal environment in which human 
actions take place. Informal rules, like social norms, customs, traditions, conventions and 
religions structure the social environment by defining the codes of conduct and norms of 
behaviour. Both formal and informal institutions influence behaviour by increasing or 
restraining incentives to behave in a certain manner.  
How does the institutional environment affect transactions? According to the economic 
analysis of law the role of legal institutions is to achieve effective and low-cost contract 
enforcement.  For example, the role of contract law is to influence rational beliefs of 
contracting parties about the likelihood of performance and thus to increase the parties’ 
confidence in performance.
34
  
The parties’ confidence in the legal institutions is dependent on the effectiveness of the 
institutions and the legal system of a society.  Similarly, the effectiveness of contract law as 
an institution is dependent on the role of many other legal institutions, like courts and judges, 
lawyers or governmental organizations.
35
  
If the legal system in a society is weak, contracting parties do not trust in the legal institutions, 
but prefer instead private ordering.
36
 In many instances the contracting parties can find more 
satisfactory private solutions to solve their contractual disputes.
37
 Private informal 
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mechanisms can also reduce contracting costs and increase the credibility of commitments 
better than court ordering.
38
 
How should an economic organization choose the best governance structure? Institutional 
arrangements are governance structures chosen by the economic organizations themselves to 
govern their own relationships. According to Klein, P. (2000) the appropriate governance 
structure depends on the characteristics of the transaction. For example, a long time 
dimension between promise and performance causes uncertainty about the promisor’s ability 
to act as agreed. Also the complexity of the transaction increases uncertainty about the 
future.
39
 
Long-term contracts are one mode of governance in the organization’s governance structure. 
According to the theory the commitment problem arises only if the change of circumstances 
has made a gap between the promisor’s ex ante and ex post incentives. How the promisor acts 
at the time of performance depends on the promisor’s ex post incentives. The purpose of the 
alternative enforcement mechanisms is to bring ex post incentives in line with ex ante 
agreements to produce the outcome the promisor has promised. The enforcement 
mechanisms share one common feature, which is that they increase the promisee’s 
confidence in getting the value of the promised performance.
40
 
One informal enforcement mechanism is self-enforcement. The self-enforcement mechanism 
is based on the threat of termination of the relationship, which would harm both of the parties: 
the promisee party could not recover from the investment and the promisor party would lose 
expected future profits. In order to create sufficient incentives for the promisor to perform, 
the loss of future profits due to the termination of the contract must be greater than the short-
term gains of non-performance. The amount of each transactor’s reputational capital 
determines the efficacy of the self-enforcement mechanism. When there is sufficient 
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reputational capital in the relationship, the parties will rely on self-enforcement rather than 
court enforcement.
41
  
Another informal enforcement mechanism is reputation. Because reputation signals 
trustworthiness, companies have an intrinsic desire to maintain their good reputation.
42
 
According to TCE reputation has been characterized as a valuable specific asset. Acquiring 
good reputation is a company specific investment in the future. Good reputation reduces 
company’s incentives to behave opportunistically and allows more flexibility in contracting. 
43
 
The self-enforcement mechanism and reputation mechanism work because they change 
incentives of the parties by changing the consequences of the actions. In the self-enforcement 
mechanism the termination of the relationship will end the quasi rents in the future and in the 
reputation mechanism the likelihood of future transactions with potential partners is 
threatened if the promisor defaults.
44
  
 
2.3. Relational contracting theory 
 
According to Macneil (1978, 1980, 1983, 1985), contract law has very little bearing on what 
contracting parties actually do. The relationship between the contracting parties is much 
wider and deeper than contract law assumes. The behaviour of the parties is guided by the 
internal norms of the contract but also by social customs and rules. Relational contract theory 
(RCT) was born as a critique against traditional contract law for ignoring the significance of 
the relationship between contracting parties.  RCT has several approaches, but common to 
them is that they all emphasize the social and interpersonal relationships between contracting 
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parties instead of seeing the contract as discrete event between the promisor and the promisee, 
like the rule-based, classical contract law.
45
  
Macaulay (1963) had earlier argued that in relational contracting the binding force of 
cooperation is not so much the commitment into a formal contract but the gaining of mutual 
benefits through cooperative relationship between the parties.
46
 The mutual relationship gives 
room for flexibility in the contract, because instead of relying on the legal mechanisms the 
parties themselves govern the transaction by mutually accepted social guidelines. Also 
Macneil’s (1980) approach towards business contracting introduces a degree of flexibility 
into the contract based on a common understanding of cooperative objectives, norms and 
collaborative activities.
47
 
How does flexibility present itself in relational contracts? Where flexibility is incorporated 
into relational contracts, the contracting parties usually adapt their obligations to changed 
circumstances and unforeseen contingencies as they arise. According to mainstream 
approaches to relational contracts, the primary obligations originating from a long-term 
relational contract are a basis for future adjustments and variations to be made by the parties. 
Therefore, breach of implicit terms in a relational contract would be viewed as an occasion 
for renegotiation, readjustment, compromise and settlement. One study further indicates that 
appropriate rules for the excuse of contractual obligations may increase the cooperativeness 
and longevity of a wide range of long-term business relationships.48  
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2.4. Rigid contract vs. flexible contract 
 
How the parties should choose between a rigid and flexible contract? The trade-off between 
rigid and flexible contracts is formalized with the incomplete contract theory including ex 
post maladaptation and renegotiation costs.
49
 Maladaptation costs arise if the parties have not 
prepared for the unexpected changes of circumstances in the contract. Renegotiation costs are 
born from the ex post changes and adaptations when contracts are incomplete. Parties try to 
sign complete rigid contracts in order to avoid renegotiations and they sign flexible contracts 
in order to adapt contractual framework to unanticipated contingencies and to create 
incentives for cooperative behaviour. 
 
Rigid contracts work as a guide in cases of doubt, and as a norm when parties do not find 
solution to their disputes. Another reason for preferring rigid contracts is that the magnitude 
of the private sanction that can be imposed is limited. A sufficiently rigid contract works as a 
complementary device for the self-enforcement system. Rigid contract terms shift 
reputational capital between the parties so that the parties have an incentive to perform in the 
future.  
In a flexible contract there is the fear of hold-up, because the other party may modify the 
contract terms to appropriate the quasi-rents of a relation specific investment made by the 
other party. Relation specific investments are investments in assets which are worthless 
outside the relationship. Quasi-rents are earned profits in excess of post-investments 
opportunity costs that will be lost upon termination of the relationship. The other party may 
hold-up only if the one-time short term gain from hold-up is larger than the total discounted 
long-term gains from future performances. Rigid contracts will restrain hold-up and other 
forms of opportunism, because they reduce short-term gains from the non-performance and 
increase long-term gains from the future performances.
50
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Flexible contracts should be preferred when uncertainty is high and reputation costs are high. 
When uncertainty is low and the probability of hold-up is high, rigid contracts are preferred. 
A rigid contract should also be preferred if specific assets are high.
51
 
 
3. Research design and data collection 
3.1. Research design 
 
The main data sources are studies of previous research on contracts and contractual practices, 
empirical data such as interviews, and information concerning respondents or respondents’ 
companies.   
Three major elements are covered in the research protocol: purpose, research questions, and 
the organization of the protocol. The purpose of the study is to examine how companies 
prepare for changes in quickly changing business environment; and how flexibility is 
introduced and adopted in contracts and contractual practices in international projects in 
China. 
The organization of the protocol outlines the procedure of how to carry out the empirical 
study, including interview questions design, finding proper respondents, conducting 
interview, recording interview, taking notes during interview, transcribing interview, and data 
analysis plan. The targeted respondents are company executives, project managers, lawyers 
(including corporate legal counsels, and lawyers working in law firms) who have working 
experience in international business projects. The  focus industries are construction business, 
information technology, and industrial equipment and maintenance services. But the study 
does not restrict itself within these industries. The main feature of a proper respondent 
company is that it has experience in long-term contractual relationships with its business 
partners, or in multi-cultural projects.  
The guided and semi-structured type of interview (with outline of topics, issues or themes, 
but variation in wording and sequence is possible) is chosen, due to its major advantage of 
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obtaining somewhat systematic and comprehensive materials (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 
2008). The structure of interviews in this study is divided into about seven sections or themes 
(general information on the respondent, projects and so forth; flexibility in contracts and 
contractual practice; barriers to flexibility in contracting; role of contract law and lawyers in 
contracting; informal institution; how to design flexibility in contracting; dispute resolution in 
contracting). Each section concerns a topic, under which several possible interview questions 
are included. Two versions of interview questions, which are slightly different, are designed 
and used for managers and lawyers.  
 
3.2. Data collection 
 
The primary activities in the data collection stage were collecting data on the respondents or 
their companies through the companies or law firms’ web-pages in advance; and conducting 
interviews with project managers and lawyers. Before interview data were formally collected, 
we conducted 2 pilot interviews, which were to ensure questions are clearly worded and 
interview design is improved. Therefore, such pilot interview data are excluded in the final 
data analysis. We contacted with the Finnish Business Association in Shanghai, and asked 
friends or previous colleagues in China to act as referral to find proper respondents for 
interviews.  
We gathered empirical data from three Chinese business companies, three Finnish business 
companies located in China, and four Chinese law firms, based on semi-structured qualitative 
interviews. The Chinese business companies have sufficient experience in international 
projects; but their fields of business and size are at different levels. The Finnish business 
companies operated in China mainly have project partners in China. Among the 13 
respondents are 5 managers, 4 legal counsellors in companies, and 4 lawyers working in 
different law firms.  
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Table 1: List of Respondents  
Company/ 
Location 
Industry  Number of 
Manager 
Interviewed 
Number of 
Lawyer 
Interviewed 
C1 (Beijing) Construction 1 1 
C2 (Beijing) Construction 1 0 
C3 (Shanghai) IT 1 0 
F1 (Shanghai) Pulp and paper 1 1 
F2 (Shanghai) Industrial equipment and 
maintenance services 
1 1 
F3 (Shanghai) Industrial equipment and 
maintenance services 
0 1 
L1 (Beijing) Law firm 0 1 
L2 (Beijing) Law Firm 0 1 
L3 (Hangzhou) Law firm 0 1 
L4 (Shanghai)  Law firm  0 1 
(C means Chinese Companies; F refers to Finnish Companies; L refers to Law firm)  
 
As all interviewees are Chinese people, the researcher chose Chinese language as the 
interview language, although it was possible to conduct an interview in English. We recorded 
the interview and took notes at the same time. The data were collected in two ways: face-face 
interview; and written answers to interview questions. Use of a tape recorder in the 
interviews assisted with data collection and accuracy. Notes were also taken during and after 
the interview.  
During face-to-face interviews, 2 interviewees (F1, F3, corporate legal counsel) did not allow 
recording, so the contents of the interview was made based on notes that were taken during 
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interview and later memory. For the rest of the 9 face-to-face interviews, interviews were 
properly recorded, and notes were taken. All the face-to-face interviews were conducted in 
respondents’ offices. The researcher later reviewed the record and notes, and translated the 
interviewees’ key ideas and sentences from Chinese into English, but did not transcribe word 
for word. There were 2 written answers to interview questions (from C3, manager; L4, 
lawyer) due to the difficulty of arranging interview time, and thus documents were translated 
from Chinese into English. Based on the companies’ and interviewees’ requests, related 
names of either company or interviewee are used anonymously.  
4. Interview data analysis 
4.1. Formal institutions in contracting 
4.1.1. Written documents; attitudes towards contracts; role of contracts 
 
This part describes the variety of written documents used by project partners, their attitudes 
towards contracts, and their opinions on the role of contracts. Through interview data, it was 
found that usually the written document is a formal contract. Many times communication 
would be done before signing a contract (C2, F1, manager). Sometimes, memoranda of 
understanding during meetings are important (C2, F1, manager). Faxes, emails, and 
purchasing orders are also written documents that reflect the requirements of customers; 
double-checking on customers’ requirements before confirmation is a common practice (F2, 
manager). Most respondents considered that they understand their customer’s requirements or 
tasks very well (C2, F1, F2, manager). It is necessary to get to know and understand them 
very clearly, as potential risks are involved. Sometimes, changes are reflected in written 
meeting memoranda after contracts have been signed (F1, manager). 
Concerning the issue of attitude of companies towards contracts, generally, companies in 
China gradually realized the importance of contracts, and nowadays take contracts and 
contract processes quite seriously. Depending on the size of company, the particular industry 
a company is in, and whether foreign business partners or governments are involved in 
projects, the attitudes of companies toward the contracts can vary. Comparatively speaking, 
big companies, state-owned companies, and foreign companies take contracts seriously (L1, 
L3, lawyer; C2, F2, corporate legal counsel); whereas some domestic Chinese companies do 
Yanan Zhang, Riitta Ahtonen 
72 
not (L1, L3, Lawyer). Many domestic Chinese companies still disregard the importance of 
contracts, but focus on development of good relationship with governments (L1, lawyer). It is 
recommended that business parties in general should respect contract, follow contract clauses, 
and implement contract properly (L1, lawyer). 
The respondents also explained the role of contracts. Firstly, contract is an important and 
necessary document to sign between parties. Contracts are considered as a guarantee and 
protection for business transactions; and are also crucial documents in resolving disputes (L3, 
L4, lawyer; F2, corporate legal counsel; C2, F1, F2, manager).Usually, projects are made of 
different contracts, which are reflections of different business processes in written form (L2, 
lawyer).Secondly, contracts provide guidance for business cooperation, and are the basis for 
project implementation (C2, F3, corporate legal counsel; C2, F1, F2, manager).  
From a different perspective, a contract can also become a preventive tool (F3, corporate 
legal counsel). Risk control and management are considered critical for companies, and 
contract management is one part of risk control (F1, corporate legal counsel). 
 
4.1.2. Role of contract law in contracting 
 
This section discusses the role of contract law and lawyers in Contracting. Firstly, we 
examine respondents’ comments on Chinese contract law. Generally, contract law itself is 
quite advanced, has sufficient force, and provides good guidance and protection for business 
parties (C1, C2, F1, F2, manager). Two company managers consider laws as a highly 
important framework; they will obey the laws during the whole stages of projects, and hope 
their project partners also work under legal frameworks (C1, C2, manager).  
However, to some extent, good contract law does not operate well in practice; and enforcing 
the law can be difficult in China (F3, corporate legal counsel). It is well recognized that 
contract law is only one aspect; contract enforcement is a more important issue, which has 
close connections with legal practice (e.g. judges’ professional quality) and business practice 
(e.g. contract performance by the parties)(L1, L3, lawyer). Familiarity with local culture, 
including aspects of business, legal, tradition, customs, helps to understand the issue of 
contract enforcement (F1, corporate legal counsel). 
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Furthermore, many judicial interpretations concerning contract law play a role in contract 
enforcement process. Sometimes courts interpret some clauses in a rigid manner, which 
restricts freedom of contracts (F3, corporate legal counsel). Sometimes, a poor quality judge 
interprets some legal provisions in a wrong way (C2, corporate legal counsel). There are also 
certain restrictions in terms of policy, or regulations from the governments, which impede 
business parties’ business activities (F2, corporate legal counsel). Enforceability of law, 
operation of courts, and quality of legal practitioners in China remain to be improved (L1, 
lawyer; F2, manager). 
 
4.1.3. Role of lawyers in contracting 
 
We further investigate when or at which phases lawyers are involved in business cooperation. 
Depending on different cases and different needs of projects, lawyers may be invited to 
engage in different phases, such as business negotiation before signing contracts, drafting 
contracts, signing contracts, project implementation, and if trouble/disputes arise. But 
lawyers are not necessarily involved in every stage, as features of legal services and clients’ 
demands can vary (L3, lawyer). Similarly, legal counsel may not be involved in every stage 
of their company’s business projects (F1, corporate legal counsel; C1, C3, manager). Where 
necessary, legal counsel may be involved in negotiation process (F1, manager). Many years’ 
tradition in legal practice is that people usually come to lawyers only after problems arise. 
However, usually it is too late to come to lawyers after disputes arise, and business parties 
can face big losses (L1, lawyer). 
In large projects, especially with international elements (e.g. foreign companies are involved), 
or in an unfamiliar country or place, business parties may invite legal counsel to participate 
business cooperation before signing contracts or invite lawyers for the whole process of 
projects, so as to avoid risks (C2, F2, manager; F3, corporate legal counsel). In addition, 
state-owned big companies, including listed companies, may also involve outside lawyers, 
besides in-house lawyers from their own legal department (L1, lawyer).This is considered a 
good practice, as this makes lawyers know the projects well, and this reduces and prevents 
potential risk; but this is not common in practice (L1, lawyer, interview).  
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Thus, improving the awareness of importance of law and contract in China is still a big task. 
Although there are calls to involve lawyers at early stages of business projects, traditional 
legal practice may still take time to change in companies.  
Additionally, we examine who takes care of contract drafting in companies. In terms of the 
group who draft contracts, it depends on particular facts. Company lawyers, lawyers hired 
outside company, project managers, and so forth can be the contract drafters alone or together. 
After many years’ experience, companies may have saved several different versions of model 
or standardized contracts suitable for different types of businesses. Sometimes managers are 
very clear which clauses are important in a contract; then they may just sign a contract by 
themselves (C2, corporate legal counsel). Sometimes, when the other party provides the 
contract, the company would only need to negotiate on certain important issues, such as price, 
quality of project, safety standards (C1, manager). Sometimes, clients have their contracts 
ready, and only require lawyers to review the contracts (L2, lawyer).  
It is also interesting to see that in some companies, contract drafting is a teamwork and 
process; different professionals (such as marketing staff, projects managers, engineers, 
budget experts, inspectors, lawyers and so forth) participating in the project work together to 
draft contracts; different experts will take care of clauses of different subject matters in the 
contracts (F1, F2, manager;L1, lawyer; C2, manager and corporate legal counsel).Therefore, 
depending on different circumstances, contracts can be drafted by different groups.  
 
4.2. Flexibility in contracting 
4.2.1. Changes of circumstances in contracting 
 
Changes of circumstances in international projects bring up the issue of flexibility. The study 
investigated what kind of changes of circumstances business partners have met with during 
project execution. During project implementation, changes of circumstances are quite normal 
in practice, particularly in industries such as construction, industrial equipment and 
maintenance services. Things can change significantly, especially during the period of 
financial crisis.  
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One manager considered that project implementation is a continuous process of dealing with 
changes (such as change of previous plans, extension of shipping period, changes of 
optimization of different subjects), and solving disputes and conflicts (C2, manager).Some 
are especially significant, such as changes of contracted materials’ price, changes of 
government policy, government rules and so forth, which have big influence on both parties’ 
performance of the contract (L1, lawyer).  
The data include many concrete examples concerning changes of circumstances in projects 
after signing a contract. For example, within a construction project, after construction site 
investigation, the workload would be tremendously heavier than the contract specified; then 
extra costs were caused; or the project deadline may be extended after negotiation (C2, 
corporate legal counsel).In a 2-year (or longer period)-project, one party may change the 
scope of goods/products; delivery time can be delayed (F3, corporate legal counsel). Clients 
required changes of some equipment’s function, or changes of design on some parts (C1, 
manager).In the IT industry, one respondent experienced changes (such as change of 
procurement on certain materials, change on indicators of equipment function, import and 
export formalities problems); but changes are not frequent, because most issues have been 
confirmed with the clients during the early bidding process (C3, manager). 
 
4.2.2. Is flexibility needed in contracting? 
 
Then we address the question of whether flexibility is needed in international projects. Most 
respondents considered that in projects, some aspects could be flexible; in terms of some 
issues that cannot be certain or clear, or for tailor-made products, some room for flexibility 
has to be left; a certain degree of flexibility would also be needed during project 
implementation in order to deal with unexpected circumstances and to solve disputes. 
Contracts cannot prescribe all situations: unexpected circumstances can arise at any phrase of 
the project. 
Most answers towards flexibility are positive. Flexibility is even considered a kind of sub-
consciousness and a must in projects (C2, manager).It is necessary to leave certain room for 
some flexibility, as customer’s requirements can change during the project process (F1, 
manager). Moreover, being flexible or mastering flexibility in order to deal with changes and 
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keep cooperation with business partners is considered as skill and capability; a project 
manager has to grasp such a capability (C1, C2, C3, F1, F2, manager). A legal counsel 
similarly held that managers should be sensitive to changes, be capable of dealing with 
various changes flexibly (F3, corporate legal counsel).  
A lawyer should also consider flexibility; otherwise, one cannot negotiate well in a later stage 
(L1, lawyer). According to two legal counsels, flexibility is also a task for lawyer, and others 
who are engaged in the projects (F1, F2). It is recognized that lawyers’ task is to help and 
facilitate, rather than obstruct business cooperation (C2, corporate legal counsel).One pointed 
out that flexibility could be very important in terms of negotiation and contract performance 
(L2, lawyer). Where both parties perform their contracts in good faith, flexibility provides a 
buffer between two sides, and is beneficial to resolving disputes (F2, F3, corporate legal 
counsel). There are also negative attitudes towards flexibility. For example, one legal counsel 
does not like flexibility at all (F3).  
The opposite of “flexible” can be “strict”, “meticulous”, or “certain”. Where some elements 
in projects cannot be flexible, lawyers must try their best to make contracts clear, feasible, 
and enforceable. 
At the same time, how to balance flexibility with certainty, thus how to make flexibility more 
meaningful is recognized and considered important (F2, manager). Flexible clauses should be 
included only when necessary (C2, corporate legal counsel). Too much flexibility is not 
acceptable and improper; otherwise, contracts lose value and meaning (L1, L2, L3, lawyer; 
C3, manager).One suggested that some principles have to be inserted to restrict flexibility 
(C1, manager). The combination of principles and flexibility is meaningful to successful 
project cooperation (F1, F2, corporate legal counsel). 
Flexibility is like a paradox; on the one hand, contract should be clear and strict; on the other 
hand, during contract implementation, a certain degree of flexibility is necessary (L2, lawyer). 
When one can deal with flexibility well, efficiency of work will be improved; otherwise, 
flexibility can lead to mistakes, gaps, and losses (C1, manager).Therefore, people still prefer 
more certainty and feasibility, and less flexibility or would try to reduce flexibility to the 
lowest degree, although under some circumstances flexibility is necessary (F1, F2, manager). 
In addition, the purpose of being flexible is to reduce or save the transaction costs (F2, 
corporate legal counsel), to try to continue performance of the contract; and to achieve 
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contract/business purpose and make business eventually successful (L1, L2, L3, lawyer; F1, 
corporate legal counsel, manager). The purpose of protecting clients’ interests is also 
emphasised when considering the necessity of flexibility (L4, lawyer). 
 
4.3. Flexibility in contract documents 
 
Flexibility in contract documents is mainly reflected in words/phrases used in contract 
clauses; and contract clauses. Some contract clauses contain words or phrases indicating 
flexible meanings: For example, principle of rightness, principle of equity, good faith, good 
manner, important reasons, legitimate reasons, special circumstances, relatively, grave, 
serious and so forth. Whether the words/phrases can place some kind of obligations on a 
party is the key matter (F1, corporate legal counsel).We discuss this issue by using one 
lawyer respondent’s basic classification (L1, lawyer):  
The first group refer to phrases such as “good faith”, “fair”, “friendly negotiation”, “principle 
of equity”, and so forth. Those words stand for general principles that are widely accepted, 
and they do not make a big difference concerning parties’ rights and obligations. The second 
group of words (such as “legitimate reasons”)may place restrictive conditions. Such words 
should be clarified, and clearly written in contract. The third group are adjective and adverb, 
such as “grave”, “serious”, “as soon as possible”. The meanings of such words are not clear, 
and thus such words are not suitable to be included in contracts. Parties should try to avoid 
using such words and try to make rights and obligations concrete (L1, lawyer).  
Most respondents feel comfortable to accept the first group of words/phrases in contract 
documents (C2, C3, C1, manager; L1 lawyer). But certainly, words/phrases with certainty 
and clear meaning are preferred, while vague and ambiguous words are avoided. 
Contract clauses that deal with changes of circumstances are discussed. Such clauses are: 
force majeure clauses, relief clauses, renegotiation clauses, clauses on certain principles, 
procedures or change mechanism and contract amendments. But usually lawyers prefer to 
consider as many circumstances as they can, and include them in contracts.  
A “force majeure” clause (prescribing changing conditions such as a natural disaster) is quite 
typical. A relief clause is also common to be included in a contract. For example, after 
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investigation, a construction site turned out to be unsuitable for further construction, then 
both parties’ obligations will be relieved (L1, lawyer). A third common clause is 
renegotiation clause. After renegotiation, clauses concerning amendment may also be added 
(C1, manager). 
In addition, a clause on a change mechanism is sometimes included in a contract. For 
example, a clause can prescribe that if one party changes design requirements, how partners 
communicate and then understand fully the changes (F3, corporate legal counsel). In certain 
type of contracts, such as construction projects, there are contract clauses indicating the 
procedure of which party will do what (L1, lawyer). With such clauses, parties know how to 
proceed, thus conflict intensification can be avoided (L1, lawyer). It may help minimize the 
problem and promote smooth progress of the project (C2, manager).  
Sometimes some subject matters are not certain even when the contract is signed. For 
example, concerning a construction project, when a contract is signed, the construction site 
may not be investigated fully or to a deep level. Some flexible clauses that deal with 
circumstances such as a construction site which is not suitable, or the construction area which 
is not big enough, need to be included in the contract document (L1, lawyer).But it is 
recognized that contract clauses dealing with flexibility need to be executed; the execution in 
turn relies on both parties’ good faith in order to continue cooperation (L3, lawyer; C2, 
corporate legal counsel). 
 
4.4. Flexibility in contractual practice 
 
The section examined how business parties will do when facing change of circumstances 
(question to managers) and what kind of advice lawyers will provide to deal with change of 
circumstances in practice (questions to lawyers).  
Facing changes of circumstances, or if changes cannot be avoided, business partners would 
firstly renegotiate or do further communication in order to work out a solution (e.g. C2, C3, 
F2, manager). Renegotiation is considered a reflection of flexibility (F2, manager). 
Notifying the other party about changes immediately is usually done and is also considered 
necessary (C1, manager; F2, corporate legal counsel). In a company, usually business 
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partners will have communicated on problem of changes beforehand, thus one party will have 
some time to prepare needed resources for the changes, such as technology, materials, human 
resources, and so forth (C1, manager).Providing a reasonable compensation is also a possible 
solution (F2, corporate legal counsel).If necessary, contract amendments may be added, after 
business parties agree to the amendments (L2, lawyer; C1, manager).  
In addition, with changes of requirements from customers (such as small changes on some 
parts, new standards), one important element for companies to consider is to ensure that 
needed changes are rational and legitimate. For example, companies usually will evaluate the 
risks and costs associated with the customers’ changing requirements or whether it is 
necessary to fully meet with such demands; if the associated risks and costs are reasonable, 
companies would make changes accordingly (C3, F1, manager).  
Sometimes, regarding changes on the deadline of a project or project payment, one prefers to 
keep some flexibility in practice, but not in contract documents. For example, in a contract, a 
date of deadline for payment is specified. If the partner is delayed for a certain number of 
days, but the delay is still within the time limits that the company can accept, the business 
cooperation will continue (F2, manager). 
Depending on different circumstances, discharging a contract, stopping the cooperation or 
transferring the business to other partners are alternatives to deal with changes; but the 
impacts or harm of such alternatives have to be evaluated carefully beforehand (F2, 
manager).Parties will not simply ask for discharge of a contract after disputes arise.  
Advice for dealing with changes of circumstances/contingencies from lawyers corresponds 
with that of business party respondents toward changes. Generally, the advice of how to deal 
with changes of circumstances has to be considered case-by-case. Different advice such as 
renegotiation, proper contract amendment, performance continuance or discharge of a 
contract may be given depending on different cases. Basically, contract clauses in original 
contract documents are important to look at, if disputes arise.  
According to one legal counsel, before providing any advice it is crucial to get to know all 
the background details of one issue; if necessary, both legal and business perspectives must 
be considered carefully (F1). Contract or business purpose is also a key point to keep in mind 
(F3, corporate legal counsel). 
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All respondents recognized that negotiation is the first choice and an essential principle, and 
also is the best and the least-costly method of solving disputes. During the negotiation 
process, the lawyer should be clear what the clients’ interests are; and also need to make the 
clients understand clearly their best interests (L1, lawyer). Furthermore, during negotiation 
cultural issues such as “face” or expressing an opinion indirectly, may be brought up. 
Knowledge of local rules and strategy or ideas applicable to Eastern people’s thinking is 
important in resolving disputes (F1, corporate legal counsel). 
Thus, to provide proper advice, besides contract documents and the facts, some other 
components such as cost, project/business purpose, both parties’ negotiation power or 
position need to be taken into consideration.   
 
4.5. Barriers to flexibility in contracting 
 
The study further investigates what kind of barriers to flexibility there are in contracting. The 
first main question concerns a language element Most respondents consider that in general, 
different home languages are not a problem to business communication, where English 
becomes a commonly used working language (e.g. F1, corporate legal counsel; C3, manager). 
However, it is agreed that it is easier and more effective to communicate, thus being able to 
understand each other deeply with the same home language than a different foreign language 
(C1, F1, F2, manager; F2, corporate legal counsel; L2, L3, lawyer). In addition, different 
home languages can complicate and lengthen negotiation or resolution process; translating a 
lengthy agreement from one language to another certainly takes time (L4, lawyer).  
On the contrary, one argues that language itself can to some extent become an obstacle, as 
different home languages mean different cultural backgrounds, expression styles and so forth 
and the understanding of certain language or concepts can be different (L3, lawyer; C2, 
corporate legal counsel). Moreover, depending on the level of English language skills, it can 
be a relatively small barrier (F3, corporate legal counsel). 
The second question is about standard terms and conditions. Standard terms can refer to 
commonly used terms in different contracts, such as miscellaneous clauses, including “force 
majeure”, dispute resolution, validity, and language. Moreover, they may include model 
contractual clauses typical in certain industry, or business fields. For example, in the 
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construction industry, many clauses are from FIDIC model clauses, which are internationally 
used in many countries. From the interview data, we found that standard terms and conditions 
or model clauses in contract documents come from various resources, such as governments, 
business associations, other business partners, previous work experience, industry custom and 
practice. 
According to the respondents, there are recognized benefits of having standard or model 
contract clauses. Firstly, such model clauses can be modified by business parties, according 
to their own business features, needs, and interests, thus providing help for parties to prepare 
for their own contract documents (L1, L2, L3, lawyer). Secondly, they save time, energy and 
human resources for working and discussing on certain contractual clauses. Thus, all 
respondents consider they are not an obstacle to flexibility. On the contrary, flexibility can 
supplement standard terms and conditions (L1, L2, lawyer). 
However, the cost of being flexible during project implementation has to be considered, as a 
company has to earn profits (C1, manager). Furthermore, the attitude of business partners 
towards flexibility can be an obstacle (C2, manager). 
 
4.6. Informal institutions in contracting 
 
The researchers are also aware of the possible influence of informal institutions in contracting 
implementations, thus addressing the informal institutions, particularly trust. All respondents 
recognize that besides contract document, many other elements (such as values, culture, 
reputation, personal relationship, trust, parties’ stakes/interests, parties’ status, good 
communication) also count in maintaining effective business cooperation. Particularly, good 
personal relationship between parties is important to contract performance; with good 
relationships, there will be fewer disputes, less doubt, and effective communication (L1, L2, 
Lawyer).  
Trust plays an important role in good cooperation. Trust is considered the very basic 
precondition for contract and the key basis for business cooperation (C2, F1, F2, manager; F1, 
F2, corporate legal counsel; L1, L2, lawyer).Trust is also the basis for parties to cope with 
changes of circumstances together (C2, manager).  
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Respecting each other is a key for trust building; trust is one’s feeling towards to the other, 
which is a kind of subjective criterion (F1, corporate legal counsel). One gets to know the 
other party and builds trust gradually; at the beginning, there is little trust, and trust can be 
increased over time (C1, C2, F2, manager). 
It is rare for parties to do a project with a new partner at the first time. For companies who are 
in their first-time cooperation, strictly performing the contract (such as delivering projects, 
making payment on time) and honestly trying to resolve a dispute without delay are good 
behaviours that will make a party look trustworthy (F1, F2, corporate legal counsel). 
But trust building is also based on objective criteria. Getting to know the other party well 
beforehand helps to evaluate whether one can fit and cooperate well with each other. One 
may judge whether the other party is trustable based on comprehensive integrated 
information collected concerning the other party (such as project experience, reputation, its 
technology level, performance capabilities, quality of service) (C1, C2, F2, 
manager).Knowledge of each party’s requirements and available resources is also important 
to help both parties to build trust with each other (F1, F2, corporate legal counsel).  
One party may also evaluate and verify trust relation by considering the other’s past 
performance, previous behaviours through business cooperation with it (C1, C2, manager),or 
third-party business parties’ knowledge or opinion of the other party (C2, manager).Thus, 
fulfilling one’s own obligations is essential to establish and maintain trust between parties 
(L4, lawyer; C2, C3, F2, manager). Moreover, the other company’s integrity, value 
congruence, its leader’s personal creditability and ability, its management team’s style and 
capacity are important elements to consider (C2, F2, manager).  
Trust has an effect on flexibility in contracting. With high-level trust, certain costs can be 
reduced; flexible methods are easy to be adopted in contract performance; flexibly dealing 
with disputes is easy; a project is likely to be successful (C2, F1, F2, manager; F1, F2, 
corporate legal counsel; L1, L2, lawyer).  In contrast, absent trust or with only low-level trust, 
changes of circumstances may be misused (C3, F1, F2, manager; F1, corporate legal counsel; 
L1 lawyer); being flexible can become difficult; flexibility may not be easily controlled, 
problems may arise from flexibility, and the end of the project would not be satisfactory (C2, 
F1, manager; L1, lawyer). 
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4.7.Resolving and preventing disputes 
4.7.1. Dispute Resolution Methods 
 
This section deals with methods for resolving disputes arising from change of circumstances 
in practice, and why a particular method is used. The interview data showed that disputes 
were finally resolved through negotiation, arbitration, or litigation. Usually, renegotiation 
(including direct communication) and trying to make compromises the preferred option for 
business parties after disputes arise (C1, C2, C3, F1, manager).The partners are considered as 
an interest group (F1, F2, manger); and long-term project cooperation objectives are 
highlighted during renegotiation process (F1, C2, manager). All respondents considered that 
the original contracts are the basis and an important tool to resolve disputes. Additionally, 
principles of impartiality and fairness are also stressed in dispute resolution process (L4, 
lawyer). 
To resolve disputes through court litigation is very rare. Most respondents indicated that 
going to court to solve a dispute is only considered as the last resort when all other methods 
do not work out. Particularly in the construction industry, companies rarely go to court, since 
if disputes go to a court, a project has to be delayed or stopped and no party can bear the huge 
loss of delaying or stopping an on-going project (F1, lawyer; C2, manager). Some elements, 
such as what kind of loss(including reputation loss) it will lead to, whether one has the 
financial capability to continue the performance, will be considered and evaluated by the 
parties before going to court(F1, F3, corporate legal counsel; C2, manager). 
However, there are also reasons to consider resolving a problem through litigation, such as 
litigation may lead to a better result than other methods (L3, lawyer); it is convenient for 
client to sue in a local court; or resolving the dispute is not so urgent (L4, lawyer). 
Commercial arbitration is a common alternative method to resolve disputes. The arbitration 
institution, the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (hereinafter 
CIETAC) is widely recognized in China. Most respondents consider that resolving disputes 
through arbitration is better than through litigation. The differences of solving disputes 
between through arbitration and litigation are recognized and compared, according to their 
experiences.  
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First, arbitration provides chances for parties to choose substantial rules and make agreement 
on certain matters; thus parties may have more rights in arbitration than in litigation. 
Secondly, in arbitration, both parties have quite equal status. Arbitrators with good standing 
can be relatively impartial, and arbitration process is fairer than litigation. Thirdly, mostly 
arbitrators are experts in some particular industry, whereas judges are not. Fourthly, 
arbitration is confidential and the process is not open to the public. However, usually 
litigation has to be open to the public. Thus some business secrets can be better protected 
under arbitration.  
Fifthly, arbitration procedure and process is simpler, shorter, and more flexible, transparent 
and efficient than litigation (L3, lawyer). The decision from an arbitral tribunal is final, and 
no appeal is allowed; whereas litigation allows appeal, entailing delay and higher costs. 
Sixthly, arbitration institutions, such as the CIETAC, basically are  independent, and will not 
be negatively influenced by local governmental bodies in making awards. However, courts 
can be negatively influenced by local protection. Finally, enforceability is easier under 
arbitration, where an international Convention (New York Convention) assists the awards 
enforcement. This is especially meaningful in terms of international arbitral disputes.  
In theory, commercial mediation is a common alternative for dispute resolution. However, it 
is surprisingly found that although mediation under court procedure is common in Chinese 
courts, commercial mediation is not known and not used to resolve business disputes in 
practice in China. One reason is that agreement reached through commercial mediation 
institution is not binding and valid, thus is not enforceable through the courts. Furthermore, 
the impartiality, function and benefits of commercial mediation are not clear to parties, and 
thus parties prefer arbitration (F1, legal counsel).  
 
4.7.2. Preventive and proactive approach 
 
This part examines the questions on how preventive and proactive approach is practiced. 
Preventing risks or bad things from happening is common sense (F2, F3, corporate legal 
counsel; C1, F1, manager). Signing contract itself is considered as a method of risk 
prevention; particularly, dispute resolution clauses are considered important (L2, L3, L4, 
lawyer). One lawyer suggested that preventing disputes should be considered in every case. 
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Questions such as how to prevent risk of disputes, how to resolve them when disputes arise, 
what procedure is better for clients’ interests and so forth, should be considered when 
contracts are drafted (L1, lawyer). 
This preventive and proactive approach is considered highly important and is applied in 
practice. In one company, risk management and prevention is highly valued; it also has a 
manual concerning risk management for its staff. In the manual, risks and preventive 
measures for such risks are listed carefully (C2, manager).Such approach is also applied in 
areas such as contract design and implementation (F2, F3, corporate legal counsel).A 
manager considered that taking good care of one’s own task is essential in a project; and 
recommended that a company should not accumulate problems or conflicts. Once a problem 
occurs, trying to solve it immediately at the very early stage is the best (F1, corporate legal 
counsel, manager). 
In addition, in long-term cooperation, regular communication within partners is considered as 
a good preventive practice (F2, manager). Sometimes, due diligence examination is 
conducted and experts opinions are collected in advance (L2, lawyer). At the same time, cost 
is recognized as an issue for parties to consider; preventive measures to guard against 
dishonest or potential risks may add some costs (C2, corporate legal counsel). 
 
4.8. Suggestions to managers and lawyers in practice 
 
Finally, the study investigates how good cooperation can be achieved between managers and 
lawyers, and considers suggestions from lawyers and managers to each other in their daily 
practice in order to effectively contribute to the success of projects. There are generally three 
suggestions to managers from lawyers. Firstly, managers should improve their awareness of 
the importance of law and contract, appreciate lawyers’ role, invite lawyers to participate in 
business cooperation at early stages, and review their contracts, so that lawyers can provide 
proper legal opinions on certain issues beforehand (L1, and L2, L4, lawyer). With early 
engagement, lawyers can get to know more about the project and project process. Then 
lawyers may foresee potential risks during project implementation, and design some 
preventive measures for some particular problems (C2, legal counsel). 
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Secondly, managers should have general (but not necessarily extensive) knowledge in 
different fields, such as business, legal, and accounting; before making a business decision, 
managers should try their best to know the related issue well from many different points of 
view (including legal points) (L2, lawyer). Then they should seek proper experts to do things 
that they cannot do well (F1, legal counsel; L1, lawyer). 
Thirdly, lawyers hope managers respect lawyers’ working style, trust lawyers’ expertise, and 
leave legal affairs for lawyers to deal with without unnecessary intervention (L3, lawyer). A 
good manager is a good partner of a lawyer (F1, legal counsel). Effective coordination and 
communication between lawyers and managers is required in order to cooperate well. 
There are also a few recommendations from managers towards lawyers. Firstly, managers 
hope lawyers can take initiatives to know and then evaluate relevant international rules, local 
rules, customs, commercial policies in the foreign country where a project will be 
implemented; and provide more help and advice to managers in foreign/international projects 
(C1 and C2, managers).Secondly, lawyers will contribute more to preventing potential risks 
through better understanding of projects by engagement in earlier stages of projects (C2, 
manager). 
Thirdly, it will be valuable if lawyers can review what has been done after each stage of 
project implementation during the project process, so lawyers may prevent potential 
problems in advance for the next stage; and provide a summary on what are good and bad 
practices after the whole project is completed (C2, manager).Fourthly, sometime lawyers 
consider too many potential risks, which preclude them from flexibility; thus lawyers should 
try to become more flexible (F1, F2, manager). 
5. Main research findings 
5.1. Is flexibility needed? 
 
The respondents shared the opinion that flexibility in contracting is needed in order to deal 
with uncertainty and to solve disputes. To many of the respondents changes of circumstances 
were common and normal. They also agreed that contract cannot prescribe all situations: 
unexpected changes of circumstances can arise at any phase of the project. 
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The respondents’ attitudes toward flexibility can be justified with economic terms. 
Uncertainty reduces contracting parties’ confidence in performance and thus reduces 
willingness in contracting. Uncertainty reduces also the profitability of the transaction, 
because unexpected changes of circumstances may endanger the continuation of the 
transaction. Thus flexibility in contracting is needed to alleviate problems arising from 
changes of circumstances.   
According to the respondents flexibility in contracting is also needed to reduce transaction 
costs. This statement can also be justified with economic terms. Parties can save negotiation 
costs because they do not have to negotiate about a procedure for all probable changes of 
circumstances at the time of concluding the contract. In addition, including a provision for 
each probable change of circumstances in the contract would increase contracting costs and 
would only make the contract complex and difficult to understand, which would increase ex 
post transaction costs. Thus, by leaving the contract flexible, contracting parties can save 
transaction costs. 
However, the respondents seemed to invest in ex ante searching costs in order to get to know 
the future partner very well before concluding a contract. Investment in ex ante transaction 
costs is economically justified particularly in long-term contract relationships, in which the 
profits accrue in the form of constant stream of quasi-rents. Careful searching for a reliable 
partner can be seen as a preventive measure against the risk of changes of circumstances.  
Investment in ex ante searching costs reduces ex post transaction costs, because contract is 
concluded only with trustworthy and reliable partners. 
 
Furthermore, some lawyers emphasised that flexibility is needed to protect clients’ interests. 
Altruistic behaviour is not usually connected with neoclassical economic analysis but 
experimental research has proved that people are not satisfied with unequal share of common 
surplus.
52
Therefore during the contract performance, besides considering one’s own interests, 
it is also necessary to try to balance the other party’s interests.Investing in contracting and 
negotiation costs in order to conclude a mutually beneficial contract increases the value of 
cooperation and strengthens the confidence in performance.  
 
                                                          
52
 Güth, Werner; Schmittberger, Rolf and Schwarze, Alan (1982) “An Experimental Analysis of 
Ultimatum Bargaining”, Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, Vol. 3, (pp. 367–388). 
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5.2. Flexibility in contract documents 
 
The data analysis revealed that flexibility in contracting manifested itself in two ways, 
flexibility in contract documents and flexibility in contracting practise. In contract documents, 
flexibility is mainly reflected in flexible words/phrases used in contract terms and contract 
clauses dealing with changes of circumstances. The economic aim of flexible contract clauses 
is to alleviate the consequences of unexpected changes of circumstances which would 
otherwise destroy the original intention of the parties. For example relief clauses and force 
majeure clauses are justified if the costs of performance would destroy the promisor’s 
business. In addition, some clauses concerning trade practises, trade customs or general 
standard terms are stipulated to be used in a certain field of industry. According to economic 
arguments these standards are efficient for most of the parties, because they represent the will 
of majority of the parties and they save time in negotiating these clauses. 
The language used in contract clauses plays also a crucial role in allowing flexibility in 
contracts. Whether flexibility in contract clauses leads to good or bad result depends on the 
clarity of the words and phrases and the method of interpretation of the flexible clauses and 
principles.The equity and foreseeability of the court judgements depends largely on the legal 
culture. But since court enforcement is not the main dispute resolution mechanism, this has 
little bearing in practise.   
The lack of common language may reduce flexibility and increase transaction costs. It is 
easier to communicate with home language than with foreign language. Because of different 
cultural background the concepts and expressions may have a different meaning than the 
party anticipated. Therefore different home languages may complicate negotiations and 
increase negotiation costs. Translation costs will also increase contracting costs. In addition, 
the danger of misunderstanding is greater than with common home language. Thus, different 
languages may increase ex post transaction costs. 
 
5.3. Flexibility in contracting practise 
 
Flexbility in contractual practice is manifested in the way business partners react to changes 
of circumstances during the contracting period and performance. In a long-term contractual 
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relationship it is often more profitable for both of the parties that the cooperation continues 
rather than terminates. If an unexpected change of circumstances threatens the continuity of 
the relationship, the partners prefer renegotiations. Especially if neither of the parties is at 
fault, the partners are ready to compromise and share the losses. Afterwards the amendments 
may be added into the contract. The parties try to react to the changes of circumstances as 
soon as possible in order to give the other party enough time to respond to the change. 
Immediate notification is a preventive measure to minimize losses. Stopping cooperation, or 
discharging contracts are rarely used, because they may have harmful impact on the future 
business. 
Common goals in a long-term contract relationship increase flexibility in contracting 
practice. Before concluding a contract, parties would continue negotiations until they have 
common principles, recognize mutual benefits, and share a common vision about the goals of 
cooperation. The skills and capabilities of the contracting parties increase flexibility. Business 
partners have adapted to changes of circumstances by developing abilities to deal with them. 
Important abilities are cooperation and coordination.Trust may also contribute to resolving 
disputes where the project is under control.  
 
Furthermore, business partners may prepare for changes of circumstances ex ante before 
concluding the contract and take actions to prevent losses during the contracting period and 
performance. The respondents took preventive and proactive measures against the changes of 
circumstances in long-term and project contracts. Proactive measures were for example 
investments in gathering information about the potential partner and investments in allocating 
foreseeable risks in the contract clauses. Preventive measures were, for example, immediate 
reactions to unexpected changes of circumstances. The parties try to react to the changes of 
circumstances as soon as possible in order to give the other party enough time to respond to 
the change.  Preventive measuresare thus justified as they minimize losses.  
 
5.4. Flexibility vs. formality 
 
The respondents see a tension between rigid and flexible contracts.  It is difficult to share a 
common viewabout the suitable amount of flexibility.Acertain degree of flexibility is needed, 
but too much flexibility could make the contract lose itsvalue and meaning. Particularly the 
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lawyers emphasised that flexibility has to be well balanced with certainty. One of them 
mentioned that inserting certain types of flexibility should not leave room for disputes. 
Companies in China are gradually recognizing the importance of contracts in business 
cooperation, and take contracts and contracting processes quite seriously. Lawyers seem to 
prefer formal contracts. Contracts are considered not only as a guarantee and protection for 
business transactions, but also a preventive tool for risk management.Lawyers highlight the 
importance of sharing risks by inclusive and exact contract clauses and they want the clauses 
to be complied with if disputes arise. They also want amendments to be added to the contract 
documents.  
Managers also prefer rigid contracts, but they seem to see them in another different 
perspective from lawyers. For managers a written formal contract works more as a basis for 
reallocation of risks than as an ex ante risk management device. For example if production 
technology fails or material costs arise, the contract clauses work as reference points against 
the changes that can be reevaluated and in accordance to that the duties and liabilities can be 
shared and prices adjusted. 
 
5.5. Contract law and enforcement in China: complementary role of formal and informal 
institutions 
 
The respondents seem to rely more on informal enforcement mechanisms than on formal 
ones in international long-term business relationships. As to formal dispute resolution 
mechanisms, commercial arbitration was the most common dispute resolution mechanism. 
Instead, court enforcement was very rarely used and commercial mediation was not practiced 
at all.Arbitration procedure was considered faster, fairer and more confidential than litigation. 
In addition, arbitrators were believed to have better standing and expertise than judges. From 
the respondents especially the managers seemed to rely more on informal enforcement 
mechanisms than did the lawyers and legal counsels. 
 
The attitudes of the respondents can be understood in the light of institutional theory. China 
has a unique institutional environment: the modern legal system in China is very young and 
the formal legal culture is still very thin. Instead, personal relations and connections are 
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important factors when doing business. Even though Chinese contract law itself is quite 
advanced, the lack of trust in the impartiality and expertise of the judges has restrained 
companies’ willingness to use court enforcement. This is not, however a negative 
phenomenon. Unwillingness to go to the court increases incentives to renegotiate and find a 
cooperative solution. It also increases incentives to comply with the terms of the written 
contract document so that court enforcement is unnecessary. In addition, distrust in court 
enforcement induces the parties to use informal enforcement mechanisms. 
 
Chinese contracting culture rests on Guanxi. Deep personal relationship seems to be a more 
important factor than formal rules of contract law in creating trust and confidence in 
performance between business partners. The respondents mentioned several times mutual 
trust as an important element of cooperation. According to the respondents cooperation is not 
started until the company has acquired sufficient information about the trustworthiness of the 
potential partner.  
 
Good reputation is a valuable asset for a business company to signal its trustworthiness. In 
relational contracting, contracts are concluded only with trustworthy partners. This creates 
incentives for the companies to protect their reputation. The desire to protect good reputation 
strengthens the power of informal enforcement mechanisms. It restrains incentives to 
opportunism and increases parties’ confidence in performance and the willingness to 
cooperate. 
 
On the other hand, the lack of good reputation can become an obstacle for a foreign firm to 
start business with Chinese companies. For example a newly started company may not be 
able to signal its’ trustworthiness, because it is not yet known in the field and it has not yet 
managed to conclude a wide enough nexus of connections. Thus Guanxi can become an 
obstacle to entry. 
 
Good reputation can be an important criterion when searching for a trustworthy and 
cooperative trading partner. Thus reputation reduces ex ante searching costs. Good reputation 
also protects transacting partners against contractual hazards due to incomplete contracts. If 
both parties have good reputation, parties can save negotiating and contracting costs, because 
they do not need to include safeguards in the contract to protect specific investments against 
the opposing party’s opportunistic behaviour. Good reputation protects also from other 
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contractual hazards, because reputation strengthens trust between the parties and increases 
willingness to share private information. Sharing private information makes it possible to 
increase mutual gains and reduce transaction costs, because the risks can be allocated to the 
party who can bear them with lower costs.53 
 
Moreover, the role of self-enforcement mechanism was also recognized. The interdependency 
of the parties makes the contract self-enforcing by creating incentives for the parties to avoid 
the termination of the contract as long as the stream of future quasi rents is greater than short-
term gains of a one-time performance. When both of the parties have a lot at stake, they are 
more willing to give up something and find a compromise. The respondents mentioned 
several restorative measures to the unforeseen changes of circumstances: immediate 
notification, helping in difficulties, protecting partner’s interests and willingness to share 
losses. 
 
The status of informal institutions is very strong in China. Especially the managers seem to 
rely more on informal enforcement mechanisms than the lawyers and legal counsels. Instead, 
lawyers’ and legal counsels seem to be more respectful towards the legal system than 
managers, and they see that the law gives framework for cooperation. We consider that 
informal enforcement mechanisms bring flexibility into the long-term contract relationship, 
because they guarantee the quality of the performance and the continuity of the relationship 
in unexpected and uncertain changes of circumstances. We thus conclude that informal 
institutions or mechanisms supplement or complement formal enforcement mechanisms in 
contract enforcement in China. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
This empirical study concerning flexibility in contract documents and contractual practice in 
China presents interesting findings. International project business nowadays presents great 
challenges to managers and lawyers. Flexibility is definitely needed during project 
implementation for business partners’ common targets. However, flexibility has to be 
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balanced with certainty, which is also required from business parties. Thus, an important 
issue is how to balance flexibility with certainty. Managers are likely to consider changes 
quite normal, and they are ready to deal with them flexibly in contracting practice. Lawyers 
instead seem to prefer formal contracts and clear rules.  
However, effective communication between company managers and lawyers is not a 
common practice. Lawyers seem to come to the stage too late –when the problems arise. 
Three reasons may explain why this phenomenon takes place. Firstly, in Chinese traditional 
culture, litigations and lawyers are not welcome by business parties. Usually parties will first 
try to solve any dispute with their partners without a third-party. Such tradition may still have 
its influence. Secondly, managers and lawyers usually do not share the same value towards 
the same issues. Thus managers may see lawyers as obstacles in their business decision-
makings. Thus, within such environment, lawyers are not willing to take imitative to 
communicate with managers, unless managers come to them. Thirdly, involving lawyers 
indicates more costs (including monetary cost and time cost). This may make business parties 
hesitate to communicate with lawyers. Lawyers could have a preventive role in defining the 
content of contract in order to control the risks ex ante. Managers could rely more on lawyers’ 
expertise if they were better informed about the whole contract project. 
The research findings will provide insights both to legal academics and practitioners, and 
business community.  It must be pointed out that the findings are based on a small number of 
interviews, and thus cannot be generalized. Future research should include a study with a 
large amount of empirical data. In addition, empirical study on the topic in other countries is 
encouraged, which will enable us to compare contracting practices of companies in similar 
industries in different countries.  
A practical implication is that managers and lawyers need to adopt a more cooperative 
attitude towards each other; and should establish more interactive and effective 
communication channels in order to contribute to the final success of projects. According to 
the respondents better results could be achieved with better coordination and communication 
between lawyers and managers. Lawyers should participate in the business operation at an 
earlier stage in order to get more familiar with the whole project and managers should 
contemplate the business relationship from a broader perspective and ask for lawyers’ and 
experts’ help in good time before any risk has materialized. 
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F3, Corporate legal counsel, Interview, conducted on 03 July 2013, Tuesday, Shanghai.  
 
L1, Lawyer, Law Firm, Interivew, conducted on 13 July 2012, Friday, Beijing.  
 
L2, Lawyer, Law Firm, Interview, conducted on 16 July 2012, Monday, Beijing.  
 
L3, Lawyer, Law Firm, Interview, conducted on 09 July 2012, Monday, Hangzhou.  
 
L4, Lawyer, Law Firm, Answers to Interview Queestions, received on 20 July 2012, Friday, 
Shanghai.  
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Legal implications of flexibility in business contracting 
from the German perspective:  
Control of standard terms and conditions and the choice of law
1
 
 
 
RA DR. HANS-WERNER MORITZ
2
 & RA MAXIMILIAN KUHN
3
 
 
This paper is concerned with flexibility in business contracting within the German legal system. After 
a short introduction about the constitutional background of freedom in contracting in the Federal 
Republic of Germany it describes in the first part how freedom of business contracting is actually 
considerably curtailed within the German legal system. 
 
The German Civil Code (BGB) provides for a rigid control of standard terms and conditions through 
the German courts: While there are detailed provisions regulating the dos and don'ts in commercial 
B2C contracts, the law allows the users of standard terms and conditions more flexibility in B2B 
contracts. However, German courts very often do not sufficiently distinguish between B2B and B2C 
contracts and apply the stringent B2C rules to B2B contracts without taking account of the 
requirements and established business practices in a given industry. The authors introduce several 
suggestions how to solve this issue. 
 
The second part of the paper deals with the possibility of choice of law under the prerequisite not to 
completely leave the German legal system. Discussed are the regimes of CISG and PECL as 
alternatives to the current German regime. 
 
 
1. Preamble 
 
This survey describes legal implications of flexibility in business contracting from the 
German perspective. European aspects will be included in so far as they have a bearing on the 
German perspective. 
 
                                               
1
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2
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3
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The flexibility issue addressed in this project directly relates to the freedom of individuals 
and corporations to form contracts without government restrictions. The freedom to contract 
is the underpinning of laissez-faire economics and is the cornerstone of free market 
libertarianism.  
 
 
2. Definitions 
 
In Germany freedom of contract is protected by Article 2 subsection 1 of the Constitution 
which provides that everyone may contract with which every party and for whatever subject 
matter one chooses, insofar as the content is not contrary to current law or public policy, or 
expressly statutorily forbidden. 
 
Freedom of contract can be distinguished as follows:
4
 
 
 
2.1. Freedom to enter into contracts 
 
Freedom to enter into contracts is the freedom of a person, to decide on his or her own terms 
whether, where, when and with whom he or she wishes to enter into a contractually binding 
relation with another person. This freedom may be limited by mandatory obligations to 
conclude a contract. An example of such obligation is the supply of electricity, where the 
electricity provider must supply the customer. 
 
 
2.2. Freedom of the contractual form  
 
Freedom of the contractual form means that one does not have to use a set form for the 
contract or choose a form defined by statute. There are some exceptions, e.g. for contracts 
                                               
4
 The following definitions are suggested by Notariat Michael Becker, Königstraße 17, D-01097 
Dresden, avail-able at http://www.koenigstrasse17.de/lang-de/notars/278-vertragsfreiheit.html. 
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including estate transfer, which are only valid by notarization according to section 311b 
subsection 1 German civil code (BGB)
5
. 
 
 
2.3. Freedom of content 
 
Freedom of content means that one can determine the content of the contract as one wishes, 
including allowing for the creation of new types of contract. 
  
The following survey will address all aspects of the above definitions.  
 
 
3. General rules of contract law in Germany 
 
The BGB generally provides for freedom of the content of a contract (section 311 BGB). 
However, a contract is null and void if its content is contrary to mandatory law (section 134 
BGB) or contrary to good faith and fair dealing (section 138 BGB). 
 
3.1. Standard terms and conditions in the BGB 
 
Furthermore standard terms and conditions used by a contract party are null and void if they 
inadequately disadvantage the other contract party contrary to the requirements of good faith 
and fair dealing (section 307 BGB). Section 307 BGB also applies to B2B-contracts however 
courts must adequately consider commercial usages and commercial practices. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
5
 German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB)  in the version promulgated on  January 2, 
2002 (Federal Law Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt) I p. 42, 2909; 2003 I, p. 738), last amended by statute 
of September 28, 2009 I 3161, online available at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/bgb/BJNR001950896.html and translated into English at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html. 
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3.2. Control of standard terms and conditions by the courts  
 
3.2.1. De lege lata  
 
Actually industry associations and legal experts are vividly discussing in Germany whether 
the control of standard terms and conditions in B2B-contracts is too rigid and should be 
reformed. De facto the jurisdiction does in the majority of cases not distinguish between 
consumer contracts and those without consumers as one of the contracting parties, although 
such distinction is expressly made in the BGB (Vogenauer, 2013, pp. 264 et seq.). Basically 
three proposals are under discussion.  
 
3.2.2. De lege ferenda 
 
3.2.2.1. Discussed is the relaxation of the strict requirements, which are currently demanded 
by the jurisdiction for the existence of an uncontrolled individual agreement. According to 
section 305 subsection 1 sentence 3 BGB, clauses have to be checked as standard terms and 
conditions when they are supposed to be used more than only once by one of the contracting 
parties and have not been topic in negotiations in a certain way. Actually, the German Federal 
Supreme Court accepts only as an “Aushandeln im Einzelnen” (lit.: negotiation with full 
details) in the sense of section 305 subsection 1 sentence 3 BGB, if the content of the 
standard terms and conditions, which is deviating from law, is seriously put to the decision by 
the using party, and the negotiating partner is given freedom of scope to represent his 
interests; according to that, the client has to get in real terms the possibility to influence the 
content of the contractual obligations.
6
 
 
Reformers argue against this judicative principle, which says that “Aushandeln” means more 
than simply “Verhandeln” (lit. also negotiate). According to them, it should be easier to 
exclude single clauses from the control according to section 305 et seq. BGB by making them 
a topic in contract negotiations.
7
 Some even don’t want to wait for a change in jurisdiction, 
                                               
6
 BGH (Bundesgerichtshof - German Federal Supreme Court) in: Neue Juristische Wochenschrift - 
NJW (1998) p. 3488, on p. 3489; BGHZ (civil law decisions by the German Federal Supreme Court) 
150, p. 299, on p. 302 et seq. = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift - NJW (2002) p. 2388, on p. 2389. 
7
 Fornasier, „Die Klauselkontrolle im unternehmerischen Geschäftsverkehr - für eine Neubestimmung 
der zivil- und kartellrechtlichen Grenzen der Vertragsfreiheit“, published in: Forschungsinstitut für 
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which would be possible under current law but would probably take its time due to the 
German legal system, but call for a revision of section 305 BGB by the legislator.
8
 
 
3.2.2.2. Others propose that judicial control of standard terms and conditions should only 
happen depending on the value of the deal. A judicial control of the standard terms and 
conditions should not happen, if the value of the contract is above a certain limit, usually 
determined at a scale between 500.000,- € and 1 Mio. €.9 This approach is based on a new 
theory, according to which the true reason for the protection against standard terms and 
conditions by law is not the need for compensation because of the difference in economic 
power between the contracting parties, but to override information- and motivation 
asymmetries between them, because for the contracting party being confronted with the 
standard terms and conditions it’s often not worth the trouble to read all the fine print as 
regularly only a single contract of often small value is at stake.
10
 
 
The Problem with this is how to set the value of a contract. Furthermore it makes a 
difference, if a contract is part of the core business or not or if it’s only about a single contract 
between the contracting parties or several contracts within running business relations. 
 
3.2.2.3. There’s also a discussion about changing the case law regarding section 307 BGB, 
using the words „unangemessene Benachteiligung“ (lit.: inadequate disadvantage) for more 
leeway in B2B-cases. Particularly, it is suggested that courts no longer use the interdictions of 
certain clauses for B2C-contracts in section 308 BGB and section 309 BGB as an indication 
for qualifying a clause as an „unangemessenen Benachteiligung“ in the sense of the blanket 
clause in section 307 subsection 1 sentence 1 BGB.  
 
As mentioned above under a), because of the peculiarities of the German legal system such a 
change will take time, because rulings of the German Federal Supreme Court will be needed. 
                                               
Wirtschaftsverfas-sung und Wettbewerb e.V., Köln (FIW), Schwerpunkte des Kartellrechts 2011, Carl 
Heymanns Verlag, Cologne Munich (2012), p. 16, on p. 21 et seq. 
8
 Berger, „Für eine Reform des AGB-Rechts im Unternehmerverkehr“, published in Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift - NJW (2010) p. 465, on p. 467. 
9
 Leuschner, „AGB-Kontrolle im unternehmerischen Verkehr - Zu den Grundlagen einer 
Reformdebatte“, published in: Juristenzeitung - JZ (2010), p. 875, on p. 883 et seq.; Fornasier, please 
see fn. 4, on p. 22. 
10
 Fornasier, please see fn. 4, on p. 19 et seq. 
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And therefor cases are necessary which find their way to the German Federal Supreme Court, 
which is even more difficult as by now there exists abundant case law (“ständige 
Rechtsprechung”) of the lower courts concerning section 305 et seq. BGB, and therefore, 
there is - according to section 543 subsection 2 German civil procedure code (ZPO)
11
 - hardly 
a reason for lower courts to allow appeal to the German Federal Supreme Court.
12
 
 
 
4. Control of standard terms and conditions through the act against restrictions of 
competition 
 
Although the control of standard terms and conditions in the BGB aims to protect the 
individual contractual counterpart and the German Act against Restrictions of Competition 
(GWB)
13
 aims to protect competition in principle, both laws can generally be applied side by 
side, especially due to their different aims and intervention limits.
14
 From the perspective of 
the above mentioned new theory, that control of standard terms and conditions as laid down 
in the BGB in section 305 et seq. BGB is not intended to compensate differences in economic 
power between the contractual parties but to override asymmetries in information and 
motivation between them (cp. above), a protection gap is opened, that possibly could be 
closed by certain reforms of the GWB.
15
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
11
 German civil procedure code (Zivilprozessordnung, ZPO) in the version promulgated on 5 
December 2005 (Federal Law Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt) I p. 3202 ;2006 I p. 431) (2007 I p. 1781) 
last amended by statute of 22 December 2011 I 3044, online available at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/zpo/BJNR005330950.html. 
12
 Berger, „Für eine Reform des AGB-Rechts im Unternehmerverkehr“, published in Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift - NJW (2010) p. 465, on p. 466; Fornasier, please see fn. 4, on p. 2 et seq. 
13
 German Act against Restrictions of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, 
GWB) in the version promulgated on 15 July 2005 (Federal Law Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt) I p. 
2114; 2009 I p. 3850), last amended by statute of 22 December 2011 I 3044, online available at 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gwb/ BJNR252110998.html and translated to English at 
http://www.cgerli.org/index.php?id=50& tx_vmdocument search_pi2[docID]=72. 
14
 Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen, AGB-Recht, 11th edition (2011), Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt KG, Cologne, 
Vorb. v. § 307 BGB, marginal numbers 76, 86. 
15
 Fornasier, please see fn. 4, on p. 28. 
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4.1. No practical significance de lege lata (Section 19 Subsection 4 no. 2 GWB) 
 
The GWB already today forbids market dominating enterprises to demand terms and 
conditions that deviate with high probability from those that would be established by 
effective competition (Section 19 Subsection 4 no. 2 GWB). In practice, the impact of this 
provision is quite small up to now. Reasons for this are first the high intervention limit of 
section 19 GWB, as only behavior of market dominating enterprises can be sanctioned, and 
secondly that the standard of scrutiny is difficult to handle: To declare the use of a term or 
condition as an abuse, a comparison with the situation under effective competition is 
required. This is quite complicated, especially as the German Federal Supreme Court asks for 
an overall view of the complete bundle of services (“Gesamtbetrachtung des 
Leistungsbündels”).16 So it is not only to answer the question, if certain singular clauses 
would also be used in a market with effective competition, but also what their effect in the 
whole contractual exchange relationship (“Äquivalenzverhältnis”) is and if this is comparable 
to one concluded in a (hypothetical) market with effective competition.
17
 
 
 
4.2. Potential practical significance de lege ferenda 
 
A big advantage of the control of standard terms and conditions by the GWB in comparison 
to the control by section 305 et seq. BGB is, that a single clause must not be checked in 
isolation but also its interaction with other clauses and the whole contractual exchange 
relationship has to be taken into account.
18
 The main problem with the GBW-approach is the 
limitation of section 19 GWB to market dominating companies. This limitation could be 
lowered according to the example of section 20 subsection 2 GWB by including also 
companies with a relatively strong position in the market, compared to depending small and 
medium-sized enterprises. Also the standard of scrutiny could be simplified, e.g. by also 
applying common legal measures of justice as stated in section 242 BGB (“good faith”) or 
                                               
16
 BGH (Bundesgerichtshof - German Federal Supreme Court), decision from 6.11.1984, Ref. No. 
KVR 13/83, in: Neue Juristische Wochenschrift - NJW (1986) p. 846, on p. 846. 
17
 Fornasier, please see fn. 4, on p. 26. 
18
 Fornasier, please see fn. 4, on p. 27. 
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section 138 subsection 1 BGB (“fair dealing”) as the standard of comparison.19 However, 
currently no efforts of the legislator are known to move in this direction.  
 
 
5. The possibility of choice of law 
 
5.1. Eligibility of the law of contract 
 
There are two further law regimes under which a contract could be concluded (without 
leaving the German legal system at all): the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG)
20
 and the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL)
21
. 
The CISG is part of the German legal system since 1. January 1991 and meshes particularly 
well with German law as it is strongly influenced by continental European legal principles.
22
 
The PECL are merely a set of model rules or restatement of principles of contract law, 
initiated by the European Commission and drawn up by leading contract law academics in 
Europe. However, the practical effects of CISG and PECL will probably be low: 
 
5.2. Freedom of contract under the provisions of the CISG (Article 6) and under the 
counterpart provisions in the PECL 
 
Both, the CISG and the PECL, address the principle of freedom of contract (Article 6 CISG 
and Article 1:102, 1:103 PECL).
23
 But while the CISG is applicable by law whenever the 
requirements of Article 1 subsection 1 lit. a) or lit. b) CISG and none of the exceptions in 
Article 2 - 5 CISG are fulfilled and the CISG is not excluded by the contracting parties (so 
                                               
19
 Fornasier, please see fn. 4, on p. 29. 
20
 Full text online available at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/treaty.html. 
21
 Online available at: 
http://frontpage.cbs.dk/law/commission_on_european_contract_law/PECL%20engelsk/engelsk_partI
_og_II.htm. 
22
 „Law - Made in Germany“, published by Bundesnotarkammer (BNotK), 
Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer (BRAK), Deutscher Anwaltsverein (DAV), Deutscher Industrie- und 
Handelskammertag e.V. (DIHK), Deutscher Notarverein (DNotV) and Deutscher Richterbund (DRB) 
in cooperation, 2nd edition (2012), p. 9; also online available at 
http://www.lawmadeingermany.de/index.htm. 
23
 Schroeter, “Freedom of Contract: Comparison between provisions of the CISG (Article 6) and 
counterpart provisions of the PECL” in: The Vidobona Journal of International Commercial Law and 
Arbitration, Vol. 6 (2002), p. 257, on p. 259. 
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called “opt-out”, Article 6 CISG, only for the law of contracting states of the Convention), 
the PECL is only applicable when the parties have chosen it and otherwise applicable 
national law allows for this choice (so called “opt-in”).24 
But more important are the differences between the two laws concerning freedom of contract 
within their respective system, if they are eventually applicable to a contract: 
 
According to the principal norm in this question, Article 1:102 subsection 1 PECL, the parties 
may determine the content of the contract “subject to the requirements of good faith and fair 
dealing”.25 Article 6 CISG does not contain a similar limitation to the freedom of contract. 
Further Article 1:102 subsection 1 and 2 PECL subjects the freedom of contract to the 
mandatory rules established in Article 4:118 PECL (limitation of the exclusion or restriction 
of remedies for fraud, threats, excessive benefit etc.), Article 6:105 (grossly unreasonable 
exercise of a unilateral right by one party to decide) and Article 8:109 (exclusion or 
restriction of remedies for non-performance if contrary to good faith and fair dealing). Article 
6 CISG names only Article 12 CISG as the single injunction the parties may not derogate 
from. 
 
Finally, according to Article 1:103 subsection 1 PECL national mandatory rules are 
applicable if the law otherwise applicable does not allow their exclusion by the way of choice 
by the parties, and according to Article 1:103 subsection 2 PECL mandatory rules of national, 
supranational and international law which are applicable irrespective of the law governing the 
contract must be given effect. Under the CISG, as far as matters governed by the convention 
are concerned, no mandatory rule of any national, supranational or international law may be 
applied - cp. Article 7 subsection 2 CISG. As not all matters are governed by the Convention, 
mandatory rules are to be given effect whenever a matter is outside the CISG’s scope. 
According to Article 4 lit. a) CISG the Convention “is not concerned with […] the validity of 
the contract or of any of its provisions or of any usage”. So mandatory rules concerning the 
question of validity can also be applicated under CISG. But national mandatory rules remain 
only applicable by Article 4 lit. a) CISG under the condition that the CISG’s provisions and 
fundamental principles are taken into account when they are applied to a CISG contract. So, 
                                               
24
 Schroeter, please see fn. 20, on p. 258. 
25
 Roth/Schubert, in: Münchener Kommentar zum BGB, 6th edition (2012), Verlag C. H. Beck, 
Munich, § 242, marginal no. 159. 
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if national law declares clauses as standard terms and conditions invalid because they are 
incompatible with the essential principles of law from which the contract parties derogate, the 
relevant essential principles are those of the CISG.
26
 
 
As shown above, the legal nature of the CISG as a contract under international law has 
allowed its drafters to go beyond the limits laid down in Article 1:102 and Article 1:103 
PECL. 
 
6. Outlook: Common European sales law 
 
6.1. The European Commission’s proposal 
 
October 2011 the European Commission presented a proposal of a Common European Sales 
Law (CESL).
27
 Its concept is that of an optional, collective material law for cross-border sale 
contracts. That means it can be chosen by the contract parties in addition to national law.
28
 
The question is, if this could be an option to avoid the control of clauses as standard terms 
and conditions according to section 305 et seq. BGB (within the German legal system and 
without complete “escape” to another legal system like e.g. the Swiss one). 
 
6.2. Practical significance doubtful 
 
De facto the possibility of choosing the CESL is not as attractive as it looks at first sight: For 
contracts between enterprises, it can - according to Article 7 of the regulation proposal - 
regularly only be chosen if one of the contract parties is a so called “small or medium-sized 
enterprise” (SME). This depends according to Article 7 subsection 2 CESL on how many 
employees are employed and that the annual turnover or balance sheet total is lower than a 
certain sum, but there are no standards mentioned how to determine this sum. This 
uncertainty even can rise, because Article 13 of the regulation proposal allows the individual 
                                               
26
 Schroeter, please see fn. 20, on p. 260 et seq. 
27
 COM(2011) 635 final, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/common_sales_law/regulation _sales_law_en.pdf. 
28
 In place of many Martinek, in: Staudinger, BGB - Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, 
Ergänzungsband: Eckpfeiler des Zivilrechts, Neubearbeitung 2012, Verlag De Gruyter; Sellier & Co, 
Berlin, A. BGB aktuell 2012 / 2013, marginal no. 120. 
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countries to decide, that within their sphere the CESL can also be used for contracts between 
two enterprises regardless of their size. In addition, also the CESL contains in its Article 79 in 
conjunction with Article 86 prescriptions that are similar to those concerning standard terms 
and conditions in section 305 et seq. BGB,
29
 so that it is not sure that German courts really 
will decide differently but will apply their usual interpretation as under German law. 
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Rigidity is a typical feature of contract law, since the cornerstone of contract law is that contracts bind 
the parties to it. Rigid contract law, however, is a challenge for contractual relations, where flexibility 
is needed. Russian contract law is rigid even compared to many other national contract laws, although 
the Russian Civil Code was completely re-written to correspond to the needs of a new market 
economy in the 1990´s. Due to the socialist inheritance, even contracting practices in business are 
exceptionally rigid. Such a contract culture reflecting strong attitudes of legal centralism leads on the 
one hand to peculiar ways in circumventing the rigid rules of contract law and neglecting written 
contract documents in favor of flexible practices on the other. 
 
The article approaches contacts from two different standpoints. Firstly we study how flexibility is 
introduced in the rigid and formal contract law in the Russian Civil Code and court practice. Secondly 
we study Russian contract culture through interviews of businesspeople. We analyze our findings 
through several economic and sociological theories in a multidisciplinary way. The approach to 
understanding contracts is proactive law regarding contract as a tool in business promoting business 
goals rather than a legal device. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Legal centralist law, multiplicity of norms and contracting cultures 
 
Contemporary business functions in a global world in an environment of constant changes. 
Therefore especially long-term business cooperation requires flexibility in contracting. 
Contract law, however, was created for more stable circumstances and for ordinary sales 
transactions, in which keeping promises is the main goal, not adjusting to constant changes in 
the environment. Pacta sunt servanda is the strong cornerstone of contract law. Connected 
with freedom of contract, the wide private autonomy of contract law is supposed to protect 
the parties, who rely on the binding effect of contracts in their original form.  
 
Classical Continental contract doctrine sees contract as a consent formed through expressions 
of the free will of the parties.
5
 Freedom of contract, which is based on the free will of the 
parties, allows contracting parties to draft more flexible contracts if they wish to do so. In 
principle the rigid nature of contract law may even encourage either to introduce flexibility in 
contract documents or to nourish it in contractual relations. 
 
Lawyers often ignore the fact that contracts are not written for courts and lawyers to interpret 
the will of the parties. They tend to pay attention only to the legal dimension of contracts and 
from that standpoint defend the classical interpretation of pacta sunt servanda. A court-
centered approach, which is anchored to legislation, court cases and legal doctrines and 
which forgets that contracts are made for business cooperation and that disputes are more 
often solved outside courtrooms with other than strictly legal rules, is called legal centralism.
6
 
Lawyers tend to focus only on legally binding rules, which are protected by courts, and 
ignore all other sets of norms and rules as non-binding.  Lawyers generally represent legal 
centralism, while businesses may have to respect business practices, which may bind them 
even more effectively than legally binding rules. Even if breaking such rules might not be 
                                                        
5
  E.g.: Popondopulo, Vladimir F. (1987) Ob´´ektyvnye granitsi, pravovye formy i kriterii 
klassifikatsii obezatelstv. Problemy grazhdanskogo prava. Leningrad; Larenz, Karl (1989) 
Allgemeiner Teil des deutschen Bürgerliches Rechts. Ein Lehrbuch 7, 515. Aufl. Verlag C.H. Beck. 
München; Hemmo, Mika (2006) Sopimusoikeuden oppikirja. Talentum, Helsinki, 31. 
6
   See:  Galanter, Marc (1981) Justice in Many Rooms. Courts, private ordering and indigenous law. 
Legal Pluralism 19 (1981), 1-47; Nysten-Haarala, Soili (1998) The Long-term Contract. – Contract 
law and contracting. Finnish Lawyers Publishing, Helsinki. 
The Interplay of Flexibility and Rigidity in Russian Business Contracting 
112 
sanctioned in courts, loosing reputation in business may be a more effective sanction. Legal 
sociologists and anthropologists pay attention to the multiplicity of different sets of rules, 
which seems to increase in global business. Businesses have to cope with global, national and 
local rules, which may contradict each other.
7
 
 
The plurality or multiplicity of norms has also been recognized in legal studies. Private 
international law has always dealt with the conflict of laws, which traditionally focuses on 
which country’s law is applied in international legal problems between companies or 
individuals.  Nowadays there is also a discussion on lex mercatoria or New Merchant Law, 
focusing on the need to accept international principles and rules (UNIDROIT Principles, 
Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) and alike) as sources of law in court decisions.
8
 
The circle of international commercial lawyers already applies such sets of rules in private 
arbitral tribunals. It can be claimed that international business contract law resembles an 
international legal system, while national contract laws are only variations of it. Even this 
international contract law reflects legal centralism, but with a universal approach. It 
emphasizes similar features in national laws and promotes unification or harmonization of 
contract law.
9
 
 
The principle of freedom of contract promotes the multi-regulatory environment of 
international business. National contract law, such as the Russian Civil Code is mostly non-
mandatory; such default rules are applied only if not otherwise agreed in the contract. 
Although there is also a growing tendency towards an increase of mandatory norms, which 
protect either consumers or competition on the market, businesses have alternatives in 
choosing the law and regulations, which are applied to their contracts.  
                                                        
7
  Сf. the discussion on global legal pluralism e.g. Teubner, G. (1992) The Two Faces of Janus: 
Rethinking Legal pluralism. Cardozo Law Review 13, 1443-1451; Teubner, Gunther (1997) Global 
Bukowina: legal pluralism in the world society. In Teubner (ed.) Global Law without a State. 
Dartmouth Aldershot, 3-28; Michaels, Ralf (2005) The Re-State-ment of Non-State Law: the State, 
Choice of Law, and the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism. Duke Law School Legal Studies 
Research paper Series, No 81 (September 2005). Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=809244 
(accessed 26 August 2014); Berman, Paul Schiff (2005) From International Law to Law and 
Globalization. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law Vol. 43(2), (2005) 485-556. 
8
  See e.g. Berger, Klaus Peter (2010) The Creeping Codification of the New Lex Mercatoria. Kluwer 
Law International; Von Bar, Christian and Mankowski Peter (2003) Internationales Privatrecht. Band 
1. Allgemeine Lehren. 2 edition. Beck München. 
9
  See e.g. Lando, Ole (2007), Is Good Faith an Over-Arching General Clause in the Principles of 
European Contract Law? European Review of Private Law, Vol. 15(6), 1687-1725; Berger, Klaus 
Peter (2010) The Creeping Codification of the New Lex Mercatoria. Kluwer Law International.  
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Contract culture, however, is more difficult to avoid than the provisions of contract law. 
Every industry or commercial branch has its own standards, which sometimes can be 
commercial usages or trade customs. Even they can be set aside agreeing otherwise in the 
contract. Multinational corporations often tend to introduce their own contracting practices to 
their business partners with their own contract templates. The rise of American contracting 
practices with long and detailed contract documents is proof of such a worldwide 
phenomenon.
10
 In spite of such development of a more technical and formal nature, informal 
contracting practices such as thinking modes and working habits may be more difficult to 
avoid or set aside in practice, since they are cultural and unconscious.  
 
Douglass North’s institutional economics gives a good explanation for the difficulties 
encountered even by huge influential multinationals in tackling with local habits and thinking 
modes. They are informal rules of the game, while laws and formal contracts are formal rules 
of the game or formal institutions.
11
 Formal institutions were in Russia changed very quickly 
simply by drafting a new Civil Code with new values of a new market economy. Change in 
the formal rules of the game does not, however, change the informal rules such as habits in 
contracting and ways of approaching contracts and contractual liabilities. These habits may 
carry unconscious cultural values from earlier times. Since Russia is a country with strong 
informal institutions and weak formal institutions,
12
 unconscious informal rules of the game 
are important also in contracting. 
 
Sociologists and anthropologists have paid attention to latent and not articulated 
communication and other cultural dimensions of contracting.
13
 Edward T. Hall suggested 
distinguishing low-context and high-context cultures. In high-context cultures many things 
                                                        
10
 Professor Giuditta Cordero Moss’s research group at the University of Oslo has studied this 
phenomenon especially from the point of view of contract clauses (see 
http://folk.uio.no/giudittm/AngloAmerican%20Contract%20Models.pdf). 
11
 North, Douglass C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional change and economic performance: A new 
Economic History. Cambridge University Press;  
North, Douglass C. (2005) Understanding the process of institutional Change. Princeton University 
press. Princeton, New Jersey. 
12
 Rose, Richard (2000) Getting Things done in an Anti-modern Society: Social Capital Networks in 
Russia in Dasgupta P. and Seragelden I. (eds.) Social Capital. Washington D.C. World Bank, 147-
171. 
13
 Hofstede, Geert (1983) Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, December 28 (4), 625-629; 
Garfinkel, Harold (1967) Studies in Ethnomethodology. Prentice Hall, Inc, Englewood Cliffs New 
Jersey;  Geertz, Clifford (1973) The interpretation of cultures: Selected essays. New York: Basic 
Books. 
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are left unsaid and require cultural context to illuminate the meaning.  North America and 
Western Europe are regarded as low-context cultures, which value logic, facts and directness, 
while high context cultures in Asia, Middle East, Africa and South America are relational, 
collectivist, intuitive and contemplative emphasizing interpersonal relationships.
14
 In more 
recent research based on fieldwork, John Hooker divides cultures as rule-based or 
relationship-based and thus assumes a continuum between different cultures that result from 
multiple combinations of features of both types of cultures.
15
 Even the most typical examples 
of rule based cultures also have a relational dimension of contracting as Macaulay (1963, 
1985) and Macneil (1974, 1978) have shown.
16
 Cultural or business cultural dimensions can 
be important especially from the informal and relational point of view and can reflect on the 
reputation of companies even without legal sanctions. 
 
Contracting can and should in practice be approached from many different standpoints. There 
are; 
 
1) more or less global rules of the game of the industry; 
2) organizational culture and rules; 
3) more general cultural rules of the area; as well as  
4) national, international or even local formal rules and regulations.  
 
They all frame contracting and contract documents. 
 
 
1.2. Approach and Method 
 
The typical understanding of contracts as legal documents, which should be left for lawyers 
and hidden in a safe box, is an example of informal institutions, which have developed during 
                                                        
14
 Hall, Edward T. (1976) Beyond culture. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. 
15
 Hooker, John (2012) Cultural differences in Business Communication. In Paulston, C. B., S.F. 
Kiesling and E.S. Rangel (eds.) Handbook of Intercultural Discourse and Communication. Wiley. 
16
 Macaulay, Stewart (1963) Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary study. American 
Sociological Review, Vol. 28, 55-67; Macneil, Ian (1978) Contracts: Adjustment of long-term 
economic relations under classical, neoclassical and relational contract law. Northwestern University 
Law Review, Vol. 72, No 6 (Jan-Feb 1978), 854-905; Macaulay, Stewart (1985), An Empirical View 
of Contract. Wisconsin Law Review 1985, 465-482. Macneil, Ian (1974), The Many Futures of 
Contract, 47 Southern California Law Review p. 691-816. 
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a long period of time in business. It shows how strong the influence of legal centralism is, 
since it has managed to colonize contract documents on behalf of lawyer-master taken out of 
the hands of the real users of contract. The wider perspective, which we apply in our study, 
represents proactive law paying attention to improving business contracting in order to better 
serve business purposes and avoid unnecessary disputes, especially disputes, which are taken 
to courts.
17
  
 
Contracting in proactive law is seen as organizational capabilities, which can be improved.
18
 
Nysten-Haarala and her research project detected three intertwining dimensions of 
contracting capabilities, namely content, process and relational. Content capabilities are 
directed to planning and choosing the content for contract documents. Content capability is 
not just a legal skill to draft and choose contract clauses, but a wider capability in 
understanding the environment of contracting and the multiplicity of norms around the 
contract and affecting the contents. Process capability refers to organizational processes and 
technical contract management in an organization. Relational capabilities are negotiation and 
communication skills, which are important from the point of view of informal rules of the 
game (CCC report 2008).  
 
The more precise objective of our research is to find out how flexibility is introduced in 
contracts in an environment of rigid contract law and rigid formal practices of drafting 
contract documents. First, however, we present the framework of formal and informal rules 
of contracting. The formal rules are the national Civil Code of the Russian federation
19
 
compared with the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) which in Russia is 
                                                        
17
 Siedel, George. J. & Haapio, Helena (2011) Proactive law for Managers: a hidden source of 
competitive advantage. Gower Publishing Company; Haapio, Helena (2006) Introduction to Proactive 
Law from a Business Lawyer’s Point of View. In Peter Wahlgren (ed.) Scandinavian Studies in Law. 
A Proactive Approach. Stockholm Institute for Scandinavian Law, Vol. 49. Stockholm, 21-34. 
18
 Cf. Argyres, N. & Mayer, K.J. (2007) Contract design as a firm capability: An integration of 
learning and transaction cost perspectives. Academy of Management Review, Vol. 32, No 4 (Oct 
2007), 1060-1077; Teece, D.J. (2007) Explicating Dynamic Capabilities: The Nature of 
Microfoundations of (Sustainable) Enterprise Performance. Strategic Management Journal, 28 (13), 
1391-1350. 
19
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applied to contracts of international sale of goods
20
. The Civil Code applies to domestic sale 
of goods or services and also fills the gaps of the CISG as secondary legislation.  
 
In the second part of the study we advance to the application of formal rules and their 
interplay with informal rules through semi-structured qualitative interviews. Interviews were 
conducted in St. Petersburg in 2012 and 2013 in one German-Swedish company working in 
transportation, one Finnish company working in services and an American company working 
as a franchising chain in technology industry. The companies represent large and medium 
sized business, which have a history of working in Russia for at least three years. The names 
and concrete activities of these companies are obscured to protect their interests and standing 
in the market.  
 
The case studies included interviews with managers and lawyers of the companies, a study of 
the history of the companies’ operations in Russia, and an analysis of significant documents 
such as corporate codes of ethics; plus disputes in courts with these companies as a defendant 
or a claimant (2011-2012). Experts and informants were encouraged to answer freely without 
any standard options of answers. The free interview form allowed researchers to receive 
answers that reflected the interviewees’ own cognitive and mental constructions, in this case 
providing insights into how economic actors understand the problems of international 
cooperation and ways of solving them.  
 
We also interviewed a Finnish consultant, who operates in Russian markets advising Finnish 
companies. In the analysis we also refer to earlier interview studies of Finnish companies 
importing wood from Russia and their Russian partners. These interviews were also semi-
structured and were conducted in 2004 – 2005 in Finland, St. Petersburg, Petrozavodsk and 
Arkhangelsk. They have been reported in an article “Contract Law and Everyday 
Contracting” published in 2006. Although the companies of this earlier interview study 
represent a different business branch and only trade with Finnish partners, they indicate how 
contracting practices have developed or not developed during the timeframe of the last ten 
years.  
 
                                                        
20
 The CISG is already some kind of a world-wide law in international sale of goods. It has been 
ratified in 78 countries and can be applied even when there are parties from countries, which have not 
ratified the convention (CISG, Article 1).  
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Besides our own interviews, we also refer to the rare empirical studies, which other 
researchers have made in Russia and reported in literature.
21
 Based on both our own 
interviews and findings of this other empirical research, we also study the role of corporate 
lawyers in business as well as the role of courts in Russian business. 
 
 
2. The formal legal framework of contracting 
 
2.1. The origins of Russian civil law and tight control 
 
In the legal family classification of comparative law, Russian law belongs to the family of 
continental civil law systems. German BGB was the example for the first Soviet Civil Code 
in 1922 as well as for the Civil Code of 1964. The concepts and the style of codifying law 
originate from Germany, although the main institutions of civil law, such as private property 
and freedom of contract became less significant in soviet civil law. Property rights were weak 
even before socialism, the long tradition of which still obscures the Russian economy. 
Contract law in the socialist planned economy became administrative by nature, since 
contracts were made based on the state economic plans and functioned to fulfill these plans. 
Contracting parties could not freely draft contractual clauses, but were tied to instructions 
from above. Yet, in our opinion Zweigert and Kötz are right in understanding that socialist 
law was never as socialistic and as different as the Marxist scholars made it seem.
22
 
 
Planned economy was an attempt to abolish the markets, but it actually prompted a parallel 
shadow economy to fill in the gaps of the official planned system. The official economy 
answered with tighter control, which the shadow economy again circumvented.
23
 Red tape 
and arbitrary control of authorities were typical features of Russian administration already 
before the revolution.
24
 Weak formal institutions allowed red tape and arbitrary control to 
continue and accordingly become an essential part of the society’s structures, which informal 
rules of the game then support. This indicates that modernization has not been completed in 
                                                        
21
 e.g. Murrell, Peter (ed.) Assessing Value of Law in Transition Economies. Ann Arbor. The 
University of Michigan Press 2001. 
22
 Zweigert, Konrad and Hein Kötz (1998) Introduction to Comparative Law. Translated by Tony 
Weir. 3 edition. Oxford University Press. 
23
 Hosking, Geoffrey S. (1985) A History of the Soviet Union. Fontana Press. 
24
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Russia and the level of the Weberian formal rationality not been reached in economic 
administration. 
 
When the Soviet Union collapsed, civil law and its historical roots did not disappear. The 
new Civil Code of the Russian Federation was drafted by lawyers, who represent the Soviet 
tradition.
25
 The concepts and doctrines are of German origin and are still based on will 
theory, juristic act, subjective rights and the like.
26
 The drafters actively searched models for 
law for a new Russian market economy from European and American, both civil law and 
common law legal systems. Transplants from Western market economy systems were 
adopted, but nobody was truly able to anticipate how a new market economy would work in 
practice. Drafting of new laws was strongly lawyer-driven, and lawyers in all legal systems 
are typically unaware of economic and social dimensions of society operating only under 
legal concepts.
27
  
 
Traditional ideas of the need for tight state control can be found in a many requirements of 
formal procedures, which are considered as safeguards for actors in the market. One typical 
safeguard is the requirement of a written form of contracts. According to the Civil Code of 
1994, oral contracts were valid only between citizens and with the value less than 10 
minimum wages
28
 and most contracts required notarial proof or registration (Articles 158-165 
GK). After the recent reform of the Civil Code which entered into force from September 1, 
2013 (FZ 07.05.2013 N 100-FZ) the minimum value for oral contracts rose up till 10. 000 
rubles except for contracts, which based on legislation require a written form. The 
requirement for registration was limited only to transfer of ownership of immovable 
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 Members of the group preparing for the Civil Code, which Braginsky’s and Virtyanski’s 
commentary book (1999) mention, such as A.L. Makovskij, G.E. Avilov, S.S, Alekseev, G.D. 
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27
 See supra 25 
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property.
29
 Although formal requirement have been diminished, there still are many 
requirements for permissions thus allowing strong control of the authorities. 
 
 
2.2. Commercial usages 
 
The Civil Code commentary of Vitryansky and Braginski clearly indicates that the lawyers 
who were preparing the Civil Code were consciously making the rules of the game for 
business, not just enabling a framework for business. One clear indication of this legal 
centralist mentality is that commercial usages cannot be applied if they are not stipulated in 
legislation (Article 5.1. GK). In principle this did not mean that a commercial usage had to be 
clearly mentioned in the Civil Code, but that it could somehow have been interpreted as 
corresponding to legislation. In practice, compared with the CISG this requirement gave 
commercial usages a lower position in the hierarchy of legal sources which can be interpreted 
by courts.
30
 This regulation clearly differs from international contract law, where 
“commercial usages, which the parties knew or ought to have known and which are widely 
known and regularly observed in the particular trade concerned, can be impliedly applied to 
the contract” (CISG art 8). Besides an extreme legal centralist attitude, this difference in 
Russian domestic contract law may also have reflected a suspicious attitude towards 
commercial practices in domestic business, which either originated from administrative 
practices of the soviet economy or from the earlier criminal shadow economy.
31
 These early 
business practices were not regarded among lawyers as being fair, therefore a measure test 
with the Civil Code seemed a logical idea in order to sweep out undesired practices. 
 
In the recent change of the Civil Code
32
 this stipulation was clarified to refer only to business 
practices, which are not established commercial usages. Such practices even if they are 
widely spread in business or adopted in contracts are not legal in case they contradict with 
                                                        
29
 The concept of immovable property is rather wide in Russian law; including land property and 
buildings even on state owned land. Even vessels (ships, aircrafts and space related vessels) are 
immovable property (CC article 130) 
30
  Braginskij, M. I and Vitryanskij V. V. (1999) Dogovornoe pravo. Kniga pervaya. Obshsie 
polozheniya. Moskva: Statut, (p. 72-71). 
31
 The supremacy of trade usages may also be a threat to business. According to Lisa Bernstein’s 
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Berstein (forthcoming in 2014)). 
32
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norms of behavior, which are presupposed by legislation. Business practices can be regarded 
as illegal, but this regulation is actually targeted only towards wild practices, which 
contradict mandatory legislation. 
 
 
2.3. Standard contracts 
 
The attitude of civil law to standard contracts is also influenced by the Soviet past. In the 
planned economy there were many standard templates, which were introduced through 
legislation and/or used by state enterprises. Present Civil Code recognizes such contracts as 
model contracts (tipovye dogovory art 426) required by law and issued by the Government of 
the RF or federal organs authorized by the Government. These templates are used in 
situations where the public entity having a monopolistic position in the market is forced to 
make a contract, because the other party has no alternative partners for concluding the contact 
with. Such templates are also in use under the Consumer Protection Act. Nowadays, the 
amount of such contracts has, however, diminished considerably. 
 
The Civil Code also regulates so called General Model Conditions (primernye usloviya art 
427). The only requirement under the Civil Code for these general conditions is that they 
should be published in press. Any commercial company can develop a model contract, 
publish it in press and in this way prove that the model is publicly known. Such model 
contracts can be referred to in a contract in order to make them a part of the contract. 
According to the Civil Code such standard contracts can also have a status of commercial 
usages. The text book of Braginsky and Vitryansky identified an abundance of all kinds of 
published models. Book stores are full of collections of templates, which are often quite plain 
and cover only provisions, which are required by default rules of the civil code. The civil law 
commentary points out that these collections of templates have a different function than 
model contracts, which are based on legislation, confirmed by the government and issued by 
a ministry or a corresponding authority.
33
 Many published templates can, however, be used as 
some kind of checklists in order to control that the provisions required by legislation are 
included in the document. 
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The Civil Code regulates in article 428 (dogovor prisoegineniya) how standard contracts 
become binding between contracting parties. This article regulates contracts in which one 
party is in “a take it or leave situation” such as consumers in concluding insurance contracts, 
contracts with banks or e.g. a lease contract in St. Petersburg. The Civil Code gives an 
opportunity to ask the court to terminate such a contract even if it does not contradict any 
legislation but only diminishes his rights in an unfair way compared to the contents of default 
rules. The unfair conditions of the contract have to be such that the consumer would not 
without the “take it or leave it”-situation have accepted them. The above mentioned 
regulation does not, however, protect parties to a B2B contract. 
 
Standard contracts recommended by industrial organizations, such as ORGALIME or NL 
contracts, which are widely used in Europe, are not yet well known in Russia. International 
trade has, however, brought these standard contracts to Russia, as well, because international 
contracting parties may suggest them to be used. Limitations of seller’s liabilities, which are 
characteristic to these standard contracts, may be confusing for Russian contracting parties 
and even lawyers, but there is no legal obstacle in using them in B2B relations.  
 
 
2.4. Interpretation of Contracts 
 
The Civil Code, which is officially proclaiming freedom of contract (Article 421) on the one 
hand, wants to control business on the other. Even rules of interpreting contracts differ in 
Russian domestic contract law (Article 421) from international contract law – in the form of 
the CISG (Article 8), which is applied to contracts of international sales even in Russia. In 
the CISG:  
 
“the starting point of interpretation is the intent of the parties, or if that is not possible to the 
understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as the other party would have had 
in the same circumstances.” These are interpreted through “all the circumstances of the case, 
including the negotiations, any practices, which the parties have established between 
themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties.” 
 
In more formal Russian law, the written text of the contract document is the starting point, 
which can then be complemented with other material such as negotiations, other oral 
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expressions, commercial usages and established practices of the parties. If the written 
contract is unclear, other conditions and the aim and spirit of the contract as an entirety will 
contribute to the interpretation (Article 431 GK). Written expressions are emphasized 
because of their value of proof in courts. The entirety of contract is certainly more difficult to 
prove in Russian courts, which do not prefer oral proof to a written document. 
 
 
2.5. Requirement of a Written Form of Contracts 
 
The recent change of the civil code abolishing the earlier requirement of the written form 
from international sales contracts is quite radical.
34
 Soviet Union was one of the countries, 
which required a reservation to the CISG making written form of contract obligatory for 
contracts with one of the parties from a country, which joined the reservation (Article 96 of 
the CISG). Now Russia has abandoned the reservation and from September 1, 2013 even oral 
contracts are valid in international trade. On the one hand, this change takes Russia closer to 
the CISG community in international trade, but on the other widens the difference between 
domestic and international contacts. The warnings of Russian text books from applying 
domestic rules to international contracts and their emphasis on the many differences in 
interpretation of international sales contracts compared to domestic contracts, are still valid.
35
 
 
Written contracts are still recommenced in international trade, because they are a handy proof 
of the content of the contract in courts. On the other hand state authorities control contracts, 
which for this purpose need to be in a written form. The difference which the change in law 
makes is that written contracts do not necessarily have to be changed with every price 
reduction or other minor change. The authorities cannot claim that the changes are invalid, if 
they are not made in a written form. Proving the new content of a contract, which exists in an 
oral form, may, however, be demanding. Thus, price reductions and other similar changes are 
still recommended to be made in a written form. 
 
The customs office controls contracts of import and export. The amount of goods mentioned 
in the document has to correspond with the real amount. The banks have to control that the 
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payments correspond to the contract price. Tax authorities can arrange a raid to the premises 
and check all the contracts. In such circumstances formal contracts are written for the state 
authorities not for the parties themselves. Contract documents cannot be devices of 
communication between contracting parties, as proactive law suggests, because they serve for 
other purposes.
36
 A contract document is more like an official façade for a contractual 
relationship rather than a document reflecting the real relationship. A formal contract is not 
written only as the potential safeguard of the court as in the Western countries, but to satisfy 
all the authorities, who require that the formal rules of the game be followed.  
 
Sale of goods contracts can avoid Russian contract law provisions almost totally. The CISG 
governs international contracts, although it can also be excluded and other national laws 
chosen instead (Article 6 of the CISG). Yet, the CISG does not apply to services (Article 3)
37
 
or all goods (Article 2), furthermore it does not apply to all the problems. The CISG does not 
cover invalidity of contracts, authorization, or property rights (Article 4). These have to be 
covered by secondary legislation which if not otherwise agreed depends upon the rules of 
private international law. According to those rules, the secondary legislation can be Russian 
law or the law of the other party of the contract. The secondary legislation can also be agreed 
in the contract, as well as the site of dispute resolution be moved out of Russia. Domestic 
contracts with parties, whose places of business are in Russia, are covered by the Russian 
Civil Code. A foreign owned company which is registered in Russia is a domestic company.  
 
 
2.6. Rules of Invalidity of Contract 
 
Invalidity of contracts is an interesting aspect of Russian civil law (Articles 166-181 GK). 
According to the Civil Code a contract can be invalidated based on formal mistakes, 
mandatory legislation, lack of authority and flaws in the formation of will such as fraud, 
physical or psychological duress and error irrespective of motive. An error can be found also 
in not understanding the aim of the contract. Furthermore a fake contract or a contract 
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established against legal principles and ethics can be invalidated. The latter rules certainly 
give a lot of room for interpretation.  
 
The Russian Civil Code also includes a very peculiar reason for invalidity, which is that the 
contract has been concluded against the aims of the company declared in the company’s 
founding documents (Article 173 GK). Earlier anyone could ask for invalidating a contract 
based on this rule, and often state authorities interfered in contracts based on this rule. After 
the changes of 2013 only the organization itself, its founder or someone in the organization 
can ask for invalidating the contract based on it contradicting the aims of the company if it 
can be proven that the other party knew or ought to have known that the contract was 
contrary to the aims and purposes of the company. 
 
In principle invalidity is in all legal systems a grave exception, which leads the contract being 
interpreted as never having existed. In Russia, however, the courts have often interpreted 
invalidity quite broadly, especially when the authorities are involved. Therefore invalidating 
contracts has become a tool in getting rid of unprofitable or otherwise bad contracts as well 
as a tool for authorities’ arbitrary interference. Since formal requirements, such as notarial 
certificates or various licenses are many, and interpretation of other grounds for invalidating 
a contract wide, it is easy to find or even deliberately leave an option in the document for 
later invalidating the contract in case everything does not work as it was planned. Companies, 
who change their minds and do not want to cooperate any more, have been able to find 
loopholes in for instance defining the essential terms of contracts, and manage to get the 
contract declared invalid in court. Rigid rules start to work in a contradictory manner, when 
they are used for circumventing the otherwise binding contract. 
 
The recent reform of the Civil Code tries to limit the possibilities for using rules of invalidity 
in bad faith, excluding it from a party who was not in good faith, especially if his behavior 
leads the other party rely on the validity of contract. It remains to be seen, how often absence 
of good faith and deliberate causing of invalidity can be proven in courts. By law protected 
threatened interests of a third party, can also lead to invalidating a contract. Even after the 
reform, the authorities were left with opportunities in interfering contracts. The Civil Code 
stipulates that if public interests or other interests protected by law are threatened, the court 
can from its own initiative declare the contract invalid. In other cases only the parties to the 
contract can claim for invalidity. 
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Invalid contract were earlier null and void as such, while now the civil code applies the term 
“disputed” (osparimaemyi) making validity of such contracts dependent on the parties. If the 
contracting parties do not claim for invalidity, the contract stays in force. 
 
In the data collected about the three case study companies, we found several legal disputes in 
arbitrazh courts (during 2011-2012).
38
 Most of the cases, which we found in the Russian 
database of arbitrazh courts concerned foreign owned companies claiming for a payment 
from their Russian clients. In almost all of those cases the Russian defendant claimed that the 
contract is invalid. Even if in none of those cases such counterclaims were accepted, claiming 
for invalidity indicates that it is an ordinary tool in a litigating lawyer’s toolbox and may 
sometimes work. The new amendments of the Civil Code should close some of these 
loopholes and decrease the amount of artificial and unjustified invalidity claims. 
 
This is not the only case in which loopholes are identified and then mended. Law in Russia is 
often misused creatively for purposes that it was not meant for. The misuse of minority 
shareholders’ rights and bankruptcy legislation in hostile takeovers is one such phenomenon39 
and introducing corruption with the help of anti-corruption rules is another.
40
 The legislator 
can never know in advance, which legislation is going to be misused and how to close the 
loopholes for good. New loopholes will definitely be discovered as soon as the old ones are 
mended. This kind of flexibility is harmful for the whole credibility of the legal system, 
which cannot protect business from misuse of law. Unfortunately, the tendency to circumvent 
law also affects on the wording of legal text and makes it excessively complicated. 
 
 
2.7. Changed Circumstances and Early Termination of Contract 
 
Flexibility in law is often connected with the regulations concerning changing circumstances. 
The original model for drafting changed circumstances has for civil law countries, which 
follow the German tradition, been the BGB 242 general clause of good faith (Treu und 
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Glauben). More recent civil codes of European countries as well as international principles of 
contract law have paid attention to regulating the effect of changed circumstances in 
contracts. The Russian Drafting Committee of the Civil Code seems to have looked at the 
UNIDROIT (Articles 6.2.1. – 6.2.3.) principles in developing exception rules of the article 
450 of the Civil Code. Traditionally changing circumstances can lead to termination of 
contract in very rare cases, since it is required that changes in circumstances are mostly 
foreseeable and assumed that contingencies can be anticipated with contracts. The main rule 
in article 450 reflects this idea: “One-sided termination of contract in the absence of a 
contractual provision allowing it is possible only if there is a significant breach of contract or 
if it is provided by law. A significant breach of a contract is such that the other party to a 
significant extent loses what he was entitled to in the conclusion of contract.” (Article 450)  
 
Contracting parties can together quite freely stipulate on a termination clause. The length of 
the termination period can also be agreed, but in the absence of it, the minimum length of the 
termination period is thirty days (Article 452). Special legislation can stipulate on longer 
termination periods, e.g. in case of lease or rent contracts. Legislation also allows special 
reasons for claiming for one-sided termination of e.g. lease contracts.  
 
The CISG does not contain a stipulation similar to Article 450 GK, but does permit 
termination in “impediment beyond control” either temporarily or permanently. If nothing 
else is agreed in the contract, only natural disasters or decrees of state authorities making the 
contract impossible to perform, are accepted in courts as grounds for non-delivery (CISG 
Article 79). The Russian domestic regulation is similarly strict calling the impediment the 
force, which could not have been prevented. A contractual clause, in which the grounds for 
non-delivery are regulated, is called a force majeure clause. Based on either a force majeure 
clause or Article 79 of the CISG or the Civil Code Article 401, the delivery may be 
postponed or the contract terminated. 
 
The CISG does not recognize economic hardship, but in more recent contract law and in 
some international collections of principles changing economic circumstances (hardships) 
may lead to modification or termination of contract. In UNIDROIT Principles hardships lead 
to renegotiations, after which the court can free the other party from liability, if the 
renegotiations fail (Articles 6.2.1. – 6.2.3.). Russian civil code has borrowed the requirements 
of early termination or modification from UNIDROIT principles, but not the possibility for 
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the court to urge the parties to renegotiate. The Principles of European Contract law mention 
circumstances which have become too onerous for a contracting party (Article. 6.1.1.). 
 
These international principles are not binding legislation, but they can be chosen to be 
applied to contracts. International arbitrators often try to find assistance in them even if they 
would not bind the parties. Hardship is an example of non-binding regulations, which in the 
New Merchant law discussion is urged to be accepted as legally binding rules in disputes on 
international commercial contracts. 
 
Finnish and other Nordic contract laws allow unfair contracts to be modified or terminated if 
circumstances have become unfair or if the stronger party already from the beginning has 
misused its power to make the other party conclude an unfair contract (Nordic Contracts Acts 
36§). This tool, which now is interpreted to be applied also in hardship case, is applied very 
cautiously in courts, especially when it comes to business contracts. Consumer protection 
may, however, allow modification of a contractual provision, which is unfair to the 
consumer. Some other countries, such as Germany or France have black lists of illegal unfair 
terms of contract. The result of applying those rules is usually similar to the modification of 
unfair contracts in the Nordic countries. 
 
The Russian Civil Code adopted a possibility to ask for termination or modification of a 
contract in court owing to significant changes of circumstances. This article 451 is not only a 
hardship rule, since it can in principle be applied in all significant changes of circumstances 
where if the other party had foreseen the circumstances, that person would not have 
concluded the contract. Four additional conditions must be fulfilled before the court can 
adjust or terminate the contract. Firstly, the change has to be such that the parties could not 
have foreseen it when the contract was made. Secondly the change could not have been 
overcome with the carefulness and diligence which is characteristic for similar contracts. 
Thirdly, the performance of the contract without changing it would violate the balance of 
property interests of the parties and involve the interested party such a damage that he would 
have considerably lost what he was entitled to expect at the conclusion of the contract. 
Fourthly, the court has to check that there is not an established trade custom of risk-sharing to 
be applied to the case.  
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Although this provision has existed from 1994 in the Civil Code, the courts have not applied 
it, although Russian economy has experienced drastic changes - or perhaps exactly because 
of them. Text books treat article 451 in a very abstract manner
41
 or not at all.
42
 In a 
commentary from 1996 it is mentioned, however, that for instance such a change in the 
currency value of the Russian ruble that the stock market crisis in 1994 (11.10.1994) 
represents, could not have been foreseen.
43
 Although the economic depression of 1998 could 
also have fulfilled the requirements of article 451, there were no cases in courts claiming for 
modification of contracts. It has never been tried at the Highest Court of Arbitration. The 
reason may be that modification is too new and strange for Russian lawyers. Disputing 
parties seem to find it easier to try and claim for invalidity instead of trying to apply the 
article 451. 
 
 
3. Contracting practice 
 
3.1. Control of Authorities 
 
Contracting culture in Russia is rooted in the socialist past, when contracts were devices of 
control in fulfilling the state economic plans. Contract document became formal and rigid, 
something similar to official state documents. The public sector red tape contaminated 
contracts with excessive rigidity. When Russia in the beginning of 1990s became a market 
economy, the red tape practices spread also into business. This quite large formal part of 
business is administrative by nature. Contract documents are connected with bureaucratic red 
tape and they require formality.  
 
The nature of state control is well indicated in the following quotation of a Finnish manager 
running a company in Russia: 
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You need to get a bunch of approvals: one should approve, then another, then a third person 
has to make his verdict and so on. There was a funny case, while we tried to get the 
approval, 1,5 years passed.<…>So while we were collecting all the necessary documents in 
various committees: the committee on urban planning, historic and architectural committee, 
etc.; waiting for all the possible permits, resolutions and approvals; the head of, I don’t 
remember which instance, it was one of departments of administration of the area X in St. 
Petersburg, he was replaced by another person. And when we brought all the documents, he 
didn’t approve it and just said: “I can’t believe that you have all the required permits.” And 
we had to talk to this person for a very long time without bribes or something like this, and 
finally we got his approval. The funniest thing is that on the following day after we received 
his permission, the ordinary officers of Road Police came to our premises and started 
asking, who is the boss here and why did we put the terrace? And they were really surprised 
when, instead of calling to some authorities, we showed them all the required documents 
and permits, saying to them: “Look, all our documents are legal, we have all the required 
permits.” (manager_Fin) 
 
This example is quite typical and revealing and shows that the control of authorities is strict, 
but arbitrary. Therefore, conduct of business strictly according to the rules may confuse the 
authorities, since Russian business often choose to find faster, but more risky informal ways 
with dealing with permissions. Confusion of authorities indicates that informal institutions 
are strong and used for other than strictly control purposes. The following quote demonstrates 
how foreign businessmen, who come from low-context cultures and countries, where formal 
institutions are strong, would understandably prefer transparency and legality in 
governmental control: 
 
It would be much better if the rules of the game were more open and obvious. Our ability of 
managing our business will depend on governmental control, and we hope that joining the 
WTO will change this situation. (manager_USA). 
 
 
3.2. The Need for a Reliable Assistance 
 
Since formal institutions are weak, foreign business needs to know, how the informal practice 
works. For this purpose they need someone, who is reliable and knows how to deal with 
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governmental authorities and business partners, but does not get the company in trouble with 
the legal system and authorities.  
 
I think it should be a person who is both honest and knowledgeable in the business sphere. 
Anyone who has opened a business there [in Russia] says that it is the most important thing. 
You have to find an honest man, and you know that this is the most difficult aspect--to find 
such a person. (expert_develop). 
 
When the foreign company does not operate directly in the Russian markets, but only exports 
products, it is easier to leave dealing with Russian authorities to their Russian cooperation 
partners. Finnish forest companies preferred to use small Russian entrepreneurs to deal with 
the authorities on the Russian side of the boarder, and sometimes not even care, how they 
managed to find ways out by using informal methods. Closing one’s eyes is more difficult 
when the company is already established in Russia. It may also be dangerous even when the 
company operates from the home base. The example of Stora Enso being blamed for illegal 
loggings in Russian Karelian forests is quite revealing. A contract with the sub-contractor 
leaving the liability for violations of Russian law to the latter does not free the foreign 
company from liability in the eyes of the clients in the Western markets.
44
 This is a good 
example of the weakness of legal centralism. A company, which has not violated legal rules 
and is not legally responsible for its cooperation partners may more effectively be sanctioned 
by losing its reputation in the eyes of its client than in the courts. 
 
Sometimes the trust in a reliable Russian partner may be dangerously strong. In the interview 
study of wood importing companies in Finland a representative of one small Finnish 
company stated that a Russian lawyer writes their contracts in Russian on behalf of their 
Russian business partner. The small company did not even bother to invest in translating the 
contracts into Finnish or English, because it was costly and they simply chose to rely on their 
business partner. The manager was of the opinion that formal requirements were 
requirements of Russian legislation and a Russian lawyer knows how to deal with them. Such 
an opinion indicates that Finnish businessmen also saw that the informal part of the deal is 
                                                        
44
 Nysten-Haarala, Soili (2006) Contract Law and Everyday Contracting. In Peter Wahlgren (ed.) 
Scandinavian Studies in Law. A Proactive Approach. Stockholm Institute for Scandinavian Law, Vol. 
49. Stockholm, 263-283. 
Soili Nystén-Haarala, Elena Bogdanova, Alexander Kondakov, Olga Makarova 
131 
what counts between business partners, not the formal document.
45
 The attitude of this 
particular businessman may also indicate a mixture of understanding Russian informal rules 
and Nordic small business culture, where a handshake is enough. You simply have to take 
risks in business. 
 
 
3.3. Requirements concerning the Form of the Contract 
 
The need to write formal contracts in the Russian rigid and official way seems to be an 
unexpected finding even for international businessmen, who have worked globally and have 
experience in many different contract and business cultures: 
 
Most agreements in America are sealed with a handshake. In Russia, people are very rigid 
and the business climate is very strict: even the main points about the contract that were 
discussed during the meeting need to be noted in the protocol and signed by all participants 
of the meeting. I have never done anything like this in any of the countries I have worked, 
neither in Brazil, the United States, nor in India. That is a big difference. (manager_USA). 
 
Formal contracts need to be very detailed and all the changes also have to be in a written 
form because of the tight government control. Discounts, which are given afterwards, may 
confuse tax officials, who require proof of any change, which may affect on the taxed amount 
of profit. Although only a few contracts end up in courts, the practice of arbitrazh courts of 
not accepting oral contracts strengthens the formal practices of business contracting.
46
 The 
courts simply interpret the Civil Code, which gives the written form as a formal requirement, 
although other materials can be used in interpreting the content of the contract in court. Even 
after the recent changes in civil law, oral proof is not necessarily accepted in Russian courts. 
 
I: What is the level of detail with regard to the requirements that each side needs to fulfill in 
the contract? 
R: Very detailed, up to ... any discount is prescribed in a supplemental agreement, that is, 
there are clients who have some special arrangements with us, they receive benefits and so 
on. For each bill we have a supplementary agreement, some people have piles of such 
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contracts. The contract itself is very basic – everything is written down: the terms of 
payment, the terms of granting power of attorney to an employee who arrives for a bill of 
lading, everything. (manager_Germ) 
 
 
3.4. Changes in Circumstances 
 
Rigid contracts are, however, not necessarily complied with. Business partners may agree to 
make changes or implement the contract differently from the formal document. The study on 
wood importing companies revealed that Finnish companies valued continuing cooperation 
and were ready to adjust to changed circumstances. However, if the partner turned out to be 
unreliable, they simply found a new business partner and dropped the old partner out when 
their fixed-term contract for one year ended.
47
  
 
There is also systemic negligence in implementing contracts. Contract regulations are 
regularly violated, but this rarely leads to any sanctions. Some managers stated that delayed 
payments for services are a frequent nuisance. Timely payment is even exceptional and 
delaying payments some kind of customary practice of the market: 
 
I: To what extent do contract parties honor the agreements? That someone didn’t do 
something on time or didn’t pay, does that happen? 
R: In general, it is difficult to control it, because we have too much clients. We can’t … I 
mean, we see, that there is an unpaid bill. The accountants already noticed it, they call and 
ask – why don’t you pay? But, as a rule, there are a lot of clients that don’t pay until the last 
moment. And the only way to get money from them – is when they are ordering the next 
container, we first look at their debts. Until our financial department allows us to process the 
order, our import department doesn’t issue the necessary documents to our clients. First of 
all we look at the clients’ debts and tell them – you have unpaid bills. They immediately 
start whining – how could it be? Please, give us a container and so on. They try to use all 
possible tricks.…In general, anything they can come up with. And we look at debts – no, 
you have an unpaid bill. But we can only do that before sending another shipment. If we 
have already sent them a container, it is very difficult to do it post-factum. Because we have 
a lot of other stuff to do – we can’t trace everything. That’s why, actually, the payment 
period of five days is rarely observed. (manager_Germ). 
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According to Kathryn Hendley since 1993 at least 40 percent of the contractual disputes in 
arbitrazh courts have involved non-payments.
48
 She describes non-payment as almost 
epidemic.
49
 Our more recent study proves that non-payment is still a practice in Russian 
business. A search from the database of Russian arbitrazh court concerning years 2011-2012 
reveals that the three companies, which we interviewed have sometimes also resorted to 
courts in order to get their payments. All cases, which they were involved in, concerned 
claiming for payments.  
 
According to Kathryn Hendley the practice started with the reforms of 1990s, when the 
whole economy suffered from non-payment: salaries were not paid, the government did not 
have money and the privatized business was to a great extent near bankruptcy.
50
 Non-
payment up till the last possible moment must have been a practice also earlier, since pre-
payment was an established practice in foreign trade during the Soviet Union. According to 
interviews in 2004 prepayment was still an ordinary contractual clause in sales contracts with 
Russian partners. The Finnish wood buyers, however, did not all apply prepayment, but 
explained that banks function quite normally and that the price can be paid safely on a 
Russian bank account of the seller. Based on the interviews of Russian sellers of wood, 
Finnish buyers were very popular, because they were reliable.
51
 
 
Obviously paying on time was an advantage on a market, where not paying or paying as late 
as possible is epidemic. Prepayment could have encouraged delivering lower quality, since 
quality control was the weak part of wood trade. Wood buyers, however, had the advantage 
of long-term relations, which allows corrections of quality, quantity or price with the next lot. 
This, however, is a bit complicated, because all adjustments of contract had to be written for 
the sake of customs and tax control. 
 
The practice of not paying can be interpreted to indicate low respect of formal rules of the 
game and a “who cares “- mentality. Claiming invalidity of the contract in court as a counter 
claim to the claim for payment of the seller gives an impression that non-payment is not even 
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regarded as a loss of reputation and that all methods can be used no matter how absurd it may 
seem. In other words, non-payment is not exceptional and far from being shameful. 
 
The practice of not paying before the last minute may on the other hand simply represent a 
business adjustment of the market. If paying on time is not effective in the circumstances of 
Russian markets, avoiding paying as long as possible will become the rule of the game. 
 
 
4. The Role of lawyers and courts in Russian business 
 
The profession of a lawyer, let alone a company lawyer, was not highly appreciated in the 
Soviet Union. The work was quite administrative, consisting of writing claims (pretenziia)
52
 
and checking that contracts correspond with the formal legal and administrative rules. 
Nowadays the profession is more highly valued. The work of a company lawyer is still quite 
simple. Contracting remains quite rigid and formal, and the lawyer is there to check that all 
the rules and numerous regulations are fulfilled and that the contract will be legally binding. 
Company lawyers also take care of court cases. Simple non-payment cases are not legally 
challenging. Company lawyers also claim that disputes with tax officials are easy, because 
the tax officials are unprofessional and the Tax Code favors tax payers with allocating the 
burden of proof strictly on the tax officials (Article 22 of the Tax Code).  
 
The amount of invalidity claims as counterclaims towards non-payment claims indicates that 
the court procedure is played strictly with the rules of lawyers without taking business needs 
into consideration. Disputes, as soon as they have entered courts, are totally out of the hands 
of businesspeople. Reputation in business does not seem to count any more. Hopefully the 
recent reforms of the civil code will diminish artificial claims for invalidity. 
 
Furthermore, Russian business tends to turn to the courts quite often. The fear of losing 
reputation or showing a failure with ending up in court does not seem to be nearly as high as 
it is in the western countries. Russian courts are also much better than their reputation. 
Ordinary people suspect that courts and judges are corrupted or arbitrary, but this probably 
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only reflects the general tendency of corrupted practices and the constant complain about 
them in Russian society. Courts and arbitrazh judges, however, enjoy about similar level of 
respect both among the general public and businesspeople than their counterparts in Great 
Britain.
53
 Respect for courts and ethical standards of the judges are actually much higher than 
for any other institution in Russia.
54
 
 
In surveys foreign businessmen express great wariness toward the impartiality of Russian 
courts. They fear that courts would favor the Russian party to the dispute. The fear may 
simply indicate prejudice of foreign businessmen, because statistically there is no evidence of 
partiality of Russian courts. On the contrary, Glenn P. Hendrix reports on good experience of 
Western lawyers who have litigated in Russian arbitrazh courts. He, however, reminds that 
lawyers may have a need to exaggerate the effect of court proceedings to outsiders.
55
 
 
Private commercial arbitration is not as much applied in Russia as in the western countries. 
The reason may be that it is a new institution, which has not developed yet. Disputes of 
foreign trade were taken before the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the RF (earlier 
USSR) in the Soviet period, but there was no practice of domestic arbitration. Company 
lawyers claim that disputes take a longer time in private arbitration because “the arbitrators 
do not work full time in arbitration and because their professional quality is not necessarily 
high”. Ordinary arbitrazh courts are preferred instead of commercial arbitration because of 
the speed and quality of the work. Legislation on commercial arbitration, which was issued in 
2002, provides with rules for similar private commercial arbitration than in western countries. 
It is, however, possible that Russian business complains easily on awards, which are not 
decided on their own favor. Ordre public may be more easily discovered, and since 
arbitration is new, there may be more mistakes. 
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Alternative dispute resolution such as mediation is not wide spread in Russia. There is, 
however, a law on ADR from 2010, which means that mediation is encouraged and can in 
course of time increase as well as arbitration and other means of alternative dispute 
resolution. In Russia it is very important that subsequent legislation exists. Otherwise the 
institution is non-existent and avoided. Regulation, however, can lead to too rigid and clumsy 
practices for the sake of state control.  
 
Bilateral means of negotiations, however, are widely used and business partners actively use 
informal methods for solving problems in the contractual relationship. The world of informal 
rules is, however, not always a simple one, since it is hidden and closely interactive with the 
rigid formal rules. Application of informal rules has to be learned in practice and often 
through making mistakes. The weakness of formal rules and the strength of often hidden 
informal rules make Russia a challenging market for foreigners. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
A sharp distinction between formal legal rules and informal business rules is typical in 
Russia. The strong legal centralist approach of lawyers means they do not care for such 
disparities, but focus only on legally relevant problems. As in western countries, lawyers 
specialize only on law without paying too much attention to business rules and practices. 
Lawyers are there to check the legality of rigid documents and take care of disputes in courts. 
The gap between law and business is even wider in Russia than in the western countries, 
although the legal centralist attitude in principle is the same. 
 
The special feature in Russia is that rigidity of rules and the existence of excessive and 
arbitrary control leads to avoidance and circumvention of formal rules, which are regarded as 
strange and unnecessary. When formal rules are not respected, they are more easily 
neglected. The formal legal default rules themselves do not greatly differ from their 
counterparts in western countries, although Russian text books make a distinction between 
domestic and international contract law. The emphasis on formal requirements is a remnant 
of the soviet past and a sign of a legal centralist attitude, which exaggerates the power of 
legal rules.  The lower status of trade usages and business practices can also be interpreted to 
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indicate strong legal centralism and as need to control contractual relations in spite of the 
newly born freedom of contract. Recent changes of the civil code have, however, diminished 
formal requirements.  
 
The tendency to misuse legal rules, which were created in order to protect business, 
sometimes leads to absurdities. Loopholes are constantly amended, but that does not prevent 
creative misuse of law. Flexibility is often creative circumvention of formal rules, which 
creates inefficiency in business.   Content capabilities of Russian lawyers seem to cover only 
knowing the formal rules and requirements of law. Such an attitude makes lawyers focus on 
lawyering tricks instead of drafting proactive contracts, which serve business in the long run. 
 
Not only law, but also business practice often appears to be rigid. The reason for this rigidity 
is the requirements of the bureaucratic administration. Formal contract documents are made 
neither for business purposes nor for potential court disputes, but to cope with the rigid 
administrative control of state authorities. There are certainly informal ways to circumvent 
the rigid control, but foreign businesses are more vulnerable than domestic business for 
claims of illegal practices on the part of authorities. Formal and rigid rules as well as their 
arbitrary applications, seem to lead to circumventing and ignoring them as well as to low 
respect of authorities. While in western societies the role of authorities is considered to be 
creating a favorable framework for business to operate, in Russia it obviously seems to be 
controlling businesspeople from resorting to illegal practices. Excessive control of 
authorities, however, makes business vulnerable for bribery and other means to speed the 
work of authorities. 
 
Rigid business practices because of the scrutiny by authorities reflect only the surface of 
Russian rules of the game in business contracting. Under the surface, informal practices can 
be flexible. The surface can be broken only by creating trust and managing to maintain it with 
the business partners. Hidden practices may not be rigid and complicated once they are 
discovered and properly understood. Flexibility has to be created based on personal relations 
and trust. Relational capabilities of contracting are the more valued, the more formal rules are 
rigid. Local informal rules are an important part of the Russian plurality of norms. Ignoring 
them is going to lead to inefficiency and constant struggles with formal rules and control of 
the authorities. 
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The strength of informal rules may also keep Russia separated from international practices. 
Russia does not seem to bend to international (American) practices of contract drafting, but 
keeps to its own. There is a certain barrier for international business constituted by the rigid 
formal rules, which require excessive transaction costs and by the hidden informal rules, 
which require effort and costs to attain familiarity. The distinction between domestic and 
international contract law also leads to specialized lawyers of international trade and 
international arbitration. 
 
Although the multiplicity of norms is visible in Russia, the effect of globalization in 
contracting practices seems to be rather limited. The reason, however, is not a strong nation 
state with strong formal rules, but on the contrary, weak formal rules and strong informal 
practices, which have developed in order to enable business survive in the world of strict 
formal rules. 
 
Courts are not as bad as they are claimed to be - at least compared to their western 
counterparts. The Russian federation has actually invested a lot in courts, which are regarded 
as the engines of the rule of law. Court practice, however, has preserved administrative 
practices from the soviet times. These practices require excessive use of courts in such issues 
as non-payment. In the western countries courts are not regarded as creators of rules for the 
business, but as the last resort when something goes wrong. In Russia courts seem to be one 
available alternative among others to solve disputes. Court procedure seem not be avoided as 
eagerly as in the Western countries. Maybe courts are also used a lot, simply because court 
decisions are needed for enforcement even in clear non-payment cases. 
 
Flexibility in Russia can be practical agreeing and setting rigid formal rules aside when they 
are too complicated to apply. In this way flexibility saves excessive transaction cost. 
Flexibility can, however, also be unwanted, when informal rules require a lot of transaction 
costs to get familiarized with. Flexible contracting culture is on the one hand a necessity 
when contract law is too rigid. On the other hand it can develop traps for even experienced 
businessmen.  
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Achieving flexibility in contracting by using vague terms 
in international business contracts: 
A comparative approach from the perspective of 
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It is common to find general clauses referring to codes of ethics, professional standards and customs 
in commercial contracts between parties from different legal systems. Those clauses may impose 
obligations or provide permission to apply certain provisions, rules or customs. Such general clauses 
may contain vague phrases, such as ‘principles of fair trading’, ‘good manners’, ‘common good’, 
‘important reasons’, ‘legitimate reasons’, ‘special circumstances’, ‘good faith’, “friendly negotiation”. 
The examples are taken from different legal texts such as statutes and contracts written in Chinese, 
German, Polish and English. The vague contract terms are taken from standard contracts that are used 
in certain fields of commerce in which long-term obligations are usually found, for example, 
construction contracts. 
 
What do those general clauses and vague phrases in contracts mean to commercial parties? Do they 
really have the same understanding when they sign the contracts? Can such clauses and phrases be 
understood flexibly to accommodate both parties’ commercial interests? How important are such 
clauses for those parties who seek long-term relationship?  
 
The authors show the differences in the meaning of selected general clauses, which apparently signify 
the same entities and concepts but in fact differ significantly due to the different law-systems that 
form the background of those terms and other factors.  The main aim of this Chapter is to establish the 
constituent characteristics of the concepts being analyzed and to distinguish near equivalence and 
partial equivalence of selected vague phrases referring to codes of ethics, professional standards and 
customs. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Contracting is a process that culminates in the finalizing phase in which the contract is 
actually signed and then executed. The process of contracting starts with developing trust in 
the future contract partner, followed by a phase in which the parties negotiate the terms of the 
contract and finally the matter is closed in a contract. Therefore one might seek flexibility in 
contracting in the first two stages of the process of getting to contract rather than in the later 
period after the signing of the contract. A contract, once concluded, binds the parties and is 
intended to remain binding even if circumstances change. For instance, if the financial 
position of one of the parties changes, his or her need for the object of the contract alters or 
the value of the object goes up or down, the validity of the contract itself will not be 
affected.
4
 The principle of pacta sunt servanda is guaranteed in most, if not all legal systems 
respecting individual liberties and the freedom of contract.
5
 
 
But even if the contract is fixed and closed, a need may arise to adapt the contract to altered 
circumstances. This need may be most acute in contracts entailing continuous obligations for 
a significant period. 
 
One can argue that trust and negotiation never entirely cease during the process of getting to a 
contract. Trust as an inherent and accompanying value must be established and maintained. 
In the contract itself it is often expressed as the principle of “good faith” that lies underneath 
the provisions of the contract and it is of course also expressed in the private law rules of the 
different legal systems.  
 
 
2. How does vagueness foster flexibility in contracts 
 
Flexibility for the period after the rendering into force of the contract can be achieved by 
several methods. 
 
                                                          
4 Hondius, E., Grigoleit, H.C., (2011), ed., unexpected circumstances in European contract law, 
Cambridge: University Press, p. 3.  
5 Ibidem, p.4. 
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Frame contracts are used for the purpose of designing a frame for the general conditions in, 
for instance, a long term delivery relationship.  In contrast, the concrete price, time and 
amount of a special delivery is fixed by additional single contracts for each sale. 
  
There are boilerplate-clauses that indicate a duty to negotiate certain matters, if a specific 
need to do so arises.  This formalizes the principle that communication never entirely ceases 
even after the enforcement of a contract. These clauses can be taken from template clauses, 
i.e. the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) which can serve as a model for a 
contract when the parties have agreed to incorporate them into their contract. Hardship-
clauses or force-majeur-clauses often state the duty to renegotiate terms in case the 
performance of a contract becomes more onerous to the parties. Art 6:111 PECL contains a 
duty to negotiate, if circumstances change. Other legal rules which can likewise be used as 
templates contain similar but not identical obligations to negotiate when certain conditions 
are met.
6
 The INCOTERMS for example contain a secondary obligation about who has to 
inform the other partner about what. Another common method to make a contract more 
flexible is to use vague terms in it, so that the contract would fit under a variety of 
circumstances. There are contract clauses referring to codes of ethics, professional standards 
and customs which are applicable to the relation regulated of the contract. Clauses containing 
vague phrases are often also used in flexible contracting between parties from different legal 
systems to impose obligation or permission to apply certain provisions, rules or customs such 
as: “good faith”, reasonableness”, “onerous”, “due progress”. 
 
In this article we would examine the selected vague phrases/clauses of good faith and 
reasonableness from contracts actually used in business transactions, business template 
contracts or other legal instruments and would try to show how they would be understood 
(although the text is the same) under common law, German, Polish, and Chinese law. 
 
 
  
                                                          
6 Ibidem, p. 657. 
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3. The concept and scope of the term “general clause” 
 
It is not easy to define precisely the term “general clauses” in Polish literature and legal acts 
for example there are numerous discrepancies and diverging functions or definitions for 
vague clauses or phrases. 
 
In accordance with s. 155 lit. 1 of the annex of the decree of the President of the Council of 
Ministers from 20.6. 2002 on the Rules of Legislative Techniques
7
 the legislator may apply 
terms with flexible meanings, general clauses or indicate uncrossable upper and lower 
borders of freedom of decisions, if there is a need to provide flexibility of a statutory 
instrument
8
. 
 
General clauses in the language of the law are usually understood as: 
- specific legal provisions containing various types of terms with flexible/undefined meaning
9
 
- terms with flexible/undefined meaning out of which the content of legal provisions is 
composed.
10
 
 
As far as the application of general clauses is concerned in Polish legal literature scholars 
favor the institution of “reference”. It means that the text recipient is referred to general 
assessment criteria of non-legal character – that is to say moral values, political values or 
economic values.
11
 This stance finds confirmation in the following definition: “a general 
clause is a flexible expression included in a legal provision referring to certain assessments 
typical of a given social group, to which such a legal provision refers by obliging persons to 
abide by them when determining a factual state of affairs regulated by a given norm”. 12 
                                                          
7 Załącznik do rozporządzenia Prezesa Rady Ministrów z dn. 20 czerwca 2002 r. w sprawie "Zasad 
techniki prawodawczej", Dz.U. no. 100, pos. 908. 
8 „Jeżeli zachodzi potrzeba zapewnienia elastyczności tekstu aktu normatywnego, można posłużyć się 
określeniami nieostrymi, klauzulami generalnymi albo wyznaczyć nieprzekraczalne dolne lub górne 
granice swobody rozstrzygnięcia”. 
9 Wolter, A., Ignatowicz, J., Stefaniuk, K. (1996) Prawo cywilne. Zarys części ogólnej,  Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwa Prawnicze PWN, p. 67. 
10 Zieliński, T. (1988) Klauzule generalne w prawie pracy, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Prawnicze, p. 
38. 
11 Rott-Pietrzyk, E. (2007) Klauzula generalna rozsądku w prawie prywatnym. C.H. Beck, Warszawa, 
p. 280-281. 
12 Radwański, Z., 2003, Prawo cywilne – część ogólna, C.H. Beck, Warszawa, 51. 
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Therefore a general clause is understood as a type of authorization for a body applying the 
law to use the criteria specified in a given general clause in the decision-making process. 
 
There is, however, another stance in accordance with which general clauses are obligations of 
government bodies applying the law to assess factual states of affairs on their own. Such 
assessments shall be made in reference to all circumstances and earlier decided cases. The 
rules, principles, norms and moral values specified in a general clause are treated as a factor 
which is either a starting point or a guide in the process of making judgments by law-
applying bodies.
 13
  According to W. Wolter, the legislator consciously does not (or may not) 
want to state more precisely the meaning but designates only some more or less subjectively 
specified meaning “field” which is to be filled in by the court practice with its individual 
assessments and judgments .
14
 
 
Both notions about the aim of general clauses are reasonable and reflect a certain function of 
general clauses. The second stance presented in the doctrine and the cited decree of the Polish 
President of the Council of Ministers would suggest the application of general clauses for 
achieving flexibility in lawmaking and contracting. It is clear that flexibility in contracting 
may be preserved by applying general clauses instead of precise guidelines. Such clauses 
could refer to general rules, i.e. principles that are laid down in a law of a higher rank such as 
the constitution, to principles of social behaviour and conduct, to ethics customs etc. 
Especially in the case of contracts whose parties come from different legal systems 
expressions with flexible meaning may enable flexibility in interpreting contract fragments in 
which they are used. 
 
 
4. General Clauses in international business contracts  
 
There are several legal instruments – some of them stated before – which can serve as a 
model for the contract, as a template.  
 
 
                                                          
13 Rott-Pietrzyk, 2007, see supra note 11, p. 282-283. 
14 Wolter, W, 1976,Uwagi o znamionach wymagających ilościowej oceny, in: Państwo i prawo, vol. 6., 
p. 25. 
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4.1.  Instruments issued by private organizations  
 
Instruments issued by private organizations which contain international rules for the 
interpretation of standard contract formulas are for example the INCOTERMS from the 
international chamber of commerce. Template contracts for certain fields of contracting 
include, for example, the ORGALIME General Conditions that are primarily intended for use 
in international contracts for delivery of engineering industry products in general, or the 
FIDIC rules which contain guides and templates for international contracts and business 
practice documents. Although they are referred to as “lex mercatoria” it is now the common 
opinion of scholars that they are not totally independent from the national law system from 
which they were originally drafted,
15
 so i.e. the FIDIC rules – although the full name of 
FIDIC: “Fédération Internationale des Ingénieurs-Conseils”– implies French roots were 
drafted from a common law background.
16
  
 
 
4.2. Instruments issued by international organizations, branch associations or academic 
groups 
 
There are also legal instruments that can serve as contract templates of a more general scope, 
issued by international organizations, branch associations or academic groups. Such are the 
UNIDROIT principles of international commercial contracts (UPICC), the principles of 
European contract law (PECL) or the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) as a 
restatement of principles of general contract law.
17
 All of these documents contain also 
general clauses.  
 
 
  
                                                          
15 Lorenz, M.,1993, Unterbeteiligungen an Krediten im Common Law und im Civil Law, in: 
Untersuchungen über das Spar-, Giro- und Kreditwesen Bd. 84, Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, p.358. 
16 Triebel, V., Balthasar, S., 2004, Auslegung englischer Vertragstexte unter deutschem Vertragsstatut, 
Fallstricke des Art. 32 I Nr. 1 EGBGB, NJW, 2189, p.2191. 
17 Cordero-Moss, G , 2011, Does the use of common law contract models give rise to a tacit choice of 
law or to a harmonized, transnational interpretation? In Cordero-Moss, G. (ed.) Boilerplate Clauses 
in International Commercial Contracts and the applicable law, Cambridge University Press, p. 37-61, 
p.44. 
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4.3. Typical examples for vague clauses in international template contracts 
 
The PECL for example contain the vague clauses of good faith, fair dealing, certainty (in 
contractual relationship) and uniformity (of application) and also reasonableness in several 
articles. The term reasonableness is used as often as 75-times in the PECL and was also 
defined there in Art. 1:302 :
18
 
 
Article 1:302: Reasonableness 
Under these Principles reasonableness is to be judged by what persons acting in good faith 
and in the same situation as the parties would consider to be reasonable. In particular, in 
assessing what is reasonable the nature and purpose of the contract, the circumstances of the 
case, and the usages and practices of the trades or professions involved should be taken into 
account. 
 
The DCFR also contains vague clauses of “good faith”, “fair dealing” and “legal certainty” as 
well as “reasonableness” in the field of interpretation and development of a contract 
concluded under those rules. An overlook of typical boilerplate clauses shows that vague 
terms are frequently used in those clauses as given by Cordero-Moss.
19
 I.e. the typical 
hardship clause relates to an “event that was beyond a party´s reasonable control and was one 
which it could not reasonably have been expected to have taken into account at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract and that the event and the consequences could not reasonably 
be avoided or overcome”.20 
 
 
4.4. Concrete clauses taken from a FIDIC based Contract 
 
The vague term of reasonableness is also used in the FIDIC template about the delivery of 
technical goods and their long term maintenance. Reasonableness is mentioned in what can 
be seen as a typical clause for risk distribution between the contractor and the owner. This 
clause reads:  
                                                          
18 Rott-Pietrzyk, E. (2005) Pojęcie rozsądku w projekcie Europejskiego Kodeksu Cywilnego, in 
Ogieły, L., Popiołka, W. Szpunar, M. (ed.) Rozprawy prawnicze, księga pamiątkowa profesora 
Maksymiliana Pazdana, Kantor Wydawniczy Zakamyczy, p. 701-719.  
19 Cordero-Moss, G , 2011, Introduction to part III, in: Cordero-Moss, G. (ed.) Boilerplate Clauses in 
International Commercial Contracts and the applicable law, Cambridge University Press, p. 119. 
20 Ibidem, p.122. 
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If and to the extent that any of those risks (specified risks defined to be in the sphere of the 
owner) above results in loss or damage to the works, Goods, (as the case may be), the 
Contractor shall (i) without undue delay give notice to the Owner and (ii) rectify this loss or 
damage to the extent that the rectification is possible by commercially reasonable means 
and instructed by the Owner.  
 
And also in the following clause:  
 
If the Contractor suffers delay and/or incurs Cost as a result of rectifying loss or damage 
which was instructed by the Owner to be rectified or otherwise as a result of the occurrence 
of any of the matters listed above the Contractor shall give a further notice thereof to the 
Owner and shall be entitled to: 
(a) an extension of time for any such delay; and  
(b) payment of any such Cost, which shall be added to the Contract Price. In the case of 
sub-paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) above, the Contractor shall be entitled to any such Cost plus 
reasonable profit. 
 
So in this clause reasonableness was placed in the context of commercially reasonable means 
and reasonable profit.  
 
In this contract there is also a clause of commitment to amendment which provides flexibility 
in the contract and is interesting because more and more projects are financed by banks or 
financial institutions and the banks do often take a seat in the negotiations.  
 
This clause reads:  
 
The Parties acknowledge, and the Contractor agrees, that the Owner will partially finance 
the payments due under this Contract by means of the Financing that will be granted to him 
by the Financial Institutions. Consequently, and considering the need for the Owner to 
obtain the Financing in order to pay the entire Contract Price, the Parties agree to 
negotiate in good faith and make every effort to amend those provisions of this Contract, 
the amendment of which is expressly requested by the Financial Institutions as a condition 
for obtaining the necessary financing for the implementation of the project. 
 
Here the vague term “good faith” is related to the way the negotiations should be conducted.  
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Another clause that is frequently found in template contracts and also in our example contract 
is a clause about the principle of an overall application of good faith for the execution of the 
contract combined with a conflict resolution clause.  
 
The Parties undertake to fulfil this Contract in good faith, resolving through 
negotiations and mutual agreements any disputes which may arise between them 
regarding its application, development, fulfilment, interpretation and implementation. In the 
event that an amicable settlement is not reached within ten (10) days from the beginning of 
the dispute that stated in the following paragraphs shall apply. 
 
These clauses are taken from FIDIC-forms of contract. FIDIC-forms of contract are 
embedded in the common law notwithstanding the fact that some of its features may be 
influenced by civil law. In fact no specific endeavors and efforts have been made to 
emancipate FIDIC-forms of contracts of its basic roots, which are undeniably identified as 
being the common law.
21
  
 
 
4.5. The need for the translation of contracts and the need for awareness of different 
meanings in different languages and different legal contexts 
 
In concluding a contract one has to distinguish between the applicable law of the contract, the 
original language of the contract and (convenience) translations of the contract for a better 
understanding of the contract for interested persons.  
 
An international business contract often contains a choice of law clause that may be 
formulated as follows: “this contract shall be governed by (i.e.) Polish law.“ 
 
The applicable law of the contract has normally an underlying language. The language 
reflects the way of legal thinking, and this way of legal thinking shapes the methods of legal 
regulation and control, whether in legislation, case law, or even in the form of a contract.
22
 A 
contract has a law that is applicable to it. If for example the applicable law to a contract is the 
                                                          
21 Bunni, N.G., 2005, FIDIC forms of contract, 3rd ed. Blackwell, Oxford p. 10. 
22 Döser, W.H., 2000, Anglo-amerikanische Vertragsstrukturen in deutschen Vertriebs-, Lizenz- und 
sonstigen Vertikalverträgen, NJW, p. 1451-1455, p. 1451.  
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Polish law, then that law is written and effective in the Polish language as that is the official 
language of Poland.
23
 Although the official language of the contract doesn´t need to be Polish 
unless the contract is a contract involving consumers or public institutions or it is a contract 
in the field of labor law
24
 the Polish law and therefore the understanding of several law 
institutions in the Polish language are crucial for the understanding of the contract.  
 
The same can be said about the application of any other law system, except that it is probably 
an exception rather than a rule that there is a statute which expressively states the 
applicability of a certain language to a contract completed under a certain jurisdiction.  
 
So if a contract is formulated in English but the German law applies there is a discrepancy 
between the English terminology of the contract and the German legal language. This may 
cause confusion to the interpretation of the contract as certain terms (such as the terms 
examined here: “good faith / Treu und Glauben” or “reasonableness”) are embedded in a 
certain legal surrounding that has to be mediated into different national legal spheres. 
 
Things get even more complicated, if a contract is drafted after a common law template in 
English and the German law applies, either by explicit choice of German law made in the 
contract or because German law as the applicable law could not have been effectively 
excluded in certain areas of the contract provisions.
25
 If such a contract is then dealt by a 
German court, the court would see the English style clauses in contracts governed by German 
law as a matter of contractual interpretation and therefore may use the English law as a tool 
to understand these clauses.
26
 If typical English clauses and legal terms are used despite of 
the German applicable law, the English understanding of these terms may become relevant.
27
 
This approach is the prevailing opinion of higher courts in Germany. But German courts 
would tend not to use the English law for interpreting these clauses, if all other connecting 
                                                          
23 Art. 4 ustawa z dnia 7 października 1999 r. o języku polskim, Dz. U. 1999, no. 90, pos. 999; with 
later amendments. 
24 Art. 7 of the law of the Polish language, Ustawa o języku polskim, Dz.U.2011, Nr.43, Pos.224. 
25 More examples for language confusion are given in: Triebel, V., Balthasar, S., 2004, Auslegung 
englischer Vertragstexte unter deutschem Vertragsstatut, Fallstricke des Art. 32 I Nr. 1 EGBGB, NJW, 
p. 2190. 
26 Dannemann, G., Common law-based contracts under German law, in: Cordero-Moss, (ed.) 
Boilerplate Clauses in International Commercial Contracts and the applicable law, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 762-79, p. 78. 
27 Triebel and Balthasar, see supra note 16, p. 2193. 
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points of the case are German.
28
 Even if the English text of the contract is taken from the 
background of the U.S. law, German courts would rather apply English law.
29
 Vice versa the 
same principle doesn´t apply. An English court would not judge a German contract to which 
the English law is applicable along with German interpretation guidelines
30
 and also in the 
practice of international arbitration courts the clauses are rather interpreted neutrally along 
with their integral meaning.
31
  
 
Even if the contract would be in English modeled along with English common law and the 
applicable law would be English common law, it is possible that a foreign judge decides the 
case. Certainly one may argue that these are rare cases, because if a contract contains a choice 
of law clause this is followed regularly by a choice of (secondary) jurisdiction clause, but still 
such cases occur. In these cases a German judge would have to apply the foreign law using 
the German language. Despite the progress in applying foreign law under the mediation of 
experts (§§ 293 ff ZPO) the basic legal understanding of the judge and his way of thinking 
determines the effect of a foreign law on his decision.
32
 
 
Even if the translation of the contract is only for convenience, contractual provisions might 
be misunderstood by a contracting party who is not capable of fully understanding the 
original (legal) language of the contract. This may cause confusion regarding the concrete 
scope of contractual obligations to the persons who are responsible to execute the contract.  
To overcome these difficulties it is possible to implement a contract clause that refers to the 
meaning of the language. The following clauses are given as:
33
 
 
1. Interpretation of a contract written only in English in accordance with German law 
This agreement and its terms shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the 
laws of Germany. If the English legal meaning differs from the German legal meaning of 
this agreement and its terms, the German meaning shall prevail. 
2. Bilingual text, English text serves only for information 
                                                          
28 Dannemann, see supra note 26 p. 78; an overview of the Court decisions is available in: Triebel and 
Balthasar, see supra note 16, p. 2193.  
29 Walz, S., Beck'sches Fb Zivil-, Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensrecht, D-E, C. H. Beck, München., 
2010, Klauseln zum Verhältnis deutschen und englischen Textes – Clauses on the relation of German 
and English text, annotation no 1. 
30 For further reference see: Triebel and Balthasar, 2010, p. 2193, supra note 16.  
31 Triebel and Balthasar, 2010, supra note 16, p. 2193. 
32 Döser, 2000, supra note 22, p. 1451. 
33 Examples: Walz, 2010, see supra note 29. 
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This text shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of Germany. The 
English version of this text serves only for information and is not part of this legal 
transaction. Therefore, in the event of any inconsistency between the German and the 
English version, only the German version shall apply. 
3. Bilingual text, German text prevails in case of doubt 
This text shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of Germany. It 
shall be executed in both the German and the English language. In the event of any 
inconsistency between the German and the English version the German version shall 
prevail. 
 
The FIDIC-contract is written from the background of an approach and language that still 
reflects the common law, but presumably not English law alone.
34
 
 
Probably in most cases FIDIC-forms of contract will be used in their original, English 
version, although translations do exist and FIDIC-terms of contract are often used in a Civil 
law context.
35
 Despite any contradictions with the applicable law, which may exist and must 
be recognized as the case may be, the use of English does not mean that the parties will 
understand the terms and clauses as an English native speaker will do.
36
 Instead at the outset 
some of the wording used by FIDIC will be either misleading or even not make sense. It is 
therefore critical to have prior knowledge of FIDIC’s common law background in order to 
render it understandable to non native speakers.  
 
Typical clauses in the FIDIC contract that have to be explained from their legal background 
are amongst others the term “reasonable” which we are going to discuss here or the 
expression “workmanlike manner”. These terms are well-developed through common law 
case law but they are also completely unknown to civil law countries.
37
  
 
 
  
                                                          
34 Jaeger A.-V., Hök G.-S., 2010, FIDIC-A Guide for Practitioners, Springer-Verlag Berlin 
Heidelberg, 2010, p. 99. 
35 ibidem. 
36 Ibidem. 
37 Ibidem. 
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5. Vague terms relating to different law families 
 
The laws of the world are systematized by scholars into different law families. We are going 
to discuss in our article mainly terms from civil law systems: German, Polish and – also to a 
certain extent relating to this law family – Chinese law. Yet for contrasting the argumentation 
and being aware that the English language – which is also the language of this article – is 
connected to a common law system, we would like to relate also to the common law family 
(English, U.S. law).  
 
 
5.1. Common Law systems 
 
Common law is the legal tradition, which evolved in England from the 11
th
Century onwards. 
This legal tradition is the basis of private law not only for England as its country of origin, 
but also for further States of the Commonwealth and de facto most important the US (except 
from Louisiana which was influenced by French law). The principles of common law appear 
for the most part in reported judgments, usually rendered by higher courts, in relation to 
specific fact situations arising in dispute, which courts have adjudicated. All in all common 
law rules seem to be more specific and detailed in comparison to civil law rules.
38
 
 
Common law is dominated by focusing on each single case, so called ‘reasoning from case to 
case’. Generalizations or principles are only developed through deciding single cases which 
form precedents for the decision of other cases. The central role in common law is played by 
the judge, who thinks and decides historically, concretely, goes by facts and whose decisions 
are normally not taken along a dogmatic conceptual construct.
39
 
 
A contract in the common law system is characterized through the fact that contract law is 
generally more concerned with certainty and expects parties to write their contracts around 
deficiencies in English law.
40
 Therefore they attempt to combine all rules to an agreement.
41
 
                                                          
38 Lengeling, D., 2008, Common law and civil law – differences, reciprocal influences and points of 
intersection; Toronto/Siegen 2008, [pdf] available at 
<http://www.consulegis.com/fileadmin/downloads/thomas_marx_08/DLengeling_paper.pdf> 
(accessed 9. 7. 2013), p. 8. 
39 Ibidem, p. 10. 
40 Dannemann, 2011, supra note 26, p. 65. 
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Contracts drafted under the US-law – as part of the common law – are famous for their vast 
amount of regulations.
42
 Today international commercial contracts are, with only a few 
exceptions, drafted on the basis of common law models.
43
 Still the PECL or the Draft 
Common Frame of Reference are grounded more on the civil law tradition as the majority of 
EU-member States belong to this tradition.  
 
 
5.2. Civil Law systems 
 
Civil law may be defined as a legal tradition which has its origin in Roman law, as codified in 
the Corpus Juris Civilis of Justinian, and as subsequently developed mainly in Continental 
Europe. The civil law legal tradition itself can be divided further into the Romanic laws, 
influenced by French law, and the Germanic family of laws, dominated by German 
jurisprudence.
44
 
 
A civil law system indicates for the contracting practice that the need for discussion and 
documentation has been limited by the existence of a large body of statute law, regulating 
relationships and limiting the room for debate.
45
  
 
A civil law system is a system in which regulation (by statutes and administrative acts) rather 
than litigation plays a stronger role in lawmaking and this influences also contracting. 
As Posner puts it:
46
 
 
Regulation and litigation tend to differ along four key dimensions: 
(1) regulation tends to use ex ante (preventive) means of control, litigation ex post 
(deterrent) means;  
(2) regulation tends to use rules, litigation standards;  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
41 Ibidem, p. 66.  
42 Döser, 2000, supra note 22, p. 1451. 
43 Cordero-Moss, introduction, supra note 19, p. 115. 
44 Lengeling 2008, supra note 38, p. 10. 
45 Cummings T., 2010, Best Practices in commercial contracting, Scandinavian Law, vol. 49, p. 134. 
46 Posner R.A., 2010, Regulation (Agencies) versus Litigation (Courts): An Analytical Framework; in: 
D.P. Kessler, (ed.) Regulation vs. Litigation: Perspectives from Economics and Law, Conference held 
September 11-12, 2009, University of Chicago Press, p. 11 - 26. 
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(3) regulation tends to use experts (or at least supposed experts) to design and implement 
rules, whereas litigation is dominated by generalists (judges, juries, trial lawyers), though 
experts provide input as witnesses; and  
(4) regulation tends to use public enforcement mechanisms, whereas litigation more 
commonly uses private ones—private civil lawsuits, handled by private lawyers although 
the decision resolving the litigation is made by a judge (with or without a jury), who is a 
public official (the jurors are ad hoc public officials). 
 
A feature of this - probably in Germany in the purest prevailing system - is the conviction 
that all possible legal constellations are abstract, sufficient and regulated by just one law. One 
would have merely to look into the Official Law Gazette to find for each case the prior 
regulated rule.
47
  From this is deduced the principle that individual arrangements between the 
parties need to contain only the statutory basics for the essentialia of the case, but beyond this 
regulation, even if the wording of the contract leads to a different assumption, the contract 
can be completed by the statutory regulations which can be found for instance in s. 133 of the 
German civil code, s. 157 German civil code and s. 9 of the law on general terms and 
conditions (AGBG).
48
  
 
Contracts concluded under German law (as an example for a civil law system) are “the better 
the shorter they are”, they are structured in a way that leads from general to specific and they 
are divided into sections with weighted logical subgroups.
49
 The detailed provisions by this 
way will be located closest to the highest relevant superordinate topic/preamble and are 
formulated as abstractly as possible, so as to encompass all conceivable variations of the later 
following system levels.
50
 An example for this – though not taken from a contract but from 
the civil code of Germany – would be the division i.e. of the first book of the civil code, 
which contains the general part of the code. The first division is about persons – a more 
general description, followed by the first title about natural persons which are consumers and 
entrepreneurs and then in the sections of this title there are regulated special questions 
concerning the beginning of legal capacity, residence, lack of full capacity etc.  
 
 
                                                          
47 Döser, 2000, supra note 22, p. 1541. 
48 Ibidem. 
49 Ibidem. 
50 Ibidem. 
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5.3. The Chinese law system 
 
It is not an easy task to define the Chinese legal system, which has to be understood in a 
dynamic manner by considering its historical, political, social, economic and cultural 
conditions. Looking at the legal history of China, Imperial China actually established its legal 
system, which has existed for at least two thousand years. There was an intense debate 
between two main school of thoughts (Confucianism and legalism) concerning which a state 
should use to effect social control; eventually Confucianism prevailed (Chen, 2000).
51
 At the 
turn of 20th century, China started its quest for modernisation and development, modern legal 
reforms, which was mainly processes of Westernisation, started by the Qing Dynasty and 
continued by the Nationalist Government. In 1949, the Communist party defeated the 
Nationalist party and established the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Then China changed 
to a socialist system and started the process of establishing a socialist legal system. However, 
the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) broke out and lasted for about ten years, which was 
considered a political and social disaster and undermined the nascent Chinese legal system. In 
1978, the 2nd generation of leader Xiaoping Deng started to reestablish the legal system in 
China. Thus, in a way, it is probably fair to say that the principal development of the current 
Chinese legal system started since the late 1970s.  
 
China has long labelled itself as “a social system of laws with Chinese Characteristics” 
(Information office of the State Council of PRC, 2011). The legal system of PRC generally 
has the civil law tradition, but also was influenced earlier by the Soviet Union and later by the 
common law tradition. It mainly has codified laws; by the end of 2010, China has established 
a comprehensive modern legal system with the Constitution as the head and civil, commerical 
laws and several other branches as the mainstay. The sources of law in China are wide, 
including the Constitution of PRC 1982, National People’s Congress (NPC) statutory law and 
other legislative enactments, international treaties and so forth (Shen, 2009).
52
 The laws 
issued by the NPC (China’s national legislature) and the administrative regulations adopted 
by the State Council (China’s cabinet) are important in China.  
 
                                                          
51 Chen, Albert H.Y. (2000) Socialist Law, Civil Law, Common Law, and the Classification of 
Contemporary Chinese Law. In Otto, Jan Michiel and Polak, Maurice V. and Chen, Jianfu and Li, 
Yuwen (Eds.): Law-Making in the People’s Republic of China, The Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer 
Law International, 55 - 74. 
52 Shen, Zongling (2009) Jurisprudence, 3rd ed., Peking: Peking University Press,263-270. 
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In order to integrate itself to the global rules-based trading system, China has made enormous 
efforts to adjust its legal system to Western Standards. China has undergone various 
economic reforms and legal reforms since its accession to WTO in 2001.  
 
Legal concepts, terminology, institutions, and processes which have origin in Western 
countries can often be seen in Chinese laws. It is thus claimed that the development of 
Chinese law to a large extent is a process of legal transplantion (Chen, 2007).
53
 However, 
certain external factors, such as environmental, social, economic, and cultural aspects can 
become barriers and have influence on the effect of legal transplantion (Kahn-Freund, 1974). 
But the term “legal adaptation” may be more proper to describe the phenomonen of legal 
reforms in China, as China usually firstly studies different models in other countries and 
international rules, learns ideas from them, and then adapts them to its own context. An 
American scholar considered Chinese legal reform as a process involving a filtering of those 
external influences for purpose of making the foreign elements compatible with Chinese legal 
and political culture (Head, 2009).
54
 Some foreign scholars have recognized the weight that 
China’s past has; thus considered, the Chinese legal system seems like a western system but 
with the influence of its own traditions (Jones, 2003).
55
 Some understand ‘Chinese law’ as a 
collective term emphasizing the plurality of legal systems (Menski, 2006).
56
 
 
 
6. Problems of translating vague legal terms from a linguistic viewpoint  
 
Legal translation theoreticians often carry out research into vagueness and fuzziness. They 
stress that numerous legal terms and expressions are used to refer to objects, institutions, 
relationships and procedures that are typical of a given legal system. Each legal system has 
its own legal realia and thus its own conceptual system and even knowledge structure.
57
 
                                                          
53
 Chen, Jianfu (2007) Modernization, Westernisation, and Globalisation: Legal Transplant in China. 
Hong Kong Law Journal, (2007),37(II). 
54
 Head, J. W. (2009) China’s Legal Soul. The Modern Chinese Legal Identity in Historical Context. 
Durham: Academic Press, 219-221. 
55
 Jones, W. C. (2003) Trying to Understand the Current Chinese Legal System. In C. N. Hsu (ed.): 
Understanding China’s Legal System. Essays in Honor of Jerome A. Cohen. New York: New York 
University Press, 7-45.  
56
 Menski, W. (2006) Comparative law in a global context: The legal systems of Asia and Africa. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 3-4. 
57 Vanderlinden, 1995, Comparer les droits, Bruxelles, p. 328-337. 
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When talking about general clauses one shall not forget about the opinion of Šarčevič (2000, 
p. 233) who claims that there are numerous indefinite or vague terms, such as ‘the best 
interests of the child’, ‘due care and attention’, and ‘good faith’, which are easily translated 
and already exist in most legal systems, but are interpreted differently by courts of different 
jurisdictions. So if they are interpreted differently, is it possible to apply general clauses at all 
in contracts between parties coming from different countries? It definitely requires vast 
knowledge going beyond legal one.  
 
As far as translation is concerned Šarčevič, opts for “measuring the degree of equivalence”. 
She claims that: Translators should be aware of the effects of differences of socio-political 
principles on interpretation. Some general clauses may have a political context and 
background, e.g. the Chinese syntagm “public needs/requirements” (公共利益的需要, 
gōnggònglìyìdexūyào) should be interpreted in the light of the fact that in the Chinese 
People’s Republic land may not be owned by private individuals, and the arable land is only 
used by people who do not enjoy any legal protection against expropriation.
58
 Those “public 
needs” enable the authorities to interpret legal provisions in various ways and may even 
constitute grounds for expropriation. So, as Cao investigating English-Chinese and Chinese-
English translation, she correctly remarks: Linguistic uncertainty, whether it is ambiguity, 
generality or vagueness includes both intralingual uncertainty, that is uncertainty found 
within a language, and interlingual uncertainty, that is, uncertainty that arises when two 
languages are compared or when one language is translated into another language.
59
 In such 
cases, words, phrases and sentences in one language may or may not be uncertain, but 
additional ambiguity or other uncertainty may arise when they are considered across two 
languages.  
 
It should be stressed here that languages are indeterminate and the level of indeterminacy of 
different languages varies. Cao argues that the level of uncertainty of Chinese in comparison 
with English is higher. To support her thesis she refers to the opinion of Grossfeld, a jurist 
from German who considers the English legal language, ‘less concentrated’ or in other words 
‘more open-textured’ than the German legal language. He also claims that legal concepts of 
the English legal system are vaguer which may pose subsequent problems.
60
 Finally, Cao 
                                                          
58 Šarčević, S. (2000) New Approach to Legal Translation. The Hague: Kluwer Law, p. 233. 
59 Cao, D. (2008) Translating Law. Shanghai, Shanghai Foreign Language Education Press, p. 19. 
60 Ibidem, p. 80. 
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argues that in translation, new linguistic uncertainty, that is, interlingual uncertainty, may be 
created due to the differences in linguistic and legal systems. This sometimes is inevitable, 
not due to translators’ mistakes, but because of the inherent nature of language. Often, the 
translator has to make hard decisions within the constraints of language.
61
  
 
Another scholar dealing with legal language and legal translation Tessuto
62
 claims that 
flexibility may be mostly found in syntagms
63
 which constitute adjectival, adverbial and 
phrasal expressions. She also turns attention to the fact that a few terms are used to refer to 
such syntagms, namely the scholars write about vagueness, ambiguity, semantic 
indeterminacy,
64
 or hedging.
65
 Among such syntagms she enumerates the following ones: 
such as, as soon as practicable, award is appropriate, fair opportunity, the award shall be 
made promptly, necessary measures, as promptly as practicable, on proof satisfactory to it, 
good cause, good faith, reasonable costs, reasonable inquiry, any circumstance likely to give 
rise to justifiable doubt and adds that of these, it is telling that the abstract and broad concept 
of ‘good faith’ has become part of different legal discourses and genres in which they have no 
technical meaning or statutory definition either, whether or not in the US law.
66
  
 
 
7. The interpretation and translation of the chosen vague terms of good faith and 
reasonableness under various jurisdictions 
 
7.1. Common Law countries, especially England and USA 
 
In literature on the English legal system it is stressed that there are no general clauses in the 
English law which would have a wide and universal scope of application--to all contractual 
                                                          
61 Ibidem, p. 81. 
62 Tessuto, Girolamo (2010) US Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures: Linguistic 
and Discoursal Features of a Genre in Action. in: Bhatia, V.K., Candlin,Ch.N., Gotti, M. (ed.) The 
Discourses of Dispute Resolution, Peter Lang, Bern, 2010, p. 259. 
63 Syntagms are combinations of two linguistics units resulting in what we understand as one word 
(Martinet, A. (1970) Podstawy lingwistyki funkcjonalnej, Warszawa, Państwowe Wydawnictwo 
Naukowe, p. 117-118). 
64 Bhatia, Vijay K., Engberg, Jan, Gotti, Mauritio, Heller, Dorothee (eds.) (2005) Vagueness in 
Normative Texts. Peter Lang, Bern, p. 12. 
65Lakoff, G. 1973, Hedges: A Study in Meaning Criteria and the Logic of Fuzzy Concepts, Journal of 
Philosophical Logic, vol. 2;  Channell, J., 1994,Vague Language,Oxford University Press; Hyland, K., 
1998,Hedging in Scientific Research Articles. John Benjamins, Amsterdam. 
66 Tessuto (2010) see supra note 62, p. 259.  
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relations, for example--although the vague term “reasonableness” maybe the exception to this 
rule. General clauses have therefore a very limited scope of application in the English law. If 
a general clause appears in a given text it may be analyzed and interpreted only in reference 
to the statutory instrument in which it is used.
67
 In American law, the restatement of the law 
of Contracts and the development of the Uniform Commercial Code in which the principle of 
good faith is stated as often as in over 50 code sections, the principle of “good faith” was 
given wider recognition.
68
  
 
7.1.1. General rules for the interpretation of contracts 
 
Under English law there is no canon of interpretation rules as is known under a civil law 
system -- as, for example in German law where the interpretation of contracts is applied as 
the wording, the grammatical sense, the systematic interpretation the teleological 
interpretation, etc.  
 
Under English law the wording of the contract is crucial. As a starting point the meaning of 
the document is to be found in the document itself, so the Court tries to find the “ordinary and 
natural meaning” (Investors Compensation Scheme/West Bromwich Building Society69). 
This is because the courts do not easily accept that people have made linguistic mistakes, 
particularly in formal documents (Lord Hoffman in ICS, at 913). If the meaning of a contract 
stays unclear there are further rules of interpretation such as to reach the most commercial 
outcome (Rainy Sky SA and Others –v- Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50). There are also 
rules about who should prevail, if ambiguity occurs in the contract such as the principle in 
contra proferentem.
70
 
 
Still the wording of the contract is crucial in the interpretive process along with the parol-
evidence-rule, in which verbal evidence is not allowed to be given … “so as to add or 
                                                          
67 Rott-Pietrzyk, see supra note 11, p. 204-205. 
68 Farnsworth, E.A., 1995, Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing under the unidroit principles, 
relevant international conventions and national laws, Tulale Journal of international and comparative 
law, vol. 3, p. 47-63, p. 52. 
69 Investors Compensation Scheme v. West Bromwich Building Society [1997] UKHL 28; [1998] 1 
All ER 98; [1998] 1 WLR 896 (19th June, 1997). 
70 Peel, 2011, Boilerplate Clauses under English law, in: Cordero-Moss, (ed.) Boilerplate Clauses in 
International Commercial Contracts and the applicable law, Cambridge University Press, p. 129-178 
p. 133. 
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subtract from, or in any manner to vary or qualify the written contract”.71 So any intentions of 
the parties not laid down written in the contract are not to be taken into account in the 
process.  
 
Of course there are more implications about the interpretation of contracts from a common 
law approach. These interpretation rules are developed from case-based reasoning rather than 
deduced from a general principal. 
 
7.1.2. Good Faith  
 
Along with the literal interpretation “good faith” might be understood as trust, belief or 
loyalty, an allegiance to a cause or a person, as for example "keep the faith" or "they broke 
faith with their investors”.  
 
Historically the term good faith finds its origin in Roman law as the expression of bona 
fides.
72
 It gave the judge an equitable discretion to decide the case before him in accordance 
with what appeared to be fair and reasonable.
73
  
 
Good faith is a term that is not really originated in the English law. In the case Interfoto 
Picture Library ltd v. Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd., judge Bingham explained this 
principle as follows: 
 
“In many civil law systems, and perhaps in most legal systems outside the common law 
world, the law of obligations recognizes and enforces an overriding principle that in making 
and carrying out contracts parties should act in good faith. This does not simply mean that 
they should not deceive each other, a principle which any legal system must recognize; its 
effect is perhaps most aptly conveyed by such metaphorical colloquialisms as ’playing 
fair’, ’coming clean’ or ’putting one's cards face upwards on the table.’. It is in essence a 
principle of fair and open dealing. 
 
                                                          
71 Triebel and Balthasar, 2004, supra note 16, p.2191. 
72 Whittaker, S., Zimmermann, R., 2000, Good Faith in European Contract Law, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 16. 
73 Ibidem. 
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English law has, characteristically, committed itself to no such overriding principle but has 
developed piecemeal solutions in response to demonstrated problems of unfairness. Many 
examples could be given. Thus equity has intervened to strike down unconscionable 
bargains.”“At one level they are concerned with a question of pure contractual analysis, 
whether one party has done enough to give the other notice of the incorporation of a term in 
the contract. At another level they are concerned with a somewhat different question, 
whether it would in all the circumstances be fair (or reasonable) to hold a party bound by 
any conditions or by a particular condition of an unusual and stringent nature.”
74
   
 
English law – as this quotation of the reasoning of judge Bingham JB in Interfoto picture 
Library ltd v. Stiletto Visual Programms Ltd. shows – would rather tend to use the terms 
fairness and reasonableness, to explain why in certain cases a contract is not concluded or 
must be adjusted to fair standards.  
 
As for “good faith” it tolerates a certain moral insensitivity in the interest of economic 
efficiency and values predictability of the outcome of a case more highly than absolute 
justice.
75
  
 
From the English legal point of view there seems to be a tension between an overall principle 
of good faith which is understood as a principle to induce general reasoning about justice and 
therefore to give a judge the possibility to overrule the wording of a contract for the sake of 
absolute justice on the one hand; and on the other hand a non-application of such a principle 
and instead an interpretation of a contract along with its wording which serves the 
predictability of the outcome of a contract and in the overall perspective economic efficiency.  
Whittaker and Zimmerman express the idea that in the absence of a principle of good faith 
the making, performing or breaking of contracts is permitted by the law to be nasty and 
brutish with the parties entitled to flout all consideration of decency and fair play.
76
  
 
Yet in many relevant cases the English law comes to similar results through the application of 
different doctrines such as equity,
77
 the interpretation of a contract by paying regard to the 
                                                          
74 Bingham in: Interfoto Picture Library ltd v. Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd., see also Peel, 2011, p. 
134. 
75 Whittaker and Zimmermann 2000, see supra note 72, p. 7, with further references. 
76 Ibidem, p. 44. 
77 Ibidem. 
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parties’ intentions,78 the reasonable expectations of the parties79 or “good faith” is being 
introduced by the law of particular contracts
80
 and also statutory law.  
 
One of the FIDIC contract provisions in which “good faith” is mentioned is the clause:  
 
(…) the Parties agree to negotiate in good faith and make every effort to amend those 
provisions of this Contract, the amendment of which is expressly requested by the Financial 
Institutions as a condition for obtaining the necessary financing for the implementation of 
the project. 
 
A clause to negotiate in good faith is a template that can be not only found in the concrete 
contracts we were analyzing but it is a typical boilerplate clause. It is also an underlying 
principle in the PECL, as sec. 3 art. 2:301: combines negative consequences in form of a 
liability for negotiations contrary to good faith.  
 
Article 2:301 PECL Negotiations Contrary to Good Faith 
(1) A party is free to negotiate and is not liable for failure to reach an agreement. 
(2) However, a party who has negotiated or broken off negotiations contrary to good faith 
and fair dealing is liable for the losses caused to the other party. 
(3) It is contrary to good faith and fair dealing, in particular, for a party to enter into or 
continue negotiations with no real intention of reaching an agreement with the other party. 
 
This is also a duty that is often formulated in boilerplate dispute regulation clauses, e.g., as 
follows:  
 
If a dispute arises out of this contract, and if the dispute cannot be settled through 
negotiation, the parties agree first to try in good faith to settle the dispute by mediation 
before resorting to arbitration, litigation, or some other dispute resolution procedure.
81
 
 
This term from an English law point of view seems to be quite problematic. A duty to 
negotiate in good faith has been described by the House of Lords in Walford v. Miles as 
                                                          
78 Ibidem, p.45. 
79 Ibidem, p. 46. 
80 Ibidem. 
81 http://www.mccammongroup.com/services-mediation/alternative-dispute-resolution-clause.asp, 
(last accessed 3. 7. 2013) 
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“inherently repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties when involved in negotiations’ 
and as ‘unworkable in practice”.82 “The reason why an agreement to negotiate, (…) is 
unenforceable is simply because it lacks the necessary certainty. (…) How can a court be 
expected to decide whether, subjectively, a proper reason existed for the termination of 
negotiations? The answer suggested depends upon whether the negotiations have been 
determined “in good faith”. However, the concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good 
faith is inherently repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties when involved in 
negotiations. Each party to the negotiations is entitled to pursue his (or her) own interest, so 
long as he avoids making misrepresentations. To advance that interest he must be entitled, if 
he thinks it appropriate, to threaten to withdraw from further negotiations or to withdraw in 
fact in the hope that the opposite party may seek to reopen the negotiations by offering him 
improved terms. A duty to negotiate in good faith is as unworkable in practice as it is 
inherently inconsistent with the position of a negotiating party. It is here that the uncertainty 
lies. In my judgment, while negotiations are in existence either party is entitled to withdraw 
from these negotiations, at any time and for any reason. There can be thus no obligation to 
continue to negotiate until there is a ‘proper reason’ to withdraw. Accordingly, a bare 
agreement to negotiate has no legal content.
83
 
 
The outcome of this reasoning is especially problematic when it comes to the example of the 
dispute-settlement-clause given before. A mediation needs from the whole definition of the 
procedure good faith of the parties so that it can be successful. If such an ADR-clause under 
the English law would be invalid, it would have an impact on many contracts. Yet there have 
been other decisions about negotiations in good faith and different perception of “good faith” 
in other common law countries.  
 
In the case United Group Rail Services v Rail Corporation Of New South Wales decided by 
the Australian NSW Court Of Appeal
84
 the Court Rejected the "Walford v Miles" – 
Construction Of Dispute Resolution Clauses by arguing that a clause requiring senior 
representatives of the parties to "meet and undertake genuine and good faith negotiations with 
a view to resolving the dispute or difference" was not uncertain in law and was therefore 
valid and enforceable. 
                                                          
82 Whittaker and Zimmermann, 2000, see supra note 72, p. 7 with further references. 
83 Lord Ackner, 1992, in Walford -v- Miles. 
84 [2009] NSWCA 177. 
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In United States law the understanding of the principle of good faith is at least in commercial 
law different. The prerequisite of good faith serves as a basic overriding principle, especially 
in the UCC. It is essentially equitable in character. The UCC enables the jurist on several 
occasions to apply that equitable principle. Good faith in the case of a merchant means 
honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in trade 
(Section 2-103(1)(b)). If not especially related to merchants, good faith means honesty in the 
conduct or transaction concerned (Section 1-201(19)).
85
  
 
7.1.3. Reasonableness 
 
In the English legal system in which precedent law dominates, reason is not only used as a 
criterion typical of traditional common law, but also as a general clause. 
 
The English term ‘reason’ (rozsądek) according to Rott-Pietrzyk86 has a wider scope of 
meaning than its Polish counterpart. The English term “reasonableness” (rozsądny) also 
means “just” (słuszny), “righteous, honest, fair” (uczciwy). One will not find connections 
between “reason” (rozsądek) and “rightness” (słuszność) in the Polish language as a criterion 
for assessments of conduct compliant with moral norms. What may be interpreted is only the 
connection with rationality of a specific action. In accordance with the definition formulated 
by Rott-Pietrzyk
87
 “rational” (rationalny) means “sensible; based on the proper thinking and 
effective in actions; justified, reasoned, and based on Latin rationalis means “reasonable” 
from ratio “account; judgment; reason, mind; method (…)”. The dictionaries of synonyms88 
give the following pair reasonable-rational. In the English language, in turn, “reasonable” 
differs from “rational” because the designate of the former, that is to say the referent, is also 
righteousness, which is not the designate of the latter term.
89
 Therefore, it is assumed that 
“racjonalny” is more linked with logic and logical thinking/reasoning on the basis of a 
logical syllogism, whereas “rozsądny” refers to “practical human problems” and “remains 
something very close to equity”.90  
 
                                                          
85 Farnsworth 1995, see supra note 68. 
86 Rott-Pietrzyk, 2007, see supra note 11, p.10 
87 Ibidem. 
88 Kurzawa, Z. (ed.) 2004. Słownik synonimów polskich, Wydawnictwo PWN, S.A. 
89 Ibidem. 
90 Rott-Pietrzyk, 2007, see supra note 11, p. 11. 
Joanna Grzybek, Tina De Vries, Yanan Zhang 
168 
In American law being "reasonable" means to have capacity of reason, acting rationally or 
governed by reason. The behavior can be called "reasonable" if the activities can be valued as 
fair, just, or equitable. The person must be honest, moderate, sane, sensible, and tolerable. 
"Reasonable" implies a certain standard of valuation. It is a standard for guiding conduct. The 
person or his acts can be characterized as reasonable if he possesses the just-mentioned 
virtues. A fictitious standard is set up to evaluate human behavior.
91
 The reasonable man test 
serves as a flexible concept, which needs to be interpreted by a constant shifting of the 
viewpoint between law and facts.
92
 
 
 
7.2. Germany 
 
7.2.1. General rules for the interpretation of contracts 
 
The German contract, embedded into the completed statutory system, will be interpreted 
firstly by the wording, secondly out of the context, thirdly by the purpose and finally along 
with the history of his creation.
93
 The premise of the interpretation of the contract is to find 
out the real intention of the parties and not to stick to the literal meaning of the expression (§ 
133 BGB). This is a subjective-objective standard that pulls all the sources of evidence 
outside the contract, and that the entire contract and its individual provisions are to be 
interpreted in the way that good faith with regard to the common usage requires (§ BGB § 
157 BGB). So this is understood as an objective standard of review that involves the 
environment around the contract, although it is perhaps not stated explicitly in the contract.  
 
  
                                                          
91Joachim, W., 1992, The "Reasonable Man" in United States and German Commercial Law, 15 
Comp.L.Yb. Int'l Bus. 1992, at 341 et seq, available under:< www.trans-lex.org/124800>, [accessed 9. 
7. 2013]. with reference to The Rath Packing Company vs. Joseph W. Jones, United States Court of 
appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 530 F.2d 1295 (1975). 
92 Ibidem, p. 360. 
93 Döser, see supra note 22, p. 1541, with further references. 
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7.2.2. Good Faith 
 
7.2.2.1. The regulation 
 
The principle of good faith (Treu und Glauben) literally: “fidelity and faith”94 or also 
translated as: “faith and credit”95 is regulated in the German Civil Code in different sections. 
The main rule is s. 242, yet it is also mentioned in s. 167, 162, 275 II, 307, 320 II and 815.  
 
Section 157, Interpretation of contracts   
Contracts are to be interpreted as required by good faith, taking customary practice into 
consideration. 
Section242, Performance in good faith.  
An obligor has a duty to perform according to the requirements of good faith, taking 
customary practice into consideration.  
 
Historically the before mentioned roman principle of bona fides could conveniently be 
blended with the indigenous notion of (Treu und Glauben) that can be found in a variety of 
medieval sources.
96
 
 
7.2.2.2. Narrowing down the principle of good faith in German jurisdiction  
 
In the German law systems s. 242 of the Civil Code is interpreted by the courts as an overall 
principle for the whole legal sphere which states that in making and carrying out his legal 
rights and obligations everybody should act in good faith.
97
 The relationships in which good 
faith plays a role are not only obligational relations; any qualified social contact would lead 
to its application.
98
 This includes relations that were founded by contract or legal regulation, 
relations that emerged out of a void contractual relation, contractual negotiations, long term 
business relations, etc.
99
  
 
                                                          
94 Whittaker and Zimmermann, 2000, see supra note 72, p.18. 
95 Farnsworth, 1995, see supra note 55, p. 68. 
96 Whittaker and Zimmermann, 2000, see supra note 72, p.18. 
97 Palandt, Grüneberg, C.,72nd ed., 2013, Kommentar zum BGB, C.H. Beck, München, s. 242, 
annotation 1. 
98 Ibidem, s. 242, annotation 5. 
99 Ibidem. 
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Although the principle of good faith is understood as an overall principle in many relations it 
has to be evaluated and concretized differently in different functional spheres.
100
 The German 
courts and lawyers categorized its various fields of application and established typical 
‘groups of cases’ (Fallgruppen) for the application of s. 242. Thus, it is generally recognized 
today that s. 242 operates to supplement the law (supplendi causa). It specifies the way in 
which contractual performance has to be rendered and it gives rise to a host of ancillary, or 
supplementary, duties that may arise under a contract: duties of information, documentation, 
co-operation, protection, disclosure, etc. These duties can also apply in the pre-contractual 
situation (culpa in contrahendo) and they may extend after the contract has been performed 
(culpa post contractum finitum). In the second place, s. 242 German Civil Code serves to 
limit the exercise of contractual rights. German commentators, in this context, very widely 
use the term “inadmissible exercise of a right” (unzulässige Rechtsausübung) as a nomen 
collectivum but they also frequently refer to “abuse of a right” (Rechtsmissbrauch) for 
instance in case someone is going against his own previous conduct.
101
 
 
The general clauses of the German Civil Code (including of course the notion of “good 
faith”) are also a gate through which the values underling the constitutional basic rights can 
pass into the private law sphere. That is the core of the theory of the indirect force of 
constitutional basic rights provisions in private law. So with this penetrability of the 
public/private law barrier the private law is made more flexible to changing circumstances as, 
for example, a changing understanding of the human rights concept which follows social 
change. 
 
From the German legal point of view the provision of the FIDIC contract “The Parties 
undertake to fulfill this Contract in good faith” would not need to be explicitly formulated in 
the contract, since it only restates the rule that is already mentioned in s. 242 BGB and this 
regulation is applicable to every contract.  
 
The second clause of the FIDIC contract: “the Parties agree to negotiate in good faith“, 
matches with regulations already to be found under the German law. The obligation to 
negotiate in good faith is concretized by the principle of culpa in contrahendo. The mere 
entry into negotiations between i.e. a seller and a purchaser establishes a pre-contractual 
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relationship which imposes various obligations on the parties, regardless of whether or not an 
acquisition agreement is eventually signed. These obligations have been broadly defined to 
comprise duties of mutual consideration, care and loyalty resulting from the trust requested 
and provided by the parties. A negligent or intentional violation of pre-contractual obligations 
by the seller or the purchaser may result in a claim for damages by the other party, provided 
that it has actually suffered damage (principle of culpa in contrahendo or Verschulden bei  
Vertragsschluss). 
 
Civil Code, s. 311, para. 2 
(2) An obligation with duties under section 241 (2) also comes into existence by 
1. the commencement of contract negotiations 
2.  the initiation of a contract where one party, with regard to a potential contractual 
relationship, gives the other party the possibility of affecting his rights, legal interests and 
other interests, or entrusts these to him, or 
3. similar business contacts.( Negotiating the Acquisition Contract, Beinert / Burmeister/ 
Tries, 2009).  
 
The rule of culpa in contrahendo which rooted in the thoughts of Rudolf v. Jhering
102
  was 
firstly developed as a doctrine by the German Courts and was codified into the Civil Code as 
s. 311 only lately in the course of the reform of the law of obligations which entered into 
force in 2002.  
 
Despite of the amendments of 2002 a wide body of case law defines in greater detail a 
number of pre-contractual obligations and is still relevant.
103
 So each party is obliged to 
negotiate in good faith. Incorrect or misleading statements are likely to constitute a violation 
of such duty. The same holds true for the non-disclosure of material information which the 
party failing to disclose knows to be relevant to the other party's decision to enter into the 
transaction, and which a party negotiating in good faith would normally disclose.
104
 
 
The pre-contractual obligation to negotiate in good faith does not, as such, require any party 
to sign the acquisition agreement and close the transaction. As long as no binding 
                                                          
102 Farnsworth,1994, see supra note 68, p. 68 with further references. 
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commitment has been made, either party may, in principle, walk away from the negotiations 
without becoming liable for damages.
105
Also a delay in the negotiations of the contract and 
the signing of the contract causes normally no liability.
106
 However, where a party has caused 
the other party to believe that the contract will definitely be signed, in particular when 
agreement has been reached on all terms and conditions, breaking off negotiations without 
reasonable cause may give rise to a claim for damages by the other side. The damage to be 
compensated along with the principle of culpa in contrahendo would be comprised of any 
damages suffered in reliance on the completion of the contract, e.g., out-of-pocket expenses 
and damages suffered by not pursuing a realistic alternative transaction, but would not 
include lost profit under the contract in question.
107
 
 
So in the stated FIDIC-Clause the overall obligation to undertake to fulfill the contract in 
good faith and the agreement to negotiate in good faith are somewhat repetitious of the 
obligations already valid under the civil code. Still the judicature under the civil code has 
interpreted good faith for a long time and put it into certain case groups so that when 
incorporating this obligation into a contract one must bear in mind the meaning given to the 
term by the German judicature.  
 
7.2.3. Reasonableness  
 
In German the legal equivalent for „reasonable man“ (literally translated: “vernünftiger 
Mensch”) would be: „der verständige Rechtsgenosse“.108 In German law the reasonable man 
is adapted to various kinds of roles or professions, e.g., the reasonable consumer, the 
reasonable car driver, whose actions and opinion i.e. serve to judge which expenses as a 
result of a traffic accident are reasonable; the reasonable house owner, or the reasonable 
traveler, who carefully looks after his insured belongings.
109
  
 
Beyond the question of the reasonable behavior of a person in a certain situation, human 
behavior in general will be evaluated in the sense of whether it is to be qualified as 
reasonable or not, when it comes to the definition of negligence. S. 276 (1) of the German 
                                                          
105 Ibidem. 
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Civil Code states: “someone acts negligently, if he disregards due care”. To decide whether 
parties in a contractual or tortious situation (from the German point of view an obligation) 
acted with due care or not, the judge often calls on the hypothetical behavior of a reasonable 
man to obtain a sound platform for that decision.
110
 To get to a result whether behavior is 
reasonable in a concrete situation, the flexible term of reasonableness has to be defined in 
more detail.
111
 
 
Consider the FIDIC-Clause containing reasonableness: 
 
“If and to the extent that any of those risks (specified risks defined to be in the sphere of the 
owner) above results in loss or damage to the works, Goods, (as the case may be), the 
Contractor shall (i) without undue delay give notice to the Owner and (ii) rectify this loss or 
damage to the extent that the rectification is possible by commercially reasonable means 
and instructed by the Owner.  
Under German Law, this clause would be interpreted as follows: The interpreter would look 
for an objective standard of conduct in a given professional area. And in this case it might 
well be understood as a reasonable use of the rights from the contract, taking commercial 
standards into account.”  
 
 
7.3. Poland 
 
7.3.1. General rules for the interpretation of contracts 
 
The general clause for the interpretation of contracts is Art. 65 of the Polish Civil Code. It 
reads as follows:  
 
Art. 65. Interpretation.  
§ 1. A declaration of intent should be interpreted in view of the circumstances in which it is 
made as required by principles of community life and established custom (zasady 
współżycia społecznego oraz ustalone zwyczaje). 
§ 2. In contracts, the common intention of the parties and the aim of the contract should be 
examined rather than its literal meaning. 
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The criteria for the interpretation of intentions or subjective wills are in line with the 
objective concepts to understand the content of declarations. The meaning of the will can be 
reconstructed on the basis of external, verifiable semantic rules associated with the context in 
which it comes to the expression of the will. It has to reconstruct the unanimous intentions of 
the parties.
112
 The interpretation is based on objectified criteria and not on the subjective 
intent of the parties. Important is the matching intent of the parties and the purpose of the 
contract which is also evident based on objective, verifiable, external criteria.
113
 
 
There are some special rules of interpretation for contracts. In the case of ambiguity or 
vagueness of a will in the form of a written paper, doubts should be resolved in favor of the 
person who has not edited the content (principle of in dubio contra proferentem).
114
 This is 
concluded from the Decision of the Supreme Court from 18.3.2003 (IV CKN 1858-180). In 
this case the Supreme Court held that the principle of social coexistence, as an interpretation 
directive supports the thesis that the interpretation of unclear provisions of the general 
conditions of an insurance company must be interpreted against the insurance company rather 
than the insured person. Still the majority opinion rejects a generalization of that position. 
The facts of the judgment contained two important factors that influenced the decision: the 
person drafting the document was a professional, and the other party to the contract was a 
consumer and the document itself was a standard form, so this rule cannot be generalized.
115
 
In the Civil Code there are included a number of special rules of interpretation. Thus art. 71 
specifies that an invitation ad oferendum in case of doubt has no binding force. Other rules of 
interpretation are regulated in art. 394 s. 1, 97, 544 s. 1 and art. 674.
116
 
 
7.3.2. Good Faith 
 
The term ‘good faith’ (dobra wiara) may be used in a subjective and objective sense. In the 
Polish Code of Contracts and Other Obligations (Kodeks zobowiązań) of 1933 the concept of 
good faith was used in both senses. In the objective sense, similarly to high morals, it 
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constituted a criterion of assessments of someone’s conduct. For instance Article 189 of the 
Civil Code stated that ‘the parties shall perform their obligations in accordance with their 
content, in a manner consistent with the requirements of good faith (…)’117. In the subjective 
sense, in turn, good faith refers to a psychical state of a given person who erroneously but due 
to justifiable reasons considers a law, a right or a legal state to exist. In that second sense the 
good faith is used especially in family law, law of succession and law of rights in rem. As far 
as the standards of conduct of persons concluding contracts are concerned, only the concept 
of good faith in the objective sense may be applied.
118
 
 
In the applicable Polish Civil Code from 1964 that was generally amended during the 
transformation process in 1990, “good faith” is mentioned in Art. 7: 
 
Art. 7. Presumption of good faith. If the law makes legal effects contingent upon good or 
bad faith, good faith is presumed. 
 
Art. 7 hasn´t been altered since 1964. Here we have an example of understanding good faith 
in the subjective sense, as a presumption on facts.  
The general clause for the interpretation of contracts is Art. 65 of the Civil Code (stated 
above).  
 
There are more places in the Polish Civil Code with reference to the mentioned vague 
phrases. These are the following:  
 
Art. 5. Abuse of right. One cannot exercise one's right in a manner contradictory to its social 
and economic purpose or the principles of community life (ze społeczno-gospodarczym 
przeznaczeniem tego prawa lub z zasadami współżycia społecznego). Acting or refraining 
from acting by an entitled person is not deemed an exercise of that right and is not protected. 
Art. 56. Effects of legal acts. A legal act gives rise not only to the effects expressed therein 
but also to those which stem from the law, principles of community life (z zasadami 
współżycia społecznego) and established custom. 
Art. 58. Unlawfulness of an act. 
                                                          
117 Strony winny wykonywać zobowiązania zgodnie z ich treścią, w sposób, odpowiadający 
wymaganiom dobrej wiary. 
118 Rott-Pietrzyk, 2007, see supra note 11, 86-87. 
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§ 1. A legal act which is contrary to the law or which is designed to circumvent the law is 
invalid unless a relevant regulation envisages a different effect, in particular that the invalid 
provisions of the legal act be replaced with relevant provisions of the law. 
§ 2. A legal act contrary to the principles of community life (sprzeczna z zasadami 
współżycia społecznego) is invalid. 
§ 3. If only a part of a legal act is affected by invalidity, the remaining parts of the act 
continue to be effective unless it follows from the circumstances that without the invalid 
provisions, the act would not have been performed. 
 
The adoption of these provisions was in 1964 a change from the legal situation in the inter-
war period as the overall (objectively used) principle of good faith was replaced by the 
principle of social coexistence. 
 
Difficulties connected with the interpretation (construction), translation and application of 
general clauses in contracts may lead to a situation in which they have different meaning 
depending on economic and regime-related laws in force in a given territory at a given time. 
The clause of “zasady współżycia społecznego” that was taken directly from the (soviet) 
Russian civil law system replaced the traditional terms of reasonableness and good faith in 
1964.
119
 Art. 65 of the Polish Civil Code stayed unaltered until today, giving room to be 
interpreted along with truly most opposite state concepts.  
 
During the communist time the principles of community life (zasady współżycia społecznego) 
were to be understood as moral rules and principles regulating inter human relations which 
are commonly accepted in a given period of time. During the communist regime the 
principles of community life were also guarantied in art. 78 Polish Constitution.
120
 Shortly 
after the entering into force of the Polish Civil Code there was a debate whether these 
principles of community life could overrule also binding provisions (jus cogens) of the Civil 
Code such as the record of a notary for the sales of land or termination of obligations.
121
  The 
majority opinion rejected this notion. In the period after the rendering into force of the Civil 
Code they were interpreted by the Polish Supreme Court as norms of morals consistent with 
                                                          
119 Safjan M. 1990, Klauzule generalne w prawie cywilnym (przyczynek do dyskusji), PiP vol. 11, p. 
48. 
120 Gralla, E., 1966, Die Generalklauseln im polnischen Zivilgesetzbuch, JOR, vol.VII, 1966, p. 183-
197, p. 190. 
121 Gralla, ibidem; Wolter, A.,1964, Zasady współżycia społecznego w nowych kodeksach, in: Nowe 
Prawo, vol. 11, p 1031-1042. p. 1031. 
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the opinion of the leading group of the society
122
 which was a synonym for the communist 
party.
123
 The Polish Supreme Court developed special principles grounded on the provisions 
of the Constitution such as the goals of the state, all constitutional principles or the 
prohibition of the abuse of rights and others.
124
 These principles were meant to transform and 
to complete reality, to adopt the legal provisions to the new ideological and political needs.
125
 
So they were constructed to actively open up space for interpretation by the judges to give a 
wider scope of communist ideology into private law.  
 
The role of the general clauses was seen as quite major in shaping the relation between the 
individual rights and the interest of the state.
126
 The Polish legal concept of the principle of 
social co-existence/principle of community life (zasady współżycia społecznego) referred to 
in the Polish Civil Code is now again interpreted as the equivalent to the principle of “good 
faith” in the objective sense. After the transformation of the communist system into a 
democratic system the provision stayed the same but the interpretation along with the 
communist ideology was discontinued.  
 
The clause of public policy as shaped by the communist legal system in Poland is still 
associated with a socialist moral doctrine despite the fact that it is used now in different 
circumstances and in a different reality and its content has also changed. It may be found in 
numerous provisions as an element that makes the content of particular institutions of civil 
law more flexible. It helps qualify some events leading to the creation of legal relations, for 
instance when interpreting declarations of will to prevent the occurrence of legal 
consequences which would be morally unacceptable (disapproved of and condemned) due to 
the particulars of the context. 
 
Taking under regard the interpretation of the stated FIDIC-clauses it comes clear that under 
Polish law there exists an overall principle to interpret contracts and wills in accordance with 
the principle of social co-existence that is actually understood as “good faith”. Concerning 
the clause about negotiations in good faith it has to be mentioned that already during the 
                                                          
122 Decisions of the Polish Supreme Court of 13 12. 1952 and 27. May 1962 published in: Nowe 
Prawo 1963, 7, 8-9) 
123 Gralla, E., 1966, ibidem, p. 195. 
124 Ibidem. 
125 Safjan, 1990, see supra note 101, p. 49. 
126 Ibidem, p. 48. 
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preparatory works for the law of obligations from 1933 it was stated that the general duty of 
loyalty and care in contract negotiations cannot be seen as a principal contractual obligation 
but merely as a supporting obligation.
127
 But still the duty to negotiate in good faith was 
affirmed. In the actual Civil Code art. 72. s. 2 is the corresponding regulation: 
 
Art. 72 (…)  
§ 2. A party which enters into or conducts negotiations in breach of good custom, in 
particular without intending to execute a contract, is obliged to remedy any damage which 
the other party suffers by the fact that it was counting on the contract being executed. 
 
Here again the general term of good custom is used but as stated before in a very similar 
interpretation as good faith.  
 
7.3.3. Reasonableness 
 
As said before the term “reasonable” (rozsądny) is in polish law not used in the sense of 
“rightness” (słuszność). It is rather interpreted as in connection with rationality in a specific 
way. The term reasonable (rozsądny) is not often used in polish law. It is used in the Civil 
Code i.e. in  
 
art. 84. (Error) 
§ 2. An error can only be relied on if it justifies the supposition that, if the person making 
the declaration of intent had not acted under the influence of the error and had judged the 
case reasonably, he would not have made such a declaration (material error). 
and 
art. 760
2
 (Principal's obligations)  
§ 2. The principal is obliged to notify the agent within a reasonable time of the acceptance 
or refusal of any proposal to execute a contract and of the non-performance of any contract 
executed with the agent's intermediary or which the agent has executed on the principal's 
behalf. 
                                                          
127 Cierpiał R., Die polnische Regelung der Haftung aus Culpa in Contrahendo im Vergleich zu 
Deutschland und Österreich, 2010, in Bachner, Th., Cierpiał, R., Lemanska, E., Liebscher, M., ed., 
Nomos, Baden Baden, p. 41-58, p. 48, with further reference. 
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§ 3. The principal is obliged to notify the agent within a reasonable time that the number 
of contracts the principal expects to be executed or their value will be significantly lower 
than that which the agent could normally have expected. 
 
The examples show that the term is used in specific ways. In art. 84 the term “reasonable” is 
part of the legal definition of a material error. Reasonableness is important to distinguish the 
objective significance of the error, i.e. that a reasonable person who is familiar with the true 
state of the matter would not have submitted his declaration of intent to this effect.
128
 So 
along with this definition an objective assessment of the significance of error will be 
considered. Here the reasonable person again is viewed as an average person who rationally 
decides how to act.  
 
As regards the notion of “reasonable time” in art. 7602 of the Civil Code, the law provides for 
the principal some flexibility in deciding how far in advance he has to inform the agent about 
a change of circumstance (in reasonable time).
129
  
 
 
7.4. China  
 
China enacted the Uniform Contract Law (UCL) in 1999, which intended to bring Chinese 
business practices into conformity with general Western practices. The UCL provides a 
supportive legal framework for international business transactions. Besides the UCL, the 
judicial interpretations from the SPC are important to the application of contract law in legal 
practice. The SPC issued Interpretation I, which came into effect on 29 Dec. 1999; and the 
Interpretation II, which became effective on 13 May 2009.  
 
7.4.1. Contract Interpretation  
 
Art. 125 of the UCL concerns contract interpretation and language versions. This is the first 
time that Chinese contract law introduced the system and principles of contract interpretation. 
This is essential to maintain freedom of contract, materialize contract justice, guarantee the 
                                                          
128Judgement of the Supreme Court of 31.08.1989, III PZP 37/89, OSN 1990 , No. 9, item. 108. 
129 Mikłaszewicz, P., 2012, Osajda, K., ed., 6th ed. Kodeks cywilny. Komentarz, C.H. Beck, Warszawa.  
2012, art. 7602 annotation 3. 
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will of parties and protect parties’ contract purposes. There are certain rules and approaches 
towards contract interpretation; but eventually judges or arbitrators have the right to decide if 
there is any dispute between parties.  
 
Art. 125 states that “in case of any dispute between the parties concerning the construction 
of a contract term, the true meaning thereof shall be determined according to the words and 
sentences used in the contract, the relevant provisions and the purpose of the contract, and in 
accordance with the relevant usage and the principle of good faith.”  
It also provides that “when a contract was executed in two or more languages, and it 
provides that all versions are equally authentic, the words and sentences in each version are 
construed to have the same meaning. In case of any discrepancy in the words or sentences in 
the different language versions, they shall be interpreted in light of the purpose of the 
contract.”  
 
From this provision, we can identify that UCL adopts the “Plain meaning” rules; “purpose” 
construction approach; custom, the principle of good faith; and the principle of “being 
interpreted as a whole”.130 However, the provision has been criticized as too simple, omitting 
concrete elements applying to each interpretation approach. Such method may lead to 
controversy and increased uncertainty for transacting parties.
131
  
 
In addition, art. 41 prescribes for disputes concerning the construction of a standard form, the 
terms shall be interpreted in accordance with common sense. If a standard term is subject to 
two or more interpretations, the interpretation that is unfavorable to the party that supplies it 
shall be adopted. If a discrepancy exists between the standard term and a non-standard term, 
the non-standard term prevails. Although art. 41 particularly concerns construction of 
standard terms, it actually points out the typical contract interpretation approach of “common 
sense” and also one special “unfavorable explanation rule” regarding standard terms.  
 
  
                                                          
130
 Liang, Huixing (2001), Contract Interpretation Method and the so-called “Right of Final 
Interpretation”, Institute of Law, Chinese Academy of Social Scientist, available at 
http://www.iolaw.org.cn/shownews.asp?id=1484, accessed 15 Mar. 2013. (In Chinese language).  
131 Qiao, Xinsheng (2001) Discussion on Contract Interpretation, published on 30 Nov. 2001, 
available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guandian/29/173/20011130/616647.html, accessed 14 Mar. 
2013. (In Chinese language). 
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7.4.2. Good Faith 
 
Good faith, freedom of contract, and fostering transactions are three fundamental and guiding 
principles in Chinese contract law. In the UCL, “the principle of good faith” in Chinese 
language refers to the term “chengshixinyong” (literally “honesty and trustworthiness”, often 
abbreviated into “chengxin”). This principle requires parties to conduct themselves 
honorably, to perform their duties in a responsible manner, to avoid abusing their rights, to 
follow the law and common business practice, and so forth.
132
  
 
UCL recognizes this principle at every stage of a transaction (contract formation, after 
contract formation and before contract performance, contract performance, termination of a 
contract). For example, art. 6 provides this principle of good faith in general, and requires the 
parties to abide by the principle in exercising their rights and performing their obligations. 
Art. 42 states the pre-contract liabilities for damages that a party may bear, if in the course of 
concluding a contract, the party engaged in some conducts that caused loss to the other party. 
The circumstances of such conducts are (i) negotiating in bad faith under the pretext of 
concluding a contract; (ii) intentionally concealing a material fact relating to the conclusion 
of the contract or supplying false information, (iii) any other conduct which violates the good 
faith principle. Art. 60 concerns that the parties shall abide by the principle of good faith, and 
perform obligations in light of the nature and purpose of the contract, and in accordance with 
the relevant usage. Art. 92 refers to the principle of good faith upon discharge of the rights 
and obligations under a contract.  
 
Concerning translation, it seems that there are two different English translations (principle of 
good faith, and “honesty and trustworthiness”) for the Chinese phrase “chengshixinyong”. 
However, Cao claimed that different translations may have different implications; and this 
also exemplifies the problem in translating Chinese law into English.
133
 In the Chinese 
contract law, the phrase “chengshixinyong” was actually translated from the English “good 
faith” under common law; thus when the Chinese phrase was translated back to English, its 
meaning seems equivalent to the English “good faith”.134 But Chinese phrase 
                                                          
132 Wang, Liming and Xu, Chuanxi (1999) Fundamental Principles of China’s Contract Law, 13 
Columbia Journal of Asian Law, (1999), Issue 13, 16. 
133 Cao, Deborah. (2004) Chinese law: A Language Perspective. Hants, England: Ashgate Publishing 
Limited, 12-13, 
134 Ibidem.  
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“Chengshixinyong” or “Chengxin” also has its own root in the Chinese cultural tradition, 
which refers to Confuciansim, Mohism, Taosim, Legalism, and Buddhism.
135
 Accordingly, to 
apply and interpret “chengxin” or other contract law terms in a proper manner may require 
the consideration of current Chinese legal practice.
136
  
 
7.4.3. Fair dealing or “fairness”  
 
Fairness, in Chinese terms, refers to “gongping”. However, the Chinese concept of 
“gongping” can have different meanings or translations in English language such as 
“unbiased”, “equitable”, “impartial”, “reasonable”, or “rational”. The UCL recognizes the 
fairness principle, which refers to article 5 requiring the parties to abide by such principle in 
prescribing their respective rights and obligations. The principle is also applied in standard 
terms provisions (art. 39 requires the party supplying the standard terms to obey such 
principle in prescribing the rights and obligations of the parties). Sometimes, the adjective 
word “fair”, which describes a certain manner or way, is used. For example, art. 271 concerns 
the tendering process in construction project, and requires the tender to be conducted in an 
open, fair and impartial manner according to relevant laws.  
 
The application of the principle “fairness” can be closely connected with “good faith”. For 
example, a letter from the SPC in 1992 (No. 27), concerned a contract dispute on sales of gas 
meter spare parts. The contract price of the main component material was 4400 RMB per ton, 
but later the price increased to 4600, and then to 16000 RMB. The SPC considered that this 
was a kind of change of circumstances that the parties could not foresee and could not be 
avoided, during the performance of the contract. Hence it would be “unconscionable” or very 
unfair to the sales party to perform the contract according to the original contract price. Some 
commented that this case represented that the SPC had accepted the concept of 
“unconscionability” and the principle of “changes of circumstances”. Some considered that 
the principle of change of circumstances is a specific case of application of “good faith” in 
contract law.
137
  
 
                                                          
135 Cao, Deborah. (2004), 169. 
136 Ibidem. 
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 Zheng, Qiang (2000) A Comparative Study of Principle of Good Faith in Contract Law, Journal of 
Comparative Law, (2000), Issue No. 1. (In Chinese language).  
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Nowadays the principle of change of circumstances is clearly recognized in China. The recent 
Judicial Interpretation II of Contract law in 2009, art. 26, particularly specifies the principle 
of change of circumstances. According to this provision, if any major change occurs which is 
unforeseeable when the parties concluded a contract; is not a business risk and is not caused 
by force majeure occurs after the formation of the contract; if the continuous performance of 
the contract is obviously unfair to the other party or cannot realize the purposes of the 
contract; and a party files a request for the modification or rescission of the contract with the 
court, then the court shall decide under the principle of fairness and in light of the facts of the 
case.  
 
7.4.4. Reasonableness  
 
Reasonableness in Chinese language usually refers to “heli”. Interestingly, the Chinese 
phrase “heli” can be understood as “rational”, “reasonable”, “fair”, “equitable” in English 
language. Considering the overlap of the meanings of concepts of “fairness” and 
“reasonableness” in Chinese language, there can be problems of choosing a proper phrase 
when doing the translations.  
 
Looking at the UCL, one can find phrases containing “reasonable”, such as “reasonable 
time”, “reasonable period”, “reasonable manner”, “be shared in a reasonable manner” in 
many articles. The usage of “reasonable” can be classified in two ways. Firstly, it is used to 
describe “period”, or “time limit”. For example, art. 23 provides if the offer does not 
prescribe a period for acceptance, and if the offer is made in a non-oral manner, the 
acceptance shall reach the offeror within a reasonable time. Similarly, art. 69 states that “after 
performance was suspended, if the other party fails to regain its ability to perform and fails to 
provide appropriate assurance within a reasonable time, the suspending party may terminate 
the contract”. 
 
Secondly, it is used as a modifier of a noun or a verb according to the specific requirements 
of concrete provisions. The use of ”reasonable” or ”reasonably” limits or defines the degree 
and scope of using, understanding or grasping the noun or verb. Art. 289 requires that a 
common carrier may not deny any normal and reasonable carriage requirement by a 
passenger or consignor. According to art. 332, a developer in commissioned development 
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shall use development funds in a reasonable manner. Such expressions can also be seen in 
business contracts in China.  
 
It is generally accepted that legal provisions should use precise wording to ensure the clear 
meaning. And vague words should be avoided, because vague or ambiguous phrases cause 
misunderstanding and difficulties of application. But then a question arises:  would the word 
“reasonable” used in contract law and contracts lead to disputes, and thus be avoided?  
 
One Chinese scholar has written that the use of “reasonable” in contract law can be positive 
from four perspectives. First, the term to some extent makes up for limitations on 
predictability of legislation; secondly, the frequent use of the term reflects party autonomy; 
thirdly, the word implies compliance with public order and good morals and respect towards 
trading custom or habits between parties in certain industries; finally, it reflects the 
application of the good faith principle.
138
 We also understand the reason and advantages of 
employing the term “reasonable” in contract law. However, we still would recommend that 
business parties specify concrete time periods, and try to avoid the usage of the term in 
contract documents in practice, if they can.  
 
 
8. Summary 
 
Flexibility in contracting can be achieved by using vague terms. There are some vague terms 
that are well known in the laws of given countries and international contract templates. The 
examples chosen here, the terms good faith and reasonableness, relate to different law 
families. As the term ”good faith” can be understood as the translation of the original roman 
term ”bona fides” and the term ”Treu und Glauben” that is deeply rooted in German legal 
history, this term actually originates from the civil law family. As the examples of the laws of 
Germany, Poland and China show, they establish an overall principle that is not only relevant 
to the interpretation of contracts and the concretization of secondary obligations of a contract, 
but concern also the way the negotiation of the contract shall be conducted. The term ”good 
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 Xu, Lingjie (2001) Rationality of Rationalization in the Contract Law, Journal of Yunan 
University (Law Edition), (2001), Issue 4. (In Chinese language). 
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faith” though often explicitly referred to in boilerplate clauses that are part of a business 
contract, is in these countries also part of the civil code.  
 
On the contrary in common law countries generally, there is no overall principle applying 
contracts with ”good faith”. Under a common law system the notion of ”good faith” in a 
contract makes sense to complete the general obligations arising from the contract, but even 
this may not be completely observed in English case law.  
 
This position, however, points to only one of the opposite ends regarding the application 
of ”good faith” under a common law family law system. The other end is marked by the US 
law where in the restatements and in the UCC the term ”good faith” is frequently used.  
 
When it comes to the term of ”reasonableness” it is rather the other way around. This term 
originates rather in common law but has been adopted in the civil law systems. While in the 
common law the term ”reasonableness” seems to have a general meaning, in the state laws of 
the civil law system such as Poland the term is used in a narrower sense. 
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The Principle of Loyalty and Flexibility in Contracts 
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Flexibility is needed especially in long-term cooperative agreements, which should work over time 
and adapt to changing circumstances. The aim of this article is to highlight how the Nordic principle 
of loyalty can facilitate the conclusion of more flexible contracts. The method used is the traditional 
legal method (Rechtsdogmatik).  
 
The principle of loyalty, the Nordic equivalent to the principle of good faith in the civil law countries 
of Continental Europe, requires that the parties to a contract have due regard to the other party’s 
interests during the contract negotiations and performance, but also after the contract has been 
executed. The principle of loyalty may, for example, oblige a party to inform the other party of issues 
that are relevant for his performance or require renegotiation of the contract due to changing 
circumstances. By clarifying for the parties the behaviour that can be expected of them, as well as 
what they can expect from others, the principle of loyalty facilitates trust and makes it easier for 
parties to dare enter into more flexible contracts. The parties can also ascertain that the principle of 
loyalty will be given weight in the interpretation of the contract through their drafting technique, as 
we show in the article.  
 
Flexible, long-term contracts are likely to include gaps and leave room for interpretation, which 
increases uncertainty. In the article we argue that the principle of loyalty proves to be beneficial in 
these situations. As the principle of loyalty functions as a legal basis for protection of the parties’ 
legitimate expectations, the gaps of the contract can often be filled with what is perceived as “normal” 
for the type of contract within the said trade. This reduces the need for highly detailed, complete 
contracts. 
 
As a result, the knowledge of the existence of the principle of loyalty might support the parties’ 
choice to conclude a flexible contract.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Good contracts are needed in commerce. By this we mean well-working contracts from the 
parties’ perspective. Since many commercial contracts are typically long-term cooperative 
arrangements, they should be flexible enough to work over time and changing circumstances.  
 
A well-working contract can also contain open questions, perhaps even conscious gaps, since 
the parties have decided to modify their contract to the extent needed during its term. The 
reason for such a decision can be strictly economic: If the parties trust one another it is easier, 
faster and cheaper to conclude a more rudimentary contract. Real-life contracts do not 
always, however, contain the flexibility needed in the form of, for example, clauses on 
renegotiation, hardship and alternative dispute resolution (ADR).  
 
The main objective of this article is to highlight that the so called principle of loyalty in 
Nordic contract law can promote the use of flexibility in contracts. This follows from the 
principle’s function of building trust between the parties, wherefore it can hinder 
opportunistic behaviour. And trusting parties dare enter into more flexible contracts. In other 
words, we find that the principle of loyalty is a helpful norm when it comes to flexibility in 
contracts.  
 
 
2. The Principle of Loyalty as a Nordic Phenomenon 
 
The principle of loyalty, the Nordic equivalent to the principle of good faith in the civil law 
countries of Continental Europe, refers to the set of obligations, which contracting parties 
have towards each other. Similarly to the good faith principle (or “Treu und Glauben” and 
“bonne foi” principles) the principle of loyalty requires that the parties to a contract have due 
regard to the other party’s interests during the contract negotiations and performance, but also 
after the contract has been executed. The principle of loyalty promotes the realisation of an 
agreement by directing behaviour so that the other party’s reasonable expectations will be 
met.
4
  
                                                        
4
 Taxell, L.E. (1972), Avtal och rättsskydd, Åbo Akademi, p. 81, Ämmälä, T. 
(1994), ”Lojaliteettiperiaattesta eräiden sopimustyyppien yhteydessä”, in Saarnilehto, A. (Ed.), 
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The principle of loyalty is primarily focused on behaviour and not actual contract terms.
5
 
Parties are, for example, obliged to contribute to the realisation of common goals and refrain 
from causing harm to the other party, while fairness or unfairness of the contract itself is to be 
resolved under the principle of conscionability found in Section 36 of the Contracts Act: “If a 
contract term is unfair or its application would lead to an unfair result, the term may be 
adjusted or set aside.” 
 
The Nordic principle of loyalty is moreover characterised by its close connection to other 
contract law principles, for example the aforementioned principle of conscionability. As it 
does not diverge clearly from other contractual principles it cannot be exhaustively defined, 
but its content should be determined instead in casu.
6
  
 
The principle of loyalty as such cannot be found in any laws in Finland, but many sections of 
different laws have been linked to the said principle and it has also been recognised in certain 
travaux préparatoires (preparatory work on legislation). The principle of loyalty is 
recognised in decisions by courts and arbitration panels as well as in contract practices. 
Today most scholars consider it an existing general principle of law, that is a legal principle 
acceptable according to the values of society.
7
 Rules and principles are both legal norms. As 
a legal rule can be described with the expression “either–or”, which means that the rule either 
comes into effect in a certain situation or it does not, a legal principle is, however, more 
correctly described with the expression “more–or–less”. This means that the principle can 
come into effect to a different extent in different situations.
8
  
 
Although the principle of loyalty has been then generally accepted in Finland, its actual 
                                                        
Lojaliteettiperiaatteesta – Vastapuolen edun huomioon ottamisesta eri oikeudenaloilla, Turun 
yliopiston oikeustieteellisen tiedekunnan julkaisuja, Turku, pp. 3–50 (pp. 4–9), Munukka, J. (2007), 
Kontraktuell lojalitetsplikt, Jure Förlag AB, Stockholm, pp. 73–101. 
5
 Munukka J. (2005): “Harmonisation of Contract Law: In Search of a Solution to the Good Faith 
Problem”, Scandinavian Studies in Law, pp. 229 – 250 (p. 242).  
6
 Taxell (1972), pp. 75–82, Ämmälä (1994), pp. 10–11, Karhu J. (2008): “Lojaliteettiperiaate 
sopimusoikeudessa – oikeudellista peruskartoitusta”, in Juhlajulkaisu Leena Kartio 1938 – 30/8 – 
2008, Suomalainen lakimiesyhdistys, Helsinki, pp. 101 – 116 (p. 103). 
7
 Sund-Norrgård P. (2011), Lojalitet i licensavtal, Publications of IPR University Center, Juridiska 
föreningens publikationsserie nr 56, Helsinki, p. 58 and references. 
8
 Dworkin, R. (1978), Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, pp. 22–28, 71–
80, Aarnio, A. (1989), Laintulkinnan teoria, Yleisen oikeustieteen oppikirja, WSOY, Helsinki, pp. 78–
83, Peczenik, A. (1995), Juridikens teori och metod, Fritzes Förlag, Stockholm, p. 75, Tuori, K. 
(2008), Rättens nivåer och dimensioner, Yliopistopaino, Helsingfors, p. 55.  
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content, theoretical basis and applicability has been quite widely debated.
9
 The situation 
seems to be similar in the other Nordic countries, where the principle of loyalty also lacks a 
clear statutory basis. For example in Sweden it has been unclear whether the principle of 
loyalty should be considered a general contract law principle or whether its applicability is 
limited only to some types of contracts.
10
  
 
In this article we have chosen to use the term principle of loyalty instead of good faith to 
emphasise the Nordic point of view while approaching the discussion about flexibility. This 
term corresponds to the Finnish “lojaliteettiperiaate”, Swedish “lojalitetsprincip”, and 
Norwegian and Danish “loyalitetsprincip”.   
 
 
3. “Complete” contracts v. flexible contracts 
3.1. The importance of legal and business knowledge in contract drafting 
 
Contracts are often drafted by businessmen without any help from lawyers, and many times 
this works very well. It is, however, always a good thing to remember that even the simplest 
contract is in essence a legal construction.  
 
A businessman concluding, for example, contracts on sale of real property in Finland without 
legal help, needs to know the content of the Finnish Code of Real Estate anyway. This 
follows from the simple fact that if a sale of real property is not concluded in accordance with 
the mandatory provisions of the said Code, the sale is considered null and void.  
 
It is also a fact that if parties in a given situation – not requiring compliance to mandatory 
rules – do not use their freedom of contract, a judge will apply default rules, should the 
parties ever end up in a courtroom or arbitration. In other words, in order to make informed 
decisions on how to use their freedom of contract the parties need to know what might follow 
if they do not. It is therefore often a good idea to involve lawyers in the contract drafting 
                                                        
9
 Muukkonen, P.J. (1993) ”Sopimusoikeuden yleinen lojaliteettiperiaate”, Lakimies, pp. 1030–1048 
(pp. 1033, 1039–1040), Mähönen J. (2000b): “’Good Faith and Fair Dealing’ ja 
lojaliteettivelvollisuus”, in Juhlajulkaisu Tuula Ämmälä 2.11.2000, Turun yliopiston 
oikeustieteellisen tiedekunnan julkaisuja, Turku, pp. 203 – 231 (pp. 222–223). 
10
 Munukka (2005), pp. 235–238, Munukka (2007), pp. 10, 62. 
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process.  
 
Before any contracts are to be concluded, the businessmen and their lawyers should 
“educate” one another. The businessmen should convey information on the business to the 
lawyers; this can be especially important for companies that lack in-house counsels and 
therefore need to seek outside legal help from people more unfamiliar with their business. It 
is likely that lawyers who do not understand the business are of less use to the businessmen 
than lawyers who do. Lawyers, on the other hand, should convey information on the law to 
the businessmen, since no contract is concluded in total detachment from the background 
law. This is so even though contracts have many functions, many of them certainly non-legal 
ones.   
 
3.2. The contract should work for the parties 
 
When a contract is to be concluded, the businessmen and their lawyers should think 
proactively. In order to end up with a well-working end product, they should avoid drafting 
contracts that could be described as mechanical and stereotyped in favour of more conscious 
and goal-oriented ones that actually work for the parties. This means that the parties’ 
intentions, goals, and expectations must be made clear, after which the drafting technique 
should be chosen accordingly.
11
   
 
If the parties feel the need to focus on risk allocation, a detailed, complete contract covering 
most, if not all, aspects of the transaction might be optimal. This may be the case if the 
parties do not know one another and therefore do not trust one another, and they are about to 
conclude a short-term contract in a situation where the circumstances are stable. On the other 
hand, if the parties are about to enter into a long-term, close cooperation based on trust, in a 
situation where the circumstances are unstable and alter rapidly, it is likely that a detailed, 
complete contract with rigid terms will lack the flexibility needed and therefore make the 
                                                        
11
 Pohjonen, S. (2005): ”Ennakoiva oikeus – dialogista oikeutta”, in Pohjonen, S. (Ed.), Ex ante – 
ennakoiva oikeus, Talentum, Helsinki, pp. 11–44 (pp. 12–13), Haapio, H. (2007), ”An Ounce of 
Prevention… – Proactive Legal Care for Corporate Contracting Success”, Tidskrift utgiven av 
Juridiska Föreningen i Finland, pp. 39–68 (pp. 40, 50–51), Pohjonen, S. (2009): ”Law and Business – 
Successful Business Contracting, Corporate Social Responsibility and Legal Thinking”, Tidskrift 
utgiven av Juridiska Föreningen i Finland, pp. 470–484 (pp. 477–478). 
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cooperation more difficult. As a result, the contract might work only if its wording is not 
followed, that is if the parties decide to apply the contract in a flexible manner even though 
the contract itself does not allow it. Surely businessmen, as well as their lawyers, must strive 
for better contracts than that.
12
  
 
It also needs to be pointed out that in many situations it is not even possible to draft a 
complete contract without gaps. Not only will it be too expensive to try to cover every aspect 
of the transaction, it will be impossible, since the future cannot be foreseen. Instead the 
cooperating parties will benefit from a more flexible contract that can be modified to the 
extent needed during its term. Since the parties strive for something more than short-term 
profit, they cooperate and focus on the principal aims of the contract. Keeping track of 
possible minor details in the contract is perceived as less important.
13
 Since the parties 
depend on one another, it is also usually in both their interests to keep the contract in force. 
Therefore, it is logical for them to solve problems through discussion and negotiation if, and 
when, they occur.
14
  
  
Anyhow, it is essential that parties think things through before concluding a contract. If you 
feel that the other party really can be trusted and you see yourself as cooperating smoothly for 
many years towards a common goal, flexibility is probably the right way to go. On the other 
hand, if you have doubts and feel that profound problems are possible in the future, flexibility 
can indeed be risky. In such a case short-term contracts with more rigid terms are probably 
better; for example a well-designed liability clause can be of great help in cases like these. 
The true difficulty in contract drafting lies therefore in finding the right balance, for the 
situation at hand, between certainty/security and flexibility.  
 
 
                                                        
12
 Sund-Norrgård (2011), pp. 100–103. 
13
 Nassar, N. (1995), Sanctity of Contracts Revisited. A study in the Theory and Practice of Long-
Term International Commercial Transactions, M. Nijhoff, Dordrect, London (etc.), pp. 21–23, 218–
219, Grönfors, K. (1995), Avtal och omförhandling, Nerenius & Santérus Förlag AB, Stockholm, pp. 
22–23. 
14
 Pöyhönen, J. (1988), Sopimusoikeuden järjestelmä ja sopimusten sovittelu, Suomalainen 
Lakimiesyhdistys, Helsinki, pp. 211–213, Nassar (1995), pp. 67, 71–73, 218–219, Nystén-Haarala, S. 
(1998), The Long-Term Contract. Contract Law and Contracting, Kauppakaari Oyj Finnish Lawyers’ 
Publishing, Helsinki, pp. 8, 27, 35, Macneil, Ian R. (2001), The Relational Theory of Contract: 
Selected Works of Ian Mcneil, David Campbell (ed.), Sweet & Maxwell, London, p. 197. 
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4. How the principle of loyalty makes flexibility easier 
 
Since the principle of loyalty is considered part of Nordic contract law this can in fact 
facilitate the conclusion of more flexible contracts. This assertion essentially follows from the 
notion that the principle of loyalty may help increasing trust between the parties.
15
 Namely, 
as long as the content of the principle of loyalty is not perceived as too vague and imprecise, 
it may help clarifying for the parties the behaviour that can be expected of them, as well as 
what they can expect from others. The parties have a moral, as well as a legal, duty to act in 
accordance with such “business sense”.  
 
When talking about the legal duty to act in accordance with the principle of loyalty it is 
nonetheless a question of debate whether a breach of the said principle in fact constitutes a 
breach of contract followed by sanctions, or if the principle is somehow weaker than that. 
Support for the view that a breach of the principle of loyalty in itself may constitute a breach 
of contract is found in the legal doctrine,
16
 as well as in decisions KKO 1993:130, KKO 
2007:72 and KKO 2008:91 of the Finnish Supreme Court. There are also scholars who view 
breach of contract and breach of the principle of loyalty as separate issues.
17
   
 
The content of the principle of loyalty is essentially based on so called legitimate 
expectations. For example an existing trade custom in the market in question can be relevant 
as to what can be expected based on it. This follows from the notion that a party to a contract, 
as a starting point, is entitled to expect the other party to act in a way perceived as “normal” 
for the type of contract in question within the said trade. As a result, the expectations of what 
follows from the application of the principle of loyalty vary.
18
   
                                                        
15
 Mähönen (2000b), pp. 213–215, Sund-Norrgård (2011), p. 106. 
16
 Muukkonen, P. J. (1975), ”Yhteistyösopimukset ja lojaliteettivelvollisuus”, in Hoppu, E. et al (Ed.), 
Juhlajulkaisu Urho Kaleva Kekkonen, 1900 – 3/9 – 1975, Suomalainen Lakimiesyhdistys, Helsinki, 
pp. 356–364 (p. 364), Pöyhönen (1988), p. 19, Nicander, H. (1995–96), ”Lojalitetsplikt före, under 
och efter avtalsförhållanden”, Juridisk Tidskrift vid Stockholms universitet, pp. 31–49 (pp. 33, 36), 
Sund-Norrgård (2011), pp. 280–281. 
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Luotonatajavastuu, Lender Liability Suomessa – velvoiteoikeudellinen tutkimus luotonantajan 
vastuusta luotonottajaa kohtaan erityisesti USA:n oikeuteen verrattuna”, Lakimies, pp. 1095–1127 (p. 
1102), Mononen, M. (2001), Sopimusoikeuden materiaalisuudesta, Helsingin yliopiston 
verkkojulkaisut – e-thesis, Helsinki, p. 164. 
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 Nassar (1995), pp. 190, 237, Nazarian, H. (2007), Lojalitetsplikt i kontraktsforhold, Cappelen 
Akademisk Forlag, Oslo, pp. 316–317. 
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The notion that one should not deviate from what is considered normal behaviour may very 
well be helpful in the building of trust between the parties, which in itself might suppress a 
possible temptation to behave in a short-term opportunistic way. Since cooperation within 
long-term contracts normally cannot work without trust, trust is rational.
19
 And it is certainly 
easier to trust someone if the risk of being let down is considered small.
20
 The assessment is 
then essentially based on the interests of the party one intends to trust: the likelihood of him 
acting in a favourable manner – or at least not in a harmful manner – is considered high 
enough for you to contemplate cooperation with him.
21
 A party that needs the other party in 
order to reach a certain goal will be less tempted to act in a short-term opportunistic way, and 
will therefore also be more trustworthy.  
 
In a situation where contract parties trust one another they lack the need to safeguard against 
opportunistic behaviour. This means that they also lack the need to strive for contracts 
covering every possible aspect of their transaction, and can settle for more flexible, and 
probably cheaper, contracts instead.  
 
In sum, even though the content of the principle of loyalty may seem somewhat vague, it 
really does exist. It is a “real” norm that can be helpful, for example, in the contract drafting.  
 
 
5. How to use the principle of loyalty to make contracts flexible 
 
Since the purpose of the judicial system cannot be to protect disloyal behaviour, the principle 
of loyalty is considered a prescriptive norm that always applies.
22
 This means that freedom of 
contract is limited by the principle of loyalty, and not the other way around. Such a 
conclusion can be drawn also from Article 1:201 in PECL, Article 1.7 in Unidroit Principles 
and DCFR III. – 1:103, according to which the principle of good faith and fair dealing is 
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 Nystén-Haarala (1998), p. 33. 
20
 Nooteboom B. (2002), Trust. Forms, Foundations, Functions, Failures, and Figures, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Great Britain, p. 37. 
21
 Gambetta, D. (1988), ”Can We Trust Trust?”, in Gambetta, D. (Ed.), Trust. Making and Breaking 
Cooperative Relations, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 213–237 (pp. 217–218), Dasgupta, P. 
(1988), ”Trust as a Commodity”, in Gambetta, D. (Ed.), Trust. Making and Breaking Cooperative 
Relations, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 49–72 (pp. 50–51), Hardin, R. (1992), ”The Street-Level 
Epistemology of Trust”, Analyse & Kritik, pp. 152–176 (pp. 152–153). 
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 Holm, A. (2004), Den avtalsgrundade lojalitetsplikten – en allmän rättsprincip, Linköpings 
universitet, Linköping, p. 18. 
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mandatory and may not be excluded or limited by contract. This is, however, mainly true for 
the moral foundations of the principle of loyalty,
23
 since the contract itself also has an impact 
on the content of the principle of loyalty; this is true for PECL and DCFR as well.
24
 So, 
although the principle of loyalty cannot – and should not – be avoided, the content of a 
contract concluded between parties of equal bargaining power can have an impact on what, in 
their case, is to be considered loyal behaviour.
25
  
 
From this notion one can draw the conclusion that if the parties’ contract can be understood 
rather as a framework for a flexible process of on-going cooperation than as a device for 
precise risk allocation, the principle of loyalty will have a greater significance in the 
interpretation of the contract. A contract of this kind shows that the parties have a need for 
loyal behaviour and trust, since they depend upon each other and therefore are more 
vulnerable. Through the drafting technique it is then possible (within certain limits) to effect 
the functions of the contract. The parties can, for example, ascertain that the principle of 
loyalty will be given weight when there are gaps in the contract that have to be filled, or 
when the contract has to be interpreted by a third party. 
 
Occasionally also parties engaged in long-term cooperative arrangements cannot solve their 
problems through negotiations. Even though it is usually not recommendable to take a dispute 
all the way to court proceedings or arbitration, this certainly happens sometimes. We need 
therefore to address the question of what happens when a more rudimentary, flexible contract 
is to be interpreted for example in court. That is, when the purpose of the contract/the 
common goal of the parties is to be identified.  
 
When a contract is interpreted, the purpose of the contract prevails. This is true also for a 
situation where the purpose contradicts a contract’s wording (if the purpose can be 
identified). This notion does not, however, change the fact that the wording of the contract 
                                                        
23
 Nazarian (2007), p. 136. 
24
 Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (2000), Prepared by The Commission on 
European Contract Law, Lando, O. and Beale, H. (Ed.), Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 
London, Boston, p. 116, Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), Full Edition Volume 1 Book III 
(2009), Prepared by the Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC 
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Contract Law, von Bar C. and Clive, E. (Ed.), sellier. european law publishers GmbH, Munich, p. 
677. 
25
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Petra Sund-Norrgård, Antti Kolehmainen, Onerva-Aulikki Suhonen 
199 
will remain the starting point, as well as the primary source, for interpretation. Since parties 
usually write down their common aim in a contract, this convention is natural. A clear 
outcome based on the interpretation of a contract’s wording is, therefore, not easily 
dismissed.
26
 
 
Having said this it is nonetheless clear that contracts today should be interpreted as a whole. 
This follows from, for example, decision KKO 2001:34 of the Finnish Supreme Court. In the 
interpretation the focus should be on all of the relevant circumstances of the case at hand and 
not solely on the written contract document. This convention that the law allows for the 
consideration of more extensive material in contract interpretation sounds perfect in theory. 
In practice, it is not always done. Instead many courts only consider the contract document in 
the interpretation.
27
 From this point of view it may, therefore, be perceived as risky to 
conclude a very flexible contract. It may hand over too much power to the judge should the 
parties ever find themselves in a courtroom.  
 
The parties can ensure that the principle of loyalty will be given weight in the interpretation 
of the contract by clearly explaining in the preamble their intention to strive for a mutual goal 
through loyal and close cooperation on terms that are favourable for both of them. An explicit 
loyalty clause can also be included in the contract stipulating that the parties will act in good 
faith towards each other in every respect during the term of the contract. The parties can 
moreover include renegotiation and/or hardship clauses in their contract in order to ensure 
that the agreed upon terms and the risk division in the contract can be altered through 
negotiations in good faith when needed. A logical next step, should none of the attempts to 
renegotiate lead to an acceptable solution of the problem, would be ADR in the form of 
mediation.
28
 Also in mediation the goal is to find a business solution to the problem instead 
of focusing on who “wins” and who “looses”.29 In situations where parties do not trust one 
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 Hemmo, M. (2008), Sopimusoikeuden oppikirja, Talentum, Helsinki, pp. 305–306, Saarnilehto, A. 
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28
 Sund-Norrgård, P. (2013), ”Omförhandling och medling – Att lösa konflikter och fortsätta 
samarbeta”, Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap, pp. 315–342 (p. 331). 
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another they will probably not include loyalty clauses or terms involving problem solving 
inter partes or through ADR in the contract.
30
  
 
On the other hand, a very precise and rigid contract document that focuses on risk division 
gives little room for other circumstances than the wording of the contract to be considered in 
the interpretation. The parties can, for example, through including a merger clause in the 
contract stipulating that the written contract contains the entire agreement on the issue at 
hand, avoid that pre-contractual behaviours and negotiations are given weight in the 
interpretation. If also a written modification clause is included stipulating that amendments to 
the contract have to be in writing in order to be valid, the parties can avoid that events 
occurring after the conclusion of the contract is given weight in the interpretation. Such a 
clause greatly influences the interpretation of the contract, even though its validity is not 
absolute in all circumstances.
31
 In other words the parties can, in their use of such a 
“classical” contracting technique, significantly hinder the impact of the principle of loyalty in 
the interpretation of their contract.
32
   
 
In a perfect world the parties and their lawyers will cooperate in order to ascertain that the 
“optimal” contract – that is a well-working contract – can be concluded for every situation. 
 
 
6. The functions and the content of the principle of loyalty  
 
6.1. The duty to inform and other duties  
 
The significance of the principle of loyalty varies, not only depending on the type of contract, 
but also depending on the phase of the contractual relationship. Loyalty and mutual trust have 
more prominent roles during the performance of a contract than in contract negotiations. 
Nevertheless, the principle of loyalty applies also in the pre-contractual phase,
33
 and harm 
                                                        
30
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31
 Norros, O. (2008), ”Sopimusperusteiset muotovaatimukset”, Lakimies, pp. 183–211 (pp. 196–199). 
32
 Sund-Norrgård (2011), pp. 141–144, 271–279, Sund-Norrgård P. (2012), ”Lisenssisopimusten 
tulkinta – uudelleenarvioinnin aika?”, Oikeustiede – Jurisprudentia XLV 2012, Suomalaisen 
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 Mähönen, J. (2000a), ”Lojaliteettivelvollisuus ja tiedonantovelvollisuus”, in Ari Saarnilehto (Ed.), 
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caused by disloyal behaviour during contract negotiations can lead to liability for damages to 
the other party.
34
 The principle of loyalty may direct the parties’ behaviour also after the 
contract has been terminated.
35
 
 
Based on an analysis of contract law doctrine one may conclude that the principle demands, 
in short, that parties to a contract also consider the interests of the other party and not just act 
in an egoistic and opportunistic manner. Even though it is somewhat unclear what actually 
follows from this requirement, it is clear that the principle’s significance increases in long-
term contracts between parties that are financially dependent on one another. Such contracts 
require mutual trust and close cooperation between the contracting parties. Good examples 
are franchising, agency and licensing agreements, which often also include specific contract 
clauses on loyalty and cooperation.
36
 
 
The principle of loyalty may, for example, oblige a party to inform the other party of issues 
that are relevant for his performance under the contract. This obligation to inform the other 
party is present, not only during the on-going contractual relationship, but already in the 
negotiation phase before the contract is concluded.
37
 Often a party’s obligation to voluntarily 
inform the other party of the content of the contract is also directly based on legal rules.
38
 
One may say, that these decisions and rules express the principle of loyalty.  
 
The principle of loyalty can moreover induce an obligation to renegotiate an existing 
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34
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35
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contract,
39
 and it may require a prohibition of competition,
40
 or a secrecy obligation.
41
 As the 
principle of loyalty applies as a general contract law principle, the parties can have 
obligations towards each other based on the said principle that exceed the terms of the 
contract.
42
 This means that, for example, the duty to renegotiate a contract can be demanded 
of a party also where the contract itself does not include a clause of this kind. In spite of this, 
the easiest way to ensure such an obligation is, of course, to include a well-working 
renegotiation clause in the contract.
43
 
  
In a situation where the contract is about to be terminated one cannot, for example, assume 
that a secrecy obligation for trade secrets is perceived as any less important than it was during 
the on-going contractual phase. On the other hand some information duties may be 
significantly less important at this stage.
44
 When the contract is about to end the principle of 
loyalty may also lead to the conclusion that a contract cannot be terminated without a 
termination period of a certain length in order to make it possible for the other party to 
“recoup” and cut his losses. Or it might lead to the conclusion that a valid reason is needed 
for termination – especially if the termination period in the contract is very short – even 
though freedom to terminate a contract is the starting point in Nordic contract law.
45
  
 
 
6.2. Filling gaps and modifying terms in the contract 
 
The principle of loyalty can fill gaps in the contract, and its application may even lead to a 
modification of express terms in a contract.
46
  
                                                        
39
 Grönfors (1995), p. 39, Nystén-Haarala (1998), p. 35. 
40
 Nicander (1995–96), p. 32, Holm (2004), pp. 1–3. 
41
 Ramberg and Ramberg (2014), p. 34. 
42
 Häyhä (1996b), p. 314. 
43
 Pöyhönen (1988), p. 374, Grönfors (1995), pp. 39, 61–67, Taxell, L. E. (1997), Avtalsrätt. 
Bakgrund, Sammanfattning, Utblick, Juristförlaget Stockholm, p. 52, Sund-Norrgård (2013), pp. 328–
329. 
44
 Nicander (1995–96), p. 36. 
45
 Bygglin (1978), pp. 137–140, Hemmo, M. (1996), ”Irtisanomisvapaus ja pitkäkestoiset 
liikesopimukset”, Defensor Legis, pp. 328–346 (pp. 330–333), Runesson 1996, p. 360, Hemmo, M. 
(2003), Sopimusoikeus II, Talentum, Helsinki, pp. 385–390, Halila, H. and Hemmo, M. (2008), 
Sopimustyypit, 2. uudistettu painos, Talentum Media Oy, Helsinki, pp. 276–277, Sund-Norrgård 
(2011) pp. 193–205.  
46
 Taxell (1972), pp. 74–75, Pöyhönen (1988), pp. 64–66, Nicander (1995–96), p. 37, Häyhä, J. 
(1996a), Sopimus, laki ja vakuutustoiminta, Suomalainen Lakimiesyhdistys, Helsinki, pp. 21–22, 221, 
Petra Sund-Norrgård, Antti Kolehmainen, Onerva-Aulikki Suhonen 
203 
When one has to decide what is to be considered loyal the idea, according to the Finnish 
scholar Juha Häyhä, is to start from what in a similar situation is perceived as customary, and 
therefore predictable.
47
 Häyhä speaks about the mechanism of tradition. The mechanism of 
tradition looks backwards. The interaction creates expectations to civil law actors, and for 
example recurrence can substitute a norm.
48
  
 
As a starting point the contract is not born in an “empty space”. On the contrary, there are 
circumstances and events around the contract, which are relevant from the legal point of 
view. This means that the foundation of legitimate expectations is not based only on the 
contract, but the contract is based on legitimate expectations too. In other words, the principle 
of loyalty can fill the space around the (written) contract when the parties’ rights and 
obligations are to be determined. It also means that there are legitimate expectations already 
before the contract is concluded.
49
 Examples of this can be found in the practice of the 
Finnish Supreme Court,
50
 and also in Finnish law. For example according to Section 9.1 of 
the Insurance Contracts Act an insurance contract is considered to be in force to the effect 
understood by the policyholder on the basis of the information received, in a situation where 
the insurer or his representative has failed to provide the necessary information or has given 
incorrect information to the policyholder, when marketing the insurance.  
 
In a situation where the parties expect that everything will “go as usual”, they might not 
conclude a written contract at all.
51
 This can be so in a situation when there has been plenty 
of previous interaction between the parties, which lead them to believe that things will go on 
in the same way also in the future. When certain events are repeated often enough, they create 
expectations. Commercial and other customs have the same effect.  
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If a party’s trust is based on expectations that follow from interaction between contractual 
parties or from business customs, the principle of loyalty offers a method for creating 
flexibility in contract drafting. Since the content of a contract can often be established by 
these expectations, the principle of loyalty means that it is not always necessary to conclude 
an accurate contract without gaps. In fact, if one can trust how things will go on, there might 
be no need to conclude a contract at all.  
 
The principle of loyalty can be seen as the legal basis for legal protection based on legitimate 
expectations that arise from outside the contract. The principle of loyalty thereby fulfils the 
“empty space” around the contract and makes contracting more flexible. And also in the 
interpretation of a contract, relevance can be given to such expectations, which are based on 
the reality surrounding the contract.
52
 Through such an interpretation, which is connected to 
the principle of loyalty, it is possible to achieve more flexibility.  
 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
A flexible contract, which is less focused on predictability and risk allocation, can be 
perceived by the parties as riskier than a more rigid one. Therefore, flexible contracts should 
be concluded in situations where they actually work for the parties; that is when the parties, 
for example, are about to conclude a contract involving long-term close cooperation towards 
a common goal. In such a situation the parties will probably find a flexible contract more 
useful than a very rigid one. This follows from the fact that circumstances – as well as the 
parties’ needs – are likely to change during the term of the agreement, wherefore also their 
contract must be designed to change along with such changes. Otherwise the contract will not 
be perceived as a well-working one.  
 
We also believe that norms can be helpful in the contract drafting process. For example in a 
situation, where the parties are about to enter into a long-term cooperation, the knowledge of 
the existence of the principle of loyalty might support their choice to conclude a flexible 
contract. This follows from the fact that the principle of loyalty can help clarifying for the 
parties the behaviour that can be expected of them, as well as what they can expect from 
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others. This is essentially a form of “business sense” consisting of the right to expect that the 
other party will act in a way perceived as “normal” for the type of contract in question within 
the said trade. Such legitimate expectations facilitates trust, and trust makes rigid contracts 
covering “everything” less important, since it is not necessary to safeguard against the other 
party’s opportunistic behaviour. In a sense the existence of the principle of loyalty therefore 
makes flexibility in contracts easier.  
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Trust as Intellectual Capital 
in Pursuing Flexibility in Business Contracting 
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1
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2
 
 
 
This paper looks contracting from an intellectual capital perspective, and specifically from the trust 
point of view. The paper discusses the role of trust as intangible asset in flexible contracting. The 
paper looks both trust and contracting from relational and processual perspectives meaning a 
collaborative activity between partners and partnering organizations in contracting processes. The 
purpose of the paper is to increase understanding of the role and nature of trust as intangible resource 
for contract management in pursuing flexibility thinking in contracts. Trust is seen as a leadership 
skill
3
 which leaders may use in influencing contract management specifically when negotiating 
flexible contracts. The proactive law approach provides potential in approaches, theories, and 
applications to discuss and integrate the organization behavior and leadership perspectives with 
contracting. It is commonly the management at different levels that is involved in contracting 
processes in organizations. Contracting involves behavioral skills such as communication for trust 
building. Trust is a relational asset forming a foundation for collaborative efforts between contracting 
parties. Therefore, examining the role, antecedents, and consequences of trust as a powerful element 
in business contracting is well grounded. The paper aims to broaden the scope of discussion about 
new approaches and practices needed and emerging in the changing field of contracting. Moreover, 
the purpose is to discuss flexibility in contracting in the view of how trust may facilitate and advance 
flexibility. Originality of the paper is based on the two main points: examining the role of trust in 
contracting as a relational, intellectual capital, and bringing a scarcely studied processual view into 
discussion about trust development and flexibility in contract management. The paper advocates the 
idea of seeking a balance between trust and contracts, i.e., control vs. freedom and flexibility. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The study looks business contracting from organizational and managerial research 
perspectives, more specifically, from the trust point of view. We discuss the nature of trust 
and business contracting and how trust in flexible contracting comes into scene. The paper 
pursues initiating opportunities of examining the topic as multidisciplinary and international 
issue, and in research collaboration within the network that exists and/or may be further 
developed. A new direction, unexplored so far, is to broaden the scope into empirical 
research on real life operations and changing contexts in which trust and contracting are 
embedded currently. Therefore, innovative and creative views and ways of studying the 
relationship between trust and flexible contracting are needed to increase scientific 
knowledge of the topic. The paper advocates the idea of pursuing a balance between trust and 
contracts, i.e., control vs. freedom and flexibility, in other words, decreasing a tension, that 
may exist between a ‘controlling role’ of contracts, and a flexible, relationally ‘balancing 
role’ of trust.  
 
The paper focuses on contractual relations which have raised more attention in ever more 
complex business relationships networks within and between organizations. Trust is brought 
into discussion as influential force for co-operation and co-creation in contracting, and for a 
more effective collaborative atmosphere within organizations and beyond.  Despite of the 
contract practices that may have a starting point in suspicions (distrust) there is also space 
and freedom for the parties to decide how to draft contracts in the practices of contracting. In 
this process managerial leadership plays a role and trust building forms a useful skill. First, 
the article provides a literature review of trust and the nature of trust in the contracting 
context; second, a discussion is made from the contracting point of view, and third, ideas are 
presented of the integration of these two perspectives in the view of balance and flexibility.  
 
 
2. Concept of trust 
 
Interpersonal trust is reciprocal in nature, and thus relational deriving from repeated 
interactions over time between trustor and trustee. Information available to the trustor from 
within the relationship itself forms the basis of trust between parties. Reliability and 
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dependability in previous interactions with the trustor give rise to positive expectations about 
the trustee's intentions.  
 
 
2.1 Trust as intellectual, intangible capital 
 
Trust has become an essential intangible asset in organizations and leadership. Trust 
promotes social order and cooperation. It is a resource that creates vitality and enables 
innovativeness for organizations.
4
 Trust is embedded in the known theoretical classification 
of intellectual capital as human, structural and relational capital
5
. Trust building is seen as 
human intellectual skill in leadership.
6
 It is seen as intangible asset within structural capital; 
and as relational in customer interaction and inter-organizational relationships.
7
 Trust is a key 
element in cooperation and communication in organizations contributing to knowledge 
sharing in different types of relationships between actors.
8
 
 
Contracting processes are generally consisted of a number of human beings from multiple 
and different constituencies, backgrounds and cultures.  In these contexts, differing manners 
likely exist and ways of communication and professional jargons as well as amenity and 
willingness to trust differ; moreover, perceptions and understanding of the meaning and even 
the role of trust in organizational contracting contexts vary. It is worth noticing that, in 
networks, intra-organizational processes such as managerial leadership could support the 
development of atmosphere, communication, openness and mutual understanding,
9
 e.g., 
willingness to compromise in the negotiations of different exchanges and transactions 
                                                 
4
 Savolainen, T. Lopez‐Fresno, P. (2013) Trust as Intangible Asset ‐ Enabling Intellectual Capital 
Development by Leadership for Vitality and Innovativeness. The Electronic Journal of Knowledge 
Management 11, (3), 244‐255. 
5
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Value by Finding its Hidden Roots. New York, NY: Harper Collins. 
6
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trust in Renewing intellectual capital) In Puusa, A. and H. Reijonen (eds.): Aineeton pääoma 
organisaation voimavarana, UNIpress, 117-141. 
7
 Edvinsson & Malone, 1997; Nahapiet, J. Ghoshal, S. (1998) Social capital, intellectual capital, and 
the organizational advantage. Academy of Management Review 23, (2), 242-265; Savolainen, 2011. 
8
 Savolainen et al., 2014; Ikonen, Mirjami and Savolainen, Taina (2011) Renewing Human 
Intellectual Capital by Building Trust in Intra-organizational Relationships. In Proceedings of the 
European Conference on Management, Leadership and Governance, Sophie-Antipolis, France 
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requiring contract making. Negotiated agreements provide the basis for business, government 
and inter-organizational and -national relations.
10
 
 
These questions show the complexity of the area of contract management from the social, 
cultural and organizational point of view. Power relations make trust more complex and 
fragile in relationships. Moreover, cultural differences appear; they are manifested in varying 
degrees of power distance, uncertainty tolerance, and collectivism.
11
 Therefore, our aim is to 
stretch beyond a mere excellent contracting suggesting that there are issues that matter in 
successful contract management from which the proactive law approach could benefit.  
 
Trust is approached mainly as a relational concept and has been defined and categorized in 
numerous ways. The study takes a closer look at the concept of trust in business contracting 
context. While many definitions exist the concept remains without a generally accepted 
definition.
12
 The relational definition of trust, applicable to the perspective of this study, is 
developed by Mayer et al.: “The willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action 
important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor/control that other party.”13 
 
This definition of trust by Mayer et al. is applicable to relationships in an organizational 
context, i.e., in a relationship between a trustor and a trustee who is perceived to act and 
react with volition toward the trustor. Making oneself vulnerable is taking risk and implies 
that there is something of importance to be lost. Trust is not taking risk per se, but rather it is 
a willingness to take risk.
14
 
 
Trust is defined above from a relational perspective which thus links it with relational 
contracting. Trust is paradoxical phenomenon in the modern society that is characterized by 
increasing uncertainty, complexity and risk. Broadly defining trust in exchange relationships, 
                                                 
10
 E.g. structural, affective and contractual factors have been studied by Mislin et al., 2011. 
11
 Hofstede, Gert. (1997) Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. McGraw-Hill USA; cf. 
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Cultural Diversity in Business. London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing Ltd. 
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14, (1), 92-103; p. 101. 
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 Mayer, R. Davis, J. Schoorman, D. (1995) An integrative model of organizational trust. Academy of 
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14
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and also related to contractual relations in intra- and inter-organizational relationships, the 
following definition by Hosmer is applicable: “The reliance by one person, group, or firm 
upon a voluntarily accepted duty on the part of another person, group, or firm to recognize 
and protect the rights and interests of all others engaged in a joint endeavor or economic 
exchange.”15  
 
Trust-based relationships refer to the situation where, instead of the intent to pursue and gain 
merely personal benefits, willingness to collaborate and compromise exist between parties. 
Paradoxically, trust involves uncertainty, complexity and risk in the current business 
environment.
16
 Contract making is often multipart decision making effort within dyads or on 
a group level. While risk taking is at the core of trust,
17
 trust forms a source of security. 
Therefore, it seems clear that the more a person trusts another’s future actions, the more 
securely and with more confidence the said person will take part in the activities of the object 
of trust.
18
 Here trust is seen as a mechanism that enables organizational actors, such as 
managers, to create open organizational culture which, in turn, affects the sharing of 
information and knowledge. Information sharing facilitates problem solving and adaptation. 
Contracting actors (parties) are willing to share private information with one another 
including short and long-term plans and goals. As a result mutual trust develops and increases 
and willingness to collaborate, consequently.
19
 Thus, trust reduces uncertainty and 
vulnerability in the relationships between inter- and intra-organizational actors.
20
 In other 
words, a tendency to making contracts by lawyers for avoiding conflicts or disputes in courts 
represents a kind of mistrust- or distrust-based approach to contracting.  A trust-based 
approach instead favors compromising and lowering risk preventively in the negotiation 
process of contracts. 
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16
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When companies use contracts as means of cooperation and communication in business it 
may produce a competitive advantage for businesses. Contracts provide also means of control 
and change. Contracts play a proactive role, in other words, to prevent disputes and to 
achieve business goals in turbulent organizational changes. The proactive approach would 
benefit businesses for contacting practices and business competitiveness, accordingly.  
 
 
2.2 Trust in contracting 
 
Pertaining to contracting, a traditionally held view is that contracts in general refer to lack of 
trust or distrust. Recently, scholars have pointed out that the relationship between trust and 
contracts depend on when, why and how contracts are used. Weibel et al.
21
, Möllering
22
 and 
Klein Woolthuis et al.
23
 suggest that trust and contract can be both complementary and 
substitutive.
24
 As contracts tend to be more or less incomplete trust is needed as an asset and 
skill to pursue collaboration and balance emerging or existing conflicts or disputes. Trust may 
play the role of moderator and facilitate flexibility for achieving the expected outcome, for 
instance, trust may enhance communication and sharing information.
25
 Trust is therefore 
involved as an essential part of contractual arrangements, i.e., a process and relations.  
 
Organizational leadership and culture have an influence on the success of contracting 
processes. Different types of contracts need different form of trust.
26
 Higher level of trust 
makes decision making more efficient by simplifying the processes of seeking and 
interpreting information.
27
 According to Barry and Oliver,
28
 the heading “post-negotiation 
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affect” includes the concept of trust.  Mislin et al.29 found out that trust is built by the talks 
consisting of the negotiation process. Therefore, in sustaining competitiveness through 
excellent contracting trust-based relationships enable negotiations which may result in 
prosperous outcomes. Processes of trust are quite scarcely studied so far, in other words, how 
trust develops, is built and re-built. An important issue is the process by which trust 
evolves.
30
 
  
Therefore, a literature review of trust and contracting in empirical settings as well as 
conceptual studies could shed more light into the role trust plays in contracting and into the 
emerging issue of flexibility, more specifically. To mention a few studies in prior research, 
e.g. Lane and Bachmann
31
 have described contract law as an important institutional 
framework for trust-based interaction. Möllering
32
 depicts that assurance and orientation 
gained from the existence of sanctions promotes trust. Not only dyadic relationships but also 
industrial, organizational and network level relations are examined in the literature. For 
example, legal regulation has an effect on the development of trust in the workplace.
33
 
Contractual trust can develop into organizational trust.
34
 As Chenhall and Langfield-Smith
35
 
have stated, interpersonal trust rarely arises spontaneously in business organizations but trust 
is fostered through formal contracts. These researchers have also produced empirical 
evidence on the mechanistic control inhibiting the development of trust. The literature review 
leads to specific expectations on peculiar mechanisms needed for flexible contracting.
36
 Trust 
is posed as a prerequisite for knowledge sharing in addition to traditional modes of 
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governance such as formal control mechanisms. Moreover, understanding the roles and 
dynamics of contracts and trust is crucial for inter-organizational collaboration.
37
 
 
We suggest a processual approach as an alternative for the traditional approach. In a process 
view, trust in contracting is seen as a process, where exchange or negotiation between two 
parties is occurring during the whole process of relationships between parties. Both parties 
have expectations related to their current and future needs and values. Trust is embedded in a 
series of episodes, in which information is exchanged in order to determine how to proceed in 
contracting. The process of interpersonal, dyadic trust development appears more complex 
and uneven than the prior research has suggested.
38
 Trust development in contracting may 
also easily turn into lack of trust or distrust instead of a positive development cycle of trust.
39
 
 
 
2.3 Role of trust after the deal  
 
The literature on negotiation has not adequately captured the dynamics in negotiation.
40
 
Reciprocity in negotiations increases the understanding of how actors (parties) behave. Trust 
is also highly dynamic and contextual in nature. Regarding both trust and negotiation as 
dynamic phenomena leads to yet unexplored process perspective. Trust in contracting is seen 
as paradoxical in nature, as the coexistence of trust and distrust may produce turns and shifts 
within relationships between people involved. Rebuilding trust depends on the extent and 
motives of trust breach: In contracting, misunderstandings may unintentionally occur, and 
from the perspective of trust development, misunderstandings should be settled down as early 
as possible. In the process of contracting, a clear articulation of the periods of considering 
and rethinking is important in order to avoid misunderstanding and trust diminishing. 
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Recently, the need for trust in negotiation is discussed by Lewicki and Polin.
41
 In the current 
paper, negotiation is also defined as a process, negotiating, as a part of a larger process of 
contracting which includes all the organizing and coordinating activities within and between 
organizations, e.g. making sense of one’s partner and the environment.42 
  
 
3. Leadership role in contract management 
 
The discussion in the paper aims to advocate the idea of seeking a balance between trust and 
contracting (a tension between control and freedom and/or flexibility). Leadership plays a 
role in this and, thus, the perspective of managerial leadership is brought into discussion. 
Moreover, the nature of trust needs to be discussed in the context of contracting. Leaders act 
in daily processes of organizations and use the means of influencing people by building trust 
and other managerial skills. Leadership is defined in essence as exerting influence on a group 
of people or an individual for achieving common goals in interaction with people.
43
 
 
The management is commonly involved in contracting processes in organizations at different 
levels and forms. Following the definition of influencing and interaction, contracting 
behavior involves interactive and influential leadership activity. Leaders key task in general 
is to communicate, advocate, and achieve common goals through people to achieve expected 
and mutually satisfying results between individuals, parties, and within groups. For this trust 
forms a foundation for willingness to mutual collaboration. Interaction and time with open 
communication are the key building blocks for functioning relationships.
44
  
 
Showing of trustworthiness, i.e., competence, benevolence and integrity, become more 
important for leaders. Communication and negotiation skills are essential for collaborative 
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and trustful working atmosphere and collaborative activity.
45
 Leaders have impact on the 
openness of culture, and atmosphere that encourages free flow of ideas, knowledge and their 
sharing. Leadership and organizational culture characterized by freedom and openness also 
best foster and support collaborative inter-organizational relationships needed for productive 
contracting.  
 
 
3.1 Relational view into leadership, trust and contracting 
 
In general, the relationship as such involves relational processes or relatedness. Thus, a 
relationship exists where there is an element of interdependence and some type of 
interaction
46
. Leaders are responsible both in vertical and horizontal relationships in intra- 
and inter-organizational relationships. As Bachmann
47
 notes, trust does not occur 
spontaneously and automatically but is deliberately created and shaped, which justifies 
studying how trust develops and searching for a better understanding of effective trust-
building as a process.
48
 
 
Pertaining to leadership perspective, there are two theoretical frameworks to studying trust 
development in contracting relationships, namely Leader-Member Exchange Theory (in intra-
organizational leader-follower relationships) and the Agent Theory (dyadic contractual 
vertical relationships). Leader-Member Exchange Theory (LMX) describes a leadership role 
and behavior in internal organizational relationships. It can be applied in this study, as the 
perspective of contractual relationships is in focus and dyadic and group level activity comes 
into question.
49
 The LMX-theory looks mainly a dyadic level
50
, as stated above with the 
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definition of trust. Trust makes cooperation desirable; and leadership support enables 
individuals to convert that desire into action in work relationships which may also be 
multipart. Both trust and leadership are necessary, but in combination they create conditions 
for integrating the disparate thinking and actions of dispersed people which commonly 
characterizes contracting circumstances.  
 
In the most advanced stage of development reaching a partnership/company stage, specific 
(and dyadic) relationships extend to groups and networks – called as ‘Team-Making 
Competence Network’51. This is what applies well to contracting contexts. Network 
relationships have been examined from the interaction/ network perspective for a couple of 
decades (called as B2B and IMP - Industrial purchasing and marketing). The approach 
comprises three dimensions: technical, social and economic. Trust and contracts are seen as 
linked in the IMP approach since they are even defined as mutually exclusive. If high level of 
trust exists, official rules and contracts are not perceived necessary.
52
  
 
Contract is intangible resource referring to intellectual property that is co-created with 
contracting parties. Successful projects and outcomes are delivered and achieved in 
environments where high levels of trust exists among the collaborators, and in which they 
may openly share their problems, concerns, and opinions without suspicions and fear of 
punishments. This makes trust and contracting support each other and business 
competitiveness, eventually. Trust and trust building form intangible asset and skill, utilizable 
at organizational, group and individual levels as antecedent and foundation for contractual 
relations and needed in exchange arrangements when contracts are made and implemented. 
 
As advantages of trust are many, cost effectiveness may be realized as one of the most 
important gains from the competitiveness point of you; making deals and realizing them 
become less risky and complex if parties trust each other. Moreover, conflicts can be solved 
more constructively in relational, often face to-face, interaction. In conflict situations, 
acceptance is achieved to decisions even unpleasant if the motives and good intentions of a 
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party or authority can be trusted. Rebuilding of trust occurring, e.g., as a consequence of 
malpractices is an important issue of business contracting management in inter-organizational 
relations and networks. Yet, the issue has been scarcely discussed and examined so far. 
 
 
3.2. Control, trust and flexibility 
 
According to agent theory contracting partners usually have different expectations of the 
advantages of contracting and the theory suggests developing control mechanisms to manage 
the processes. The current paper focuses on the tension between control and flexibility. 
Contracts are relational governance arrangements in economic exchange based on 
collaborative actions within and between organizations. Inter-organizational exchanges are 
typically repeated exchanges that are embedded in social relationships. Governance is value-
based and agreed-on process occurring in social relationships. Through the social processes, 
relational governance play a role in mitigating the exchange hazards targeted by formal 
contracts.
53
 As contracts can be seen as a form for collaboration, trust functions as both 
foundational and complementary mechanism.
54
 In reality, contracts tend to be incomplete and 
trust is needed for initiating and developing collaboration and achieving the expected 
outcome. Thus, trust becomes a necessary part of a contracting process. At least in the 
situations where a contract cannot be defined explicitly, the expectations of the actions of the 
other party are communicated, clarified and expressed through trust.
55
 
 
 
3.3 Balancing trust and control 
 
This paper suggests that the appropriate solution in tensions between control and trust may be 
reached through combining and balancing the two. Control alone can be very expensive, but 
so can mere trusting. Control plays commonly a role if the level of trust is low. Trust, in turn, 
is related to and, in fact, viewed as a part of control but also a substitute for hierarchical 
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control.
56
 If one trusts another, there is less need to control the other’s behavior and activities. 
When suspicions decrease or do not arise, flexibility may increase. Thus, the appropriate 
result might be reached through balancing trust and control. This may have implications to 
the entire process of business contracting, more specifically to flexibility that facilitates 
adaptation to unforeseeable issues and events.
57
  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Erosion of trust in society and business life is evident due to major changes at multiple levels. 
In contracting, on the other hand, flexibility is needed, as tight regulations and complex 
contracts increase bureaucracy. In the global scale, increasing flexibility in contractual 
relations, virtualization of organizational forms and more complex intra- and inter-
organizational relationships (including diversity and e-relationships) have made networks less 
easy to manage for exchange arrangements.
58
 Thus, challenges and contradictions exist and 
solutions will be needed. 
 
In conclusion, the discussion imply that, in contracting processes trust and trust building form 
and influential intangible asset and skill for more effective contract management where 
leadership skills need to be developed. In business contracting, trust building and showing 
trustworthiness cannot be overestimated in the current business environments making strong 
requests of cooperative abilities in intra- and inter-organizational practices. Trust has become 
one of the key resources in collaborative exchange relationships within and between 
organizations. It, thus, deserves to be studied and understood as competitive asset and 
advantage in organizations and networks.
59
  
 
This paper highlights the importance of raising the level of awareness of the role trust, trust 
building and leadership skills play in the processes of contracting in organizations and 
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networks. The discussion is crystallized in the suggestion of a balancing view to ease tensions 
between trust and control for pursuing flexibility in the processes of business contracting. 
Therefore, the main point for further research is concluded in the aim to discover empirically 
how trust develops and is built and re-built, and how it facilitates and makes balance between 
trust and control for flexibility in business contracting. The view of process studies in trust 
was also brought into discussion of flexible business contracting. As scarcely discussed and 
examined so far the process perspective would deserve more attention in further empirical 
research. 
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Flexibility in Assignment of Contractual Rights: 
Assignment of Account Receivables 
 
LINGYUN GAO
1
 
 
 
One significant aspect of contract flexibility is the ability of contracting parties to transfer their rights 
and duties, through the doctrines of assignment and delegation, which reduces risks and advances 
efficiency. The assignment of account receivables may be the most commonplace, and most important, 
example of this type of contract flexibility. As transactions become more global, however, both the 
laws and the practices surrounding assignment of account receivables become more complex and 
national laws differ concerning the assignment of these intangible rights and the regulations of 
financial intermediaries who carry out the transaction. More and more, businesses must understand 
the challenges and opportunities surrounding assignments of accounts receivables. Accordingly, this 
chapter examines and compares the law and practice of account receivables in China, the United 
States of America, and the United Kingdom. The analysis is based on the assignment of account 
receivables ranging from traditional factoring, forfeiting, to modern cross-border securitization 
transactions. Through comparison, this chapter concludes by identifying the various legal issues about 
Chinese law and proposing corresponding solutions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Evolution of assignment of contractual rights 
 
Contracts are regarded as private law between the business parties to the transaction because 
they are based on the agreement of the contracting parties. A contract gives rise to obligations 
which are enforced or recognized by law. The stability of this “private law” is important 
because both parties need to perform their obligations according to the contract. If the 
contract terms or the parties to the contract could be freely changed, the parties as well as any 
third party creditors may not be able to predict what their rights and obligations would be. 
Contract law thus provides such a protection by recognizing duly formed contracts and 
imposing liabilities on the party who fails to perform their contractual obligations. 
 
However, with economic development, contract law has recognized that the business needs of 
both parties may change, along with the circumstances under which the parties made the 
contract. In such cases, adherence to the original contract terms may hinder the business 
transactions. While stability of the contract is still important, flexibility has thus become 
more and more significant, especially to meet the needs for globalization, in the context of 
which the business parties come from different countries and it is more likely that their 
business needs may change over time. 
 
Generally, a contract only binds its two parties. However, after the contract has been made, 
one of the parties may want to liquidate immediately its future rights under the contract, or 
find some third party willing to perform its future duties under the contract. To accomplish 
these ends, contract law has developed the devices of assignment of contractual rights and 
delegation of contractual duties. This chapter focuses on the assignment of contractual rights, 
under which the benefits of a contract will be transferred to a third party.
2
 More precisely, an 
assignment of contractual right is a voluntary manifestation of intention by the holder of an 
existing right to make an immediate transfer of that right to another person.
3
 The assignment 
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of contractual rights is an ideal illustration of the process, and the importance, of maintaining 
flexibility in contracting. 
 
1.2. Account receivables as contractual rights 
 
One of the most significant uses of assignments in modern law occurs in the context of 
commercial financing. Where a business sells goods to a purchaser, more often than not the 
sale is on credit, which means that the purchaser promises to pay the price plus interest at 
some time in the future. This promise may be converted into money by the seller through 
assigning of the right to payment to a commercial lender, such as a bank or other financing 
institution. This is known as accounts receivable financing.
4
 The transfer (assignment) of 
accounts is a mainstay of commercial financing. 
 
The assignment of accounts happens not only within a country, but also worldwide. With the 
development of the global economy, competition in international trade has become more and 
more intense. The international market has gradually become purchaser-oriented, and the 
competition of various industries is fierce. As in domestic businesses, the enterprises of 
various countries have adopted credit sales in order to expand their participation in the 
international market. As a result, the sales volume of international trade has been enlarged 
and the scale of businesses has been expanded. Meanwhile, many enterprises have 
accumulated more and more account receivables with different due periods, occupying much 
of the enterprises’ capital. On the one hand, the enterprises are facing huge pressure of 
financing and the risks that large amount of account receivables may not be successfully 
collected; on the other hand, competition requires that the enterprises continue to offer credit 
sales, so that new account receivables are accrued continuously. In order to resolve the 
problem, businesses liquidate their account receivables by assigning them to financial 
intermediaries.  
 
The assignment of account receivables as an important way of financing has developed 
quickly in recent years, challenging the laws in different countries. Although account 
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receivables are assigned in both international and domestic contexts, often domestic laws 
determine whether and to what extent the contractual rights can be freely assigned.  
 
 
2. Assignment of account receivables 
 
2.1. Definition 
 
The Uniform Commercial Code of the United States defines “account” as:  
 
a right to payment of a monetary obligation, whether or not earned by performance, (i) for 
property that has been or is to be sold, leased, licensed, assigned, or otherwise disposed of; 
(ii) for services rendered or to be rendered; (iii) for a policy of insurance issued or to be 
issued; (iv) for a secondary obligation incurred or to be incurred; (v) for energy provided or 
to be provided; (vi) for the use or hire of a vessel under a charter or other contract; (vii) 
arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with 
the card; or (viii) as winnings in a lottery or other game of chance operated or sponsored by 
a State, governmental unit of a State, or person licensed or authorized to operate the game 
by a State or governmental unit of a State.  
 
The term does not include  
 
(i) rights to payment evidenced by chattel paper or an instrument; (ii) commercial tort claims; 
(iii) deposit accounts; or (iv) rights to payment for money or funds advanced or sold, other 
than rights arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for 
use with the card.
5
  
 
Chinese law defines “account receivables” as the rights to payment that the obligee has 
against the obligor arising out of providing certain goods, services, or facilities, including the 
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rights to present and future monetary payment and the proceeds thereof, but excluding the 
right to payment arising out of negotiable instruments or other securities.
6
  
 
In December 2001, the United Nations issued the Convention on the Assignment of 
Receivables in the International Trade, in which “assignment” is defined as “the transfer by 
agreement from one person (“assignor”) to another person (“assignee”) of all or part of or an 
undivided interest in the assignor’s contractual right to payment of a monetary sum 
(“receivable”) from a third person (“the debtor”).7 
 
The various definitions reflect the different focus of each legal document, but it is generally 
agreed that account receivables are the right to payment of a monetary obligation. As 
discussed above, one important purpose of assignment of account receivables is to obtain 
financing since account receivables are creditors’ rights with significant economic value. In 
practice, account receivables may be transferred directly or be used as collateral. This chapter 
focuses on the direct transfer.  
 
 
2.2. General forms of assignment of account receivables 
 
There are various ways to get financing based on account receivables. The most popular ways 
include factoring, forfaiting, and securitization of the receivables. 
 
2.2.1. Factoring 
 
“Factoring” is a contract, pursuant to which a supplier may or will assign account receivables 
to a third party (known as a “factor”) for ledgering receivables, collecting proceeds and 
protecting against bad debts. Factoring is a full financial package that combines services of 
credit protection, account receivables’ bookkeeping, and collection of proceeds. Under a 
factoring contract, the factor agrees to purchase the seller’s account receivables, normally 
without recourse, and assumes responsibility for the debtor’s financial inability to pay. If the 
                                            
6
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debtor goes bankrupt or is unable to pay its debts for credit reasons, the factor will pay the 
seller.
8
 People use factoring mainly for consistent cash flow, lower administration costs, 
reduced credit risks, and more time to concentrate on their core business activity. 
 
Factoring may be traced back to the period of industrial revolution. In order to export its 
goods, the textile mills in the northern part of England appointed agencies in North America 
to sell their products and then remit the proceeds back to England. Those agencies were the 
embryos of factors today.
9
 
 
When the seller and buyer of the account receivables are in different countries, the service is 
called international factoring. International factoring has developed since the 1960s. The 
Convention on International Factoring was passed by the International Institute for the 
Unification of Private Law in May 1988.  
 
International factoring may increase sales in foreign markets by offering competitive terms of 
sale, protecting against export credit losses, accelerating cash flow through faster collections, 
lowering costs involved with letter of credit, increasing liquidity to finance working capital, 
and enhancing borrowing potential. Normally, the supplier (exporter) signs a factoring 
contract with an export factor in its own country, under which the supplier assigns all export 
receivables to the export factor and the export factor is responsible for all aspects of the 
factoring service. The export factor then selects a correspondent to act as import factor in the 
country to which the exports are being sent. The receivables are reassigned by the export 
factor to the import factor. Then the import factor will establish credit lines for each of the 
debtors (importers). The credit lines will be for a specific amount and terms of sales. The 
export factor confirms the details of the credit lines to the supplier. After the supplier ships 
the goods and sends an invoice to the importer, the import factor handles the collection of the 
receivable and promptly remits the payment of the proceeds to the supplier’s account with the 
export factor. If the buyer goes bankrupt when the invoice matures, the factor will assume the 
credit risk. This is the most advantageous benefit of factoring to the exporter. 
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Factoring started in China from 1980s. In October 1987, Bank of China signed a general 
factoring agreement with a German loan company, symbolizing the official start of the 
factoring business in China. In 1992, Bank of China joined the Factors Chain International 
(FCI), thus becoming the first financial institution engaged in the factoring business in China. 
The FCI was established in the Netherlands in 1968, with its headquarters in Amsterdam, 
having more than 100 members. The purpose of the FCI is to provide its members with 
standard criteria, procedures, law, and technological consulting relating to international 
factoring. The FCI Code of International Factoring Customs, developed by the FCI Legal 
Committee, became the world’s most widely recognized legal framework for internationl 
factoring and served as the prime example for the final text of the Unidroit Convention of 
International Factoring.
10
 In July 2002, the FCI Code was replaced by a newly drafted 
document, the General Rules for International Factoring (GRIF). The GRIF has provide a 
new standard for correspondent factoring relationships and probably more than 80% of the 
world cross-border factoring volume are governed by those rules. 
 
The factoring business in China has thus developed greatly over the past twenty years. 
However, the laws governing factoring have not been unified but only scattered in the Civil 
Law, Contract Law, and Property Law. In April 2014, China Banking Regulatory 
Commission issued Provisional Measures on Administration of Factoring Business 
Conducted by Commercial Banks. In addition, Ministry of Commerce of China has also 
approved factoring by non-bank institutions in a couple areas, including Pudong New Area of 
Shanghci City, allowing business entities to be established within these areas specifically 
engaging in factoring business. It can be predicted that in the near future, Chinese legislature 
may consider promulgating a nation-wide law to specify the legal issues in factoring 
transactions. 
 
2.2.2. Forfaiting 
 
“Forfaiting” is a form of debt discounting for exporters in which a forfaiter accepts at a 
discount and without recourse promissory notes, bills of exchange, or letters of credit 
received from a foreign buyer by an exporter. Maturities are normally from one to three 
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years.
11
 The exporter receives payment without risk, at the cost of the discount. Forfaiting is 
a payment technique an exporter can use to promote sales on a deferred payment basis. By 
purchasing the credit instruments, the forfaiter deducts interest at an agreed discount rate for 
the full credit period covered by the notes. In the case of a draft, the debt instrument is drawn 
by the exporter, accepted by the importer, and will bear an unconditional guarantee. The 
letter of guarantee will normally be opened by the importer’s bank. In exchange for a 
payment, the forfaiter obtains the right of claiming the debt from the importer, and the 
forfaiter either holds the drafts or notes until maturity or sells them to another investor on a 
non-recourse basis.  
 
Forfaiting in its modern form was developed by west European exporters and their banks to 
finance equipment sales to eastern Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, and has been used in 
developing markets since the mid-1970s. At that time, east European countries were eager to 
obtain western technology, but they had little hard currency. On the one hand, east European 
importer had no access to longer trade credits, for the trade credits provided to them were 
usually up to six months, not long enough to finance the imports of capital goods. On the 
other hand, West German manufacturers of capital goods were anxious to expand their 
markets to east European countries. Since the deals were profitable, West German 
manufacturers were willing to wait up to five years for payment against negotiable 
instruments, which had been guaranteed by a state bank of the relevant east European country. 
However, the difficulty encountered by the West German manufacturers was that they had no 
access to sufficient funds to offer such extended credits to their buyers. Under these 
conditions, banks, as crucial important financial intermediaries, stepped into the gap. Swiss, 
German, and Italian forfaiters played a key role in the evolution of the forfaiting market. 
These forfaiters agreed to purchase these trade receivables from West German manufacturers 
for cash, which in turn allowed the manufacturers to continue to expand trade. According to 
the then applicable negotiable instrument law in Europe, a holder of commercial papers at 
maturity had a right of recourse against all previous parties of the paper and ultimately the 
drawer, in the event of being not paid on the due date. But in order to keep the trade simple, 
no matter whether they were bills of exchange drawn by the exporter or promissory notes 
made out by the importer, once the exporter became the bona fide holder of the negotiable 
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instruments, the exporter could sell it to a forfaiter at a discount and obtained immediate 
payment. This sale was without recourse to the exporter, but the security for the forfaiter was 
the guarantee of the importer’s bank.  
 
Among the advantages of forfaiting are that it eliminates political, transfer, and commercial 
risks; and it protects against risks arising from the fluctuation of exchange rates. In addition, 
the exporter obtains 100% of finance for the contract value, making its exports more 
competitive and facilitating its exports to high risk areas. Forfaiting turns credits into cash, 
thus not tying up the exporter’s working capital and bettering the exporter’s financial 
conditions. The documents and procedures are quite simple.  
 
Forfaiting started in China since 1994, but there is no specific law govering forfaiting in 
China. The relevant rules are also scattered in the Civil Law, Contract Law, and Property 
Law.  
 
2.2.3. Securitization 
 
Securitization originated in the 1970s firstly from the United States and later developed in 
many countries including civil law countries. Securitization is one type of structured 
financing under which the enterprise that needs financing sets aside part of its assets which 
may bring about stable cash flow in the future; then divide them into smaller units; and 
finally sell them to the capital market’s investors. Most of the time, the assets are financial 
assets, i.e., account receivables. By doing so, the enterprise that needs financing (sometimes 
called “initiator”) converts the account receivables into cash, diversifying the risks and 
obtaining financing with lower costs.
12
 Through securitization, the enterprise that generates 
the account receivables is able to sell them directly to investors. 
 
Generally, securitization is designed through establishing a special purpose vehicle (SPV) 
which may take the form of a trust or a corporation. In order to achieve the goal of 
“bankruptcy-remoteness,” local law may require the transfer of the account receivables to be 
“true sale” so that the bankruptcy law will not regard the securitized account receivables as 
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part of a bankruptcy estate. The SPV needs to pay consideration to the initiator for receiving 
the account receivables. The money paid to the initiator can be raised through loans, or 
through issuing securities to the capital market.
13
 
 
While securitization has developed furthest in the United States, it has also expanded to many 
other countries, even including civil law countries such as Japan and Korea. China also 
allows banks and financial institutions to securitize their account receivables as a way of 
financing. 
Although the aforementioned three ways of assigning account receivables are different, they 
all involve the laws governing the assignment of contractual rights. Since national laws vary 
in this regard, the following section tries to compare the different rules.  
 
 
2.3. Comparison 
 
While economic development pushes each country to encourage business transactions and 
promote various ways of financing, the law of every country may be different regarding the 
assignment of account receivables. This section will introduce the laws of a few countries 
governing the assignment of account receivables, namely, the English common law, US law, 
and Chinese law. The reason for selecting laws of these three countries is partly because the 
UK and the US are typical common law countries and China is a civil law country. While the 
laws on assignment of contractual rights have been quite developed in the UK and the US, 
Chinese law in this regard is still at its developing stage. The introduction of the relevant laws 
in these countries has different focus. The introduction to the UK law mainly illustrates the 
historical development of the law in this area, the introduction to the US law focuses on its 
current effect, and the introduction to the Chinese law is aimed to identifying the issues. 
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2.3.1. English common law 
 
The early common law developed a general rule that an attempted assignment of a contract 
right was of no legal effect whatever.
14
 The common law refused to acknowledge 
assignments of contractual rights because the contractual rights were regarded as “choses in 
action,” which means it could only be asserted by bringing an action and not by taking 
possession of a physical thing. “The early lawyers found it hard to think of a transfer of 
something intangible like a contractual right.” 15  However, contractual rights were 
transferrable in equity in England based on commercial convenience.
16
 But according to 
English common law certain contractual rights even now may not be assigned. These include 
contracts expressed to be not assignable, personal contracts, and mere rights of action. 
 
The first restriction is that if a contract provides that the right arising under it shall not be 
assigned, a purported assignment of such rights is not only a breach of that contract but is 
also ineffective, in the sense that it does not give the assignee any rights against the obligor.
17
 
However, an assignment of the benefit of a contract which is expressed to be not assignable 
may be binding as a contract between assignor and assignee. Another important restriction is 
that the benefit of a contract cannot be assigned if it is clear that the obligor is only willing to 
perform in favor of one particular creditor, and if it would be unjust to force him to perform 
in favor of another. In other words, the personal nature of the contract prevents assignment.
18
  
 
2.3.2. US law 
 
Laws within the United States favor the free transferability of contractual rights and are 
inclined to uphold the right of a party to make such a transfer. The general rule is that unless 
a contract specifically prohibits a party from transferring his rights acquired under it, or the 
nature of the contract is such that the transfer would impair the other party’s reasonable 
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expectations or would offend public policy, a party has the power to transfer contractual 
rights and obligations.
19
 This principle is well established by US law. The underlying 
rational is that an obligee’s right to performance under the contract is one of his assets – an 
item of property with some value. Although it is intangible, it is his property all the same, and 
he should be able to dispose of it if he so desires. 
 
As with English law, US law has also imposed restrictions on the right to assign contractual 
rights. The first restriction is that an assignment cannot be validly made if the contract 
prohibits it. However, US law requires that such a prohibition must be clearly expressed in 
the contract, since the law generally favors assignment. Actually, the Restatement of Contract 
(2
nd
) and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) restrictively interpret contract provisions that 
preclude assignment of contractual rights.
20
 Any doubt or ambiguity should be resolved in 
favor of transferability, and most of the time, a provision that prohibits “assignment of the 
contract” should be taken to forbid only the delegation of duties. Even if a provision of the 
contract definitely does prohibit assignment, unless the contrary intent is clear a US court 
would assume that the assignment of contractual rights is itself effective. At the same time, 
however, there is a breach so that the obligor could seek a remedy.
 
 
 
Other restrictions may include that an assignment would not be effective if the nature of the 
contract prevents the assignment; or if the assignment would materially change the obligor’s 
duty, increase the burden or risk imposed by the contract, impair the other party’s prospects 
of getting return performance, or otherwise substantially reduce its value to the other party. 
Every assignment is likely to have some effect on the obligor’s duty, even if nothing more 
than having to make a payment to someone other than the person with whom the party 
contracted. There must be a balance between stability and flexibility. Therefore, the 
requirement of material impact prevents the obligor from resisting an assignment on the basis 
of some trivial change in his performance obligation. 
 
After a valid assignment is made, the assignee substitutes for the assignor as the person to 
whom performance must be rendered. It therefore follows that although the obligor need not 
be a party to or assent to the assignment to make it effective, he must be notified of it so that 
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 Brian Blum, Contracts 673 (Aspen Law & Business 1998). 
20
 Restatement of Contract (2
nd
) § 322; UCC § 2.210(3). 
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he knows the person to whom performance is now due. There is no particular formality 
required for the notice, provided that it coherently indicates what right has been assigned, and 
to whom. The notice must be received by the obligor – that is, it must either come to his 
attention, or be delivered so that he reasonably should be aware of it. Either the assignor or 
the assignee may give this notice, but if it comes from the assignee the obligor is entitled to 
adequate proof of the assignment. 
 
When rights are assigned, the general rule is that the assignee can get no greater right against 
the obligor than the assignor had. This means that the assignee takes the rights subject to any 
conditions and defenses that the obligor may have against the assignor arising out of the 
contract. The obligor may only use the assignor’s breach defensively against the assignee. 
That is, the assignor’s breach operates as a defense to the assignee’s claim, and damages due 
to the obligor by the assignor may be offset against the assignee’s claim. However, the 
assignee has no liability for the obligor’s damages to the extent that they exceed the amount 
of the offset. 
 
The obligor’s right to assert defenses arising out of the contract is not cut off by the notice of 
assignment, so the defense is available against the assignee whether the basis for it arose 
before or after the obligor received notice. However, the notice does affect any claim of 
set-off that the obligor may have against the assignor, arising out of a different transaction. 
The rule is that the assignee’s rights are subject to any such right of set-off that arose before a 
notice of assignment, but cannot be defeated by one that arose afterwards. 
 
Unless the assignment indicates an intent to the contrary, the assignor impliedly warrants to 
the assignee that the rights assigned are valid and not subject to any defenses. Therefore, if 
the obligor successfully raises a defense against the assignee, the assignee usually has a cause 
of action against the assignor for breach of this warranty.
21
 
 
 
 
                                            
21
 See generally, Brian Blum, CONTRACTS 676-79 (Aspen Law & Business 1998). 
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2.3.3. Chinese law 
 
The Chinese law also recognizes the assignment of contractual rights and regards it as a 
change of parties to the contract. In essence, under Chinese law, assignment of contractual 
rights means that the parties to a duly formed contract may assign their contractual rights to a 
third person without changing the terms of the contract.
22
 Article 79 of the Chinese Contract 
Law provides that the obligee may assign all or part of its contractual rights to a third party. 
Chinese law allows the obligee to assign its contractual rights to a third party as long as the 
assignment does not violate law or social ethics. The underlying rationale is that the 
assignment of contracts may encourage transactions and promote development of the market 
economy. However, in order to protect the public interest and maintain an orderly 
marketplace, as well as to balance the rights and interests of both parties, Chinese law also 
limits the scope of the assignment of contractual rights.
23
 
 
According to Chinese law, there are three situations in which the contractual rights are not 
assignable: First, if the nature of the contractual rights makes them un-assignable, then the 
contractual rights may not be assigned to a third party. Similarly to the restrictions imposed 
by the English law and US law, this is the case mainly for contracts that are personal, or that 
are secondary to a primary contract . Second, if on concluding the contract the parties agree 
that the obligee must not assign its contractual rights to a third party, then the contractual 
rights are not assignable as long as such an agreement does not in itself violate the law. This 
resembles English law. However, such an anti-assignment agreement is not effective against 
a bona fide third party. Third, if the law prohibits a transfer of contractual rights, then they 
cannot be transferred.
24
 If the law imposes any special requirements on the assignment of 
contractual rights, those requirements must be complied with.
25
 
 
When assigning contractual rights, the assignor and assignee must agree on the assignment 
and cannot change the terms of the original contract. The assignor must be the obligee, with 
                                            
22
 Lingyun Gao, et al, II SERIES ON CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW: CHINESE BUSINESS LAW 151 
(Thomson West 2008). 
23
 Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter, “Chinese Contract Law”) art. 79 
(1999). 
24
 Chinese Contract Law art.79 (1999). 
25
 Chinese Contract Law art. 87 (1999). 
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full legal capacity to dispose of its rights. The assignment by an obligee with only limited 
legal capacity will not be completed unless made by its legal representative or duly 
authorized agent. Article 91 of the General Provisions of Chinese Civil Law (hereinafter, 
“Chinese Civil Law”) requires an assignor of contractual rights to obtain prior consent from 
the other party before the assignment. The Chinese Civil Law also prohibits the assignor from 
making profits from the assignment or delegation.
26
 However, article 80 of the Chinese 
Contract Law does not require an assignor to obtain prior consent from the other party, but 
only requires that the assignor notify the other party about the assignment. The law does not 
mention the profit-making prohibition, either.
27
 The discrepancy between the two laws on 
this point is quite obvious. However, if the assignment of contractual rights will not infringe 
the other party’s lawful interests or increase the other party’s burden, the law does not need to 
intervene as long as the assignment is free from fraud, duress, undue influence, significant 
misunderstanding, or unconscionability.  
 
After assignment has been completed, it becomes effective both between the assignor and the 
assignee, and among the assignor (obligee), assignee, and the obligor of the original contract. 
As between the assignor and the assignee, the contractual rights have been assigned by the 
assignor to the assignee. The assignment will be effective after the obligor has received the 
notice according to Article 80 of the Chinese Contract Law. If the assignor assigns all of its 
contractual rights to the assignee, then the assignee will become a new obligee having the 
same rights as the original obligee, and may request the obligor to perform the contract to the 
new obligee. If the assignor assigns only part of its contractual rights to the assignee, then the 
assignee will join the contractual relationship to be a co-obligee. The assignment contract 
may clarify whether the assignor and the assignee will enjoy their contractual rights in shares 
or jointly. If the contract is silent on the point, then the law will presume that they will jointly 
exercise their contractual rights. Upon assignment, any secondary rights affiliated with the 
primary rights also are assigned to the assignee, except for those that are personal.
28
 In 
addition, upon assignment, the assignor warrants that the assigned rights are free from defects 
and that the assignor will be liable for any damage caused by defects. 
 
                                            
26
 Chinese Civil Law art. 91 (1986). 
27
 Chinese Contract Law art. 80 (1999). 
28
 Chinese Contract Law art. 81 (1999). 
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Concerning the assignor (obligee), assignee, and the obligor, if the contractual rights have 
been completely assigned to an assignee, then the original obligee is out of the original 
contractual relationship and can no longer ask the obligor to perform the contract. If only part 
of the contractual rights have been assigned, and the assignor and assignee have their 
interests in shares, then the obligor must satisfy contractual obligations to both of them, 
provided that any increased cost of performance is borne by the original obligee based on the 
principle of honesty and good faith. After receiving the notice of assignment, the obligor 
must perform its contractual obligations to the new obligee to the extent that the contractual 
rights are assigned. However, the obligor may have a claim against the assignee on the 
ground of defenses he has against the original obligee, including the concurrent-performance 
defense, later-performance defense, and defense of insecurity. Furthermore, if the obligor has 
a creditor’s right against the assignor, the obligor may claim a set-off against the assignee 
when it is due. In addition, if the assignee sues the obligor to resolve disputes arising from 
performance of the contract, and if the obligor raises a defense against the obligee’s rights, 
the court may ask the obligee to be a third party to the litigation.
29
 
 
2.3.4. Summary 
 
The above introduction illustrates the development of the laws governing assignment of 
account receivables in a few different countries and demonstrates that both the civil law and 
the common law allow assignment of contractual rights, but subject to certain restrictions. 
While the nature of the contract and a prohibitive article of any law may prevent an 
assignment, the parties may also agree in the contract that the contractual rights are not 
assignable. Most of the countries would give effect to such an anti-assignment clause, but 
each country may adopt a different view. For example, the United States would assume 
transferability is the general rule, and an anti-assignment clause must be clearly stated in the 
contract and not violate other laws. Also, even if such a clause will be given effect, the 
Chinese law, for example, would only regard such a prohibitive clause as effective between 
the parties, but not against bona fide third party. 
 
                                            
29
 Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China on the Application 
of the Contract Law (hereinafter, “SPC’s Interpretation on Contract Law) art. 7 (1999).  
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2.4. Main issues and solutions 
 
Various problems arise from assignment of contractual rights, and account receivables in 
particular. These include the legal prohibition of transfer of contractual rights, the effect of 
the anti-assignment clause in the contract, the effect of the transfer of future account 
receivables, and the form of assignment. Below are some refinements of these problems, and 
some suggested solutions, based mainly on Chinese law. 
 
The first issue is quite fundamental. Although Chinese law generally allows assignment of 
contractual rights, the definition of contract for sale as defined in the Chinese Civil Law and 
Contract Law is too narrow and has not considered the transfer of contractual rights. Unlike 
the German Civil Code which provides that a contract for sale is not only for goods, but also 
for rights (including the sale of creditor’s rights, i.e., contractual rights30), the Chinese 
Contract Law only recognizes the sale of goods, not the sale of rights, as a sales contract.
31
 
Therefore, the assignment of contractual rights may need to be protected and regulated by the 
laws other than the Contract Law in China. Actually, Chinese Property Law has recognized 
the account receivables as a right which may be pledged in order to facilitate the assignment 
of the account receivables. However, there are two conditions: first, there must be a 
certificate of rights or registration system; second, there must be possession of the certificate 
of rights or through registration. Currently there is no certificate of rights that can be issued to 
account receivable holders, and neither is there a registration system.  
 
The second issue is that article 91 of the Chinese Civil Law of 1986 allows the assignment of 
contractual rights but prohibits the assignor from making profits out of the assignment. It also 
requires that the assignor must obtain the obligor’s consent regarding the assignment. This 
provision has actually prevented the development of the assignment of account receivables in 
China. The Chinese Contract Law of 1999 has removed the “consent” requirement and only 
required the assignor to notify the obligor. It has also eliminated the non-profit prohibition. 
Although the Contract Law has made significant improvement in this regard, it does not 
resolve all the issues. For instance, articles 79-83 and 87 have only considered general 
                                            
30
 Liming Wang, A Comparison of Sales Contract between China and Germany, 1 RESEARCH ON 
COMPARITIVE LAW (2001). 
31
 Chinese Contract Law art.174 (1999). 
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situations such as the situations where contractual rights are non-assignable, the notification 
requirement, the defenses and right to set-off that the obligor may have, etc. It does not make 
further detailed regulations on the important issues regarding whether future account 
receivables are assignable, the forms of assignment of account receivables, the effect of an 
anti-assignment clause, or the resolution of priority issues.  
 
The third issue regards the effect of the anti-assignment clause in the contract. As introduced 
above, both UK law and US law allow the assignment of account receivables, with US courts 
adopting a more liberal attitude toward assignability. The UK law recognizes the effect of the 
anti-assignment clause as against third parties, but under US law, even if the parties clearly 
stipulate in the contract that the contractual rights cannot be assigned, such an 
anti-assignment clause is not effective against bona fide third party. Section 210 (2) of the 
UCC provides the general rule that all contractual rights are assignable, except if the 
assignment will materially change the other party’s obligation, or materially increase the 
other party’s burden or risk. The anti-assignment clause is narrowly interpreted as a 
prohibition of transfer of the contractual duties only. The civil law attitude toward the 
anti-assignment clause is also different. The German Civil Code gives full effect to the 
anti-assignment clause like UK law, while the French Civil Code does not give any effect to 
the clause. Chinese law basically recognizes the effect of such anti-assignment clause 
according to article 79 of the Contract Law, but it does not specify various situations. 
 
Based on the above analysis, solutions are proposed that the Chinese law should make 
changes.  
 
First, its Contract Law should clearly allow the assignment of contractual rights so that 
contract flexibility in business transactions is to be enhanced. To this end, the Contract Law 
should clearly cover the sale of rights, especially after the Property Law which was 
promulgated later than the Contract Law already recognized the sale of rights. It should also 
clearly recognize the effect of assignment of future receivables considering the Chinese 
government is promoting asset securitization in the recent years. Actually, the UN 
Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade (“Convention on 
Flexibility in Assignment of Contractual Rights: Assignment of Account Receivables 
244 
Assignment of Receivables”) has explicitly recognized that future receivables are 
assignable.
32
 
 
Secondly, in order to facilitate the assignment of contractual rights, Chinese law should stick 
to the mere notification requirement and not require the assignor to obtain consent from the 
obligor upon assignment of the contractual rights. By doing so, the Chinese practice will be 
in line with the other countries’ practice as well as the UN Convention on the Assignment of 
Receivables. The Convention adopts the “notification” approach to invalidate the assignment 
of contractual rights.
33
 
 
Thirdly, the effect of anti-assignment clause should be given deference, but subject to certain 
restrictions. The law should be changed to at least recognize that the anti-assignment clause 
should not be effective against a bona fide third party. The UN Convention on Assignment of 
Account Receivables adopts an attitute in disfavor of the anti-assignment clause which is also 
in line with some countries’ practice, and it provides that: “[a]n assignment of a receivable is 
effective notwithstanding any agreement between the initial or any subsequent assignor and 
the debtor or any subsequent assignee limiting in any way the assignor’s right to assign its 
receivables.”34 
 
In addition, China needs to consider joining the United Nations Convention on the 
Assignment of Receivables in International Trade of 2001, or at least participate in 
discussions and cooperations with the other countries with regard to the assignment of 
account receivables, and revise its laws accordingly. 
 
 
 
                                            
32
 See article 8.1 of the Convention, which provides: ”[a]n assignment is not ineffective as between 
the assignor and the assignee or as against the debtor or as against a competing claimant, and the right 
of an assignee may not be denied priority, on the ground that it is an assignment of ... future 
receivables...” 
33
 See article 13.1 of the UN Convention on Assignment of Account Receivables, which 
provides: ”[u]nless otherwise agreed between the assignor and the assignee, the assignor or the 
assignee or both may send the debtor notification of the assignment...” 
34
 See article 9.1 of the UN Convention on Assignment of Account Receivables. 
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3. Conclusive remarks 
 
The title of this chapter covers a wide range, but owing to various limitations, this chapter 
mainly focuses on issues regarding assignment of contractual rights. Flexibility in contracting 
may have various layers of meaning, but the assignment of contractual rights is vital to the 
commercial well-being of many businesses. If the laws of different countries could be 
reconciled regarding such an assignment, business transactions will be further promoted and 
facilitated.  
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Promoting Contract Flexibility through Trademarks: 
“Branded” Intellectual Property Licensing Practices 
 
NARI LEE,
1
 THOMAS D. BARTON
2
 
 
  
Contract inflexibility seems to stem from two motivations: the urge to control the future, and a quest 
to improve economic efficiency. In thinking about whether and how contract inflexibility might be 
reduced, those human motivations must be taken into account. Reforms aimed at greater flexibility 
might better fit modern economic, organizational, and technological conditions, but if the underlying 
human motivations that produce inflexibility are ignored, then the reforms are likely to be 
ineffective
3
or even counterproductive.
4
  
 
This paper reflects on both the “future control” and “efficiency-seeking” impulses toward 
inflexibility, asking whether modern trends are changing the underlying assumptions of those 
impulses. Then, it examines a novel and still-evolving approach to intellectual property 
licensing—“branded licensing”--that has potentially broad application in transcending these 
motivations toward inflexibility. The branded licensing approach may achieve greater flexibility 
without compromising stability, the need for which prompts the urge to control the future. Branded 
licensing offers this greater flexibility without significantly increasing transaction costs, which 
prompts the concern about efficiency. “Branding” may thus represent a new structure for contracting 
that will be attractive psychologically, as well as legally and economically. Although as yet visible 
only in Intellectual Property licensing—examples of which are presented below—the branding 
concept could be developed in other contracting contexts. 
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1. Why Are Contracts Traditionally So Inflexible?  
 
1.1. Controlling the Future Through Legal Imperatives 
 
At least in part, people demand inflexibility in contracts because they want to control the 
future. This impulse may sound obsessive, but it is actually sensible. A perceived need for 
“future control” is best understood if we imagine a world without legally enforceable 
contracts. Exchange would proceed only where the performances of both parties are 
immediate—a synchronous transaction as in retail sales or bartering—or where one party is 
trusted to delay performance to some future moment. Absent that trust or some other 
non-contractual leverage like taking property as security against performance, the exchange 
will be too risky to undertake. Further, the greater the turbulence of background market or 
personal considerations, the harder it is to trust the other person. The greater the fluctuation 
of environmental conditions, in other words, the higher the risk of trusting that future 
performances will actually be made. A stable future reduces risk, heightens trust, and enables 
more transactions. If the reality of the future cannot be fully predicted or controlled, then 
creating a future artificially through contracts will supply that needed stability. 
 
Legally enforceable promises—i.e., contracts—are thus a breakthrough in the history of 
human exchange. Even without preexisting trust between the parties, contracts can provide 
the stability on which putting one’s trust in another person’s future performance becomes a 
tolerable risk. Therefore the performances of the contracting parties need not occur 
simultaneously. By bringing the power of the state to bear on future performances, regardless 
of then-prevailing economic or personal conditions, contracts permit the reciprocal duties of 
an exchange to be reliably performed even though asynchronous. The de-coupling in time of 
the performances dramatically increases the potential for parties to find mutually beneficial 
exchanges. It stabilizes transactions over time by smoothing out the effects of market 
fluctuations, permits risks to be more readily calculated, and enables stronger planning and 
confidence in resource allocation. Controlling the future through the law thus facilitates 
interpersonal trust, and the feasibility of contracts. It is natural, therefore, that the 
“future-control” impulse is so strongly felt among the commercial community. The trouble 
lies when that impulse turns into instinctive contractual inflexibility.  
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Safeguarding the reliability of this invention for asynchronous exchange—“contracts”-- no 
doubt explains why early contract law was so restrictive in releasing parties from their 
obligations, even where background conditions had become highly impracticable or 
unprofitable. To gain the benefits of the contract device seemed to require that people be 
clear in what they demanded of their counterparts’ future performances; it also seemed to 
require that contract law be forceful in enforcing the parties’ original intentions. That is 
indeed how contract law classically evolved: excuses from performing as specified were only 
sparingly allowed, and contract language interpretation instinctively circled back to the 
parties’ intentions.  
 
“Flexibility” is not valued in such a conceptualization. Flexibility seems inconsistent, at least 
on the surface, with capturing the efficiencies that flow from ensuring future 
performances--from “controlling the future.” If a contract could reliably specify what shall 
be, then what really is when the time for performance arrives is irrelevant. Contracts are 
designed to define legally what future conditions shall obtain, and the parties should behave 
accordingly. “Flexibility” may seem to undermine that valuable legal suspension from reality. 
 
Modernly, however, the rate of change in markets, organizations, and technology may be 
accelerating so dramatically that “freezing” the future through classical contracting may 
introduce new risks. Where an environment changes constantly, both buyers and sellers may 
begin to perceive flexibility as offering stronger opportunities and perceive commitments as 
threatening stronger risks. One of us has likened this to bridge building in an 
earthquake-prone region. One possible way to overcome the risk of an unpredictably shifting 
environment is to engineer massive inflexible strength into the bridge—often at significant 
cost. Or one can design a bridge that is itself flexible, one that will move with earth tremors 
so that the bridge never loses structural integrity. So also with contracting: in some 
environments (which may be quickly proliferating), designing contracts and contract 
processes to be flexible rather than inflexible may actually reduce risks and increase 
opportunities. Stability may be achieved, in other words, through inflexibility or through 
thoughtful flexibility. Indeed, stability is sometimes better achieved through flexible 
structures and good communications rather than through inflexible demands with expensive 
and often bruising enforcement methods.  
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1.2. Efficiency Through Standardization 
 
The second reason why people may demand inflexibility in their contracts is to better enable 
the standardization of those contracts. Standardization promotes efficiency by reducing the 
time spent on contract drafting. People may want to mass-produce a contract that is optimally 
drafted for the most commonly prevailing conditions. This mentality demands contract 
inflexibility in the form of a standardized agreement that is offered on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis, a “contract of adhesion.” Deviating from a standardized agreement raises a specter of 
substantially higher transaction costs, and greater liability risks from relatively inexpert or 
unapproved language being inserted into a tried-and-true document.  
 
This inflexibility is more often visible in consumer transactions in which little or no 
bargaining is possible, except perhaps on price or length of warranty. A typical consumer 
contract in electronic and mobile commerce is represented by what is often called 
“Click-through” contracts or licenses. 5  “Click-through” arrangements for electronic 
transactions differ little in this regard from the insertion of printed warranty terms in the 
packaging of tangible items. Certainly time and lawyer fees are saved by producing and using 
standardized contracts. Inflexibility, again, seems at first blush to be efficient.  
 
Using standardized contracts either in consumer transactions or in business to business 
contexts assumes, however, a hierarchy between the parties. The creator of the contract seems 
to impose its terms on the receiver of the contract, empowered over the other and able to 
harness that power to press the contract terms onto the subordinated party. The source of the 
dominant power could be economic—a stronger market position—or it could be more 
“structural,” reflecting dramatic disparities in sophistication and capability to draft and 
understand contractual language. Regardless of its source, the ability to impose a 
standardized (usually unread) contract onto another party suggests strongly that one party will 
“win” and the other “lose” in the transaction.  
 
In wielding potential legal tools like “unconscionability” or “undue influence” that might 
allow escape from such contracts, courts tend to be cautious. Courts are mindful of the 
                                                 
5
 See generally Kim Nancy S., WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS (NEW YORK: 
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2013)  
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business realities that seem to underlie the use of standardized contracts.
6
 If the only choices 
that appear available are: (1) to uphold standardized contracts even though they seem to make 
a mockery of traditional contract assumptions about bargained-for exchange; or (2) to impose 
a standard in which the parties come to a real “meeting of the minds,” courts typically permit 
the use of standardized contracts because requiring true consent to the terms by both parties 
would seemingly paralyze modern commerce. This issue is of vital concern not only to 
modern commerce, but also to the perception and reality of meaningful participation in that 
exchange. Thankfully, as we develop below, the choices for the law may not be completely 
binary between one-sided standardized contracts, versus unrealistic and hugely expensive 
personalized negotiation.  
 
Emerging alternatives--what we here call “branded” contracts or licensing--are potentially 
more than just compromises or trade-offs between efficiency and justice. We argue that 
branded contracting may introduce a way to make contracting both more efficient and more 
equitable, despite some shortcomings. Just as people should not necessarily equate 
“inflexibility” with “stability,” so also people should not necessarily equate “inflexibility” 
with “efficiency.” We can imagine instances in which greater stability is achieved through 
flexibility, and we can also imagine instances of greater efficiency and equity being achieved 
through flexibility. 
 
Hierarchy and power-imposition are the problem-solving tools of an era that is being replaced 
by a more level and participatory world.
7
 As these cultural trends proceed, we may speculate 
that consumers will eventually rebel against the dis-empowering dictates of standardized 
contracts. They may demand legislation that will regulate various transactions to mandate 
more balanced relationships between vendor and buyer/licensee. Such regulatory solutions, 
however, are quite likely to add to inflexibility, although they may achieve stronger 
distributional fairness. More imaginative private or private/public partnership possibilities 
such as branded licensing could conceivably achieve stronger fairness, even while increasing 
the flexibility in contracting that better serves modern businesses and organizations. The next 
section introduces both the idea, and the cultural underpinnings, of this branded approach.  
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 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).  
7
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2. Intellectual Property and Contracts: Parallels 
 
2.1. Background: The Culture of Collaboration versus Culture of Permission 
 
As Intellectual Property law has evolved alongside information technology, ideas about the 
preconditions for creativity and innovation seem to diverge in contradictory directions: 
toward a culture of “collaboration,” or a culture of “permission.” “Collaboration” emphasizes 
free exchange and open communication under a foundational metaphor of the “commons” in 
which an entire community shares access to a resource. Individual members of the 
community are free to take from the commons, and are encouraged to contribute to its 
well-being and growth: no one “owns” the commons in the sense of being able to exclude or 
control access. Collaborationist culture emphasizes organic growth through the gathering of 
diverse ideas and resources, like Wikipedia.  
 
“Permission,” by contrast, emphasizes legal entitlements and control of both property and 
information under a foundational metaphor of “enclosure.”8 A Permission culture assumes 
that innovation depends on incentives for profits that come from the ability to control and sell 
access to ideas.
9
 In this cultural model, any use of an innovation or creative expression 
would require permission from the right holders. Ideas and creations are protected by 
legally-enforced property rights,. The property title holders may restrict the use of these 
abstract objects and any users may need to seek permissions from the right holders. Only by 
assuring entitlement to such payments for permissive use, claim the advocates of Permission 
culture, will innovators have a proper incentive for investing the time, resources, and mental 
energy required for creativity. 
 
Both Collaborationist and Permissive cultures are defensible, but each is vulnerable when 
taken to an extreme. Collaborationist culture is subject to the “tragedy of the commons,”10 
which is a phrase coined by Garret Hardin to describe what is seen as the inevitable depletion 
of resources, where there is no formal owner of a resource, and hence no mechanism for 
limiting access to it. If use of a resource is free, then people will withdraw units of the 
                                                 
8
 Boyle James, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW 
& CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 33 (2003). 
9
 Posner Richard A., THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 146-168 (1981); see generally Landes William M. 
and Posner Richard A., THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003).  
10
 Hardin Garret, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
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resource while leaving its replenishment to others. Even if we take into consideration that 
intangible intellectual resources may be non-rivalous, the resources required to create and 
innovate those resources may be rivalous. The tragedy is that unfettered usage in the 
commons property will lead to no resources being available to anyone: most people will 
simply take the free resource and not contribute to its sustainability.  
 
On the other hand, a Permission culture is vulnerable to ossification. Where 
resources—tangible, intellectual, or cultural—are not shared or otherwise distributed, they 
can never grow.
11
 Economic efficiency assumes that resources should flow—by sale or 
otherwise—to their highest and best use. They should move to those who value the resource 
most, presumably because the resource is most productive in their hands. Intellectual 
innovation is similar: unless ideas circulate, they will not thrive or spark the imagination of 
people who would build on the idea. But Permission culture would theoretically permit 
property and ideas to be locked up, under-used and hence become both stagnant and 
inefficient. The exclusive property that a Permission culture presupposes is subject to a 
tragedy of another kind – the tragedy of the anti-commons, where the pervasive exclusion 
leads to under-use or non-use of the protected innovation.
12
 Avoiding inefficient ossification 
is what prompts the law historically to adopt policies in favor of free alienability of property 
and to prohibit the long-term freezing of property. Rules under intellectual property laws that 
grant statutory licenses or compulsory licenses under certain conditions are also examples 
where the law aims to prevent lock-up and under use.
13
  
  
Neither Collaboration nor Permission should therefore be embraced without limitation. 
Society is best served by viewing them not as mutually exclusive, binary opposites, but 
instead as thriving only when used in combination. Innovation and efficiency require a blend 
of Permission and Collaboration, just as social stability is best achieved through a blend of 
rules and flexibility. What appear to be antagonistic modes of human behavior—Permission 
                                                 
11
 Hyde Lewis, Common As Air: Revolution, Art, and Ownership (2010). 
12
 Heller Michael A. & Eisenberg Rebecca S., Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research 280 SCIENCE 641(1998). 
13
 Non-working of a patented invention, for example, in some jurisdictions give rise to compulsory 
licensing, just as in an anti-competitive or unreasonable refusal to license a patent. Conditions for 
grants of compulsory licensing, for example, is set internationally in Article 30, of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, (TRIPs) Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm1_e.htm (last visited May 6, 2013).  
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versus Collaboration--are better viewed as differing but potentially complementary values. 
The trick is to build structures that will enable complementarity: structures that legitimately 
bring together the qualities of rules and flexibility, Permission with Collaboration.  
 
Ironically, building frameworks open to these diverse values may be easier in social 
relationships than in Intellectual Property. In social settings, we are accustomed to a broad 
and informal range of flexibility in the interactional rules that characterize families and 
friendships. Sharing is valued, but so is saying “please” and “thank you.” Intellectual 
Property, by contrast, is a set of abstract legal constructs that the law seems historically to 
have tied strongly to Permission culture and its assumptions.  
 
Intellectual Proprietary Rights (“IPR”) are created by the law, but then also become the 
primary tools by which Permission culture realizes its outlook on the world. IPR takes 
information that flows through the intellectual commons of “knowledge” and “education” 
and encloses some forms of that information into property rights. Access to those rights is 
then controlled through legally-enforced permissions (although the law does sometimes 
require “sharing” through doctrines like “fair use” and “mandatory licensing”). 
Collaborationist culture seems to have no equivalent formal or institutional structure. So 
engrained are we with the idea that resources are protectable only through reducing them to 
property rights, that it becomes difficult even to imagine how a Collaborationist outlook 
could be enforced. Can sharing be mandated? Can generosity be legislated? However elusive 
it may be to build institutional props for Collaboration culture, many creators nonetheless 
view the legal IPR structure as stifling and failing to achieve the balance between control and 
sharing that is optimal for either innovation or distributional justice. 
 
Are the critics correct in that assessment? Does the law overly stress Permission at the 
expense of Collaboration? And if so, how may the law correct it? 
 
Those responding “yes” to the first two questions above may say that by turning to IPR as its 
primary method for defining the relationship between intellectual creator and user, the law 
inherently defaults toward Permission. IPR sets up entitlements for exclusion that must be 
purchased by users. The law could instead have created something like “IAR” (Intellectual 
Access Rights) that defaulted to entitlements for sharing, requiring those who would seek 
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exclusive control to have purchased that right from society generally.
14
 But the law generally 
did not do that. It gave the first entitlement to creators rather than users, perhaps because that 
arrangement fit so easily within pre-existing legal structures, or perhaps out of the same 
instincts or impulses that push toward contract inflexibility: concerns to keep control over 
the future of resources and to protect efficiency.  
 
For whatever reason, IPR evolved along lines of traditional property rights and now stands 
alongside traditional contract law and processes in solidarity with assumptions about the 
value and need for control, predictability, and individualized entitlements. As we discuss 
below the particulars of how branded licensing may introduce better flexibility and 
distribution in Intellectual Property, therefore, we may also imagine its potential broader uses 
in commercial contracting.  
 
 
2.2. Contracts and Licensing as Potential Bridges Between Permission and Collaboration 
  
Suppose that an inventor wanted to overcome the tendencies of IPR toward Permission 
culture. Suppose, in other words, that an inventor wanted to set up a durable Collaborative 
environment regarding his or her invention. That inventor would have to have: (1) models for 
how to share the inventiveness, so as to build a sustainable “commons;” (2) an ability to scale 
that sharing method efficiently throughout the appropriate community; and (3) the methods 
must be accessible, i.e., comprehensible and readily available to both creator and potential 
new user.  
 
IPR--and, pushing the analogy further, traditional contract law--seem to fail all three 
elements. First, IPR and contracts offer little vision for sharing–a normative alternative to the 
neoclassical image of individual wealth-maximizers. Second, both IPR and contracts struggle 
to find a method of scaling-up, apart from using standardized language in mass contracts. In 
IPR settings this takes the form of “click-on” or “click-through” computer-based licensing–a 
method that has proven to be challenging not only in terms of content, but also in perceived 
legitimacy of process. Finally, because managing the ownership and use of legal rights is 
                                                 
14
 Calabresi Guido & Melamed A. Douglas, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1089 (1972); see also Hyde, supra note 9, who 
suggests a concept of “copyduty” rather than “copyright” (at 220, 245-246). 
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complex (perhaps especially so in Intellectual Property) both contracts and licenses tend to be 
inaccessible: they are so difficult to read and understand that few people manage to do either. 
“Branded” IP licensing practices are a reaction to these perceived shortcomings. First, they 
have arisen largely among communities that favor Collaboration rather than Permission. And 
second, they provide an alternative to the traditional poor choices between inefficient, 
individually negotiated agreements and standardized Contracts that remain unread.  
 
Branded licensing practices typically involve the following steps: (1) a community of people 
is constructed who become associated with the “brand” or trademark; (2) the community 
drafts and recommends detailed terms and conditions (or a series of alternative terms, 
depending on the goals and values of the users) for using particular intellectual property; and 
(3) the community uses a sign or trademark as a shorthand for the developed terms and 
conditions that stand in the background behind the brand. By using nothing more than an 
icon, in branded licensing the parties can agree to abide by terms that have been pre-drafted 
by a community of interest, reflecting the values of that community.  
 
At some future point, a creator and users, or buyers and sellers could conceivably be able to 
bargain meaningfully about which “brand” of license or contract would govern their 
transaction. The parties would not necessarily know or understand much about the many 
terms or conditions that may stand in the background of an icon, but they could come to 
know and trust the values behind different organizations. Here is a homely analogy: when 
buying eggs, consumers can choose cartons that say “organic,” “hormone free,” or “free 
range.” Even though the details of the background practices that those words or phrases 
actually represent are not spelled out on the carton, the buyer trusts that these background 
practices are ones that the buyer would endorse. So also in contracting: different persons 
entering an agreement may have strikingly different values or preferences, but each could 
advance those preferences by choosing a “brand” that the particular contractor trusts.15 A 
consumer buyer may, for example, may request that a hypothetical “Consumer Reports” 
version of a washing machine purchase be used in the transaction, while the seller could hold 
out for a hypothetical “Chamber of Commerce” version of an agreement. Licensing parties 
could ultimately have a choice among many competing brands concerning software use, for 
                                                 
15
 These phrases may be typically protected or complemented by the brand and goodwill of the 
certification marks that represent and control the quality of the usages of these expressions in cartons 
and packaging.  
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example, with varying degrees of collaboration or control that they promote. We do not know 
which party would prevail in the contest above between using the Consumer Reports, or the 
chamber of Commerce brand. Perhaps the parties would have to agree on a third brand, like a 
hypothetical “Fair Trade” brand; but at least the bargaining would be real.  
 
As things stand now, many contracts are largely dictated by the more powerful party, taking 
the form of a standardized agreement that neither party reads or understands. Even in the 
most mundane and simplified transactions, communication of contract terms is often done 
through textual details.
16
 Branded contracts become drastically simplified in the minds of the 
negotiators, because the “visible” portions of the contract may be reduced to a highly 
symbolic and visual icon plus a few specifics like price, quantity, and delivery dates. All of 
the other terms would be accessible “behind” the icon, probably on the community drafter’s 
website. Hence a real choice could be restored to many transactions that currently lack 
choice. This form of bargaining could be highly efficient, and need not add significant 
transaction costs.  
 
In the sections that follow we describe and offer examples of the growing phenomenon of 
branded licensing, which seems the leading edge of a possible broader branded contract 
innovation. In this description of how branded licensing evolved and now serves the IP 
community, we suggest a categorization among types as “community-based,” 
“drafter-based,” and “industry associations.” We will then analyze the potential dangers as 
well as benefits of the practices of branded licensing.  
 
Tying the paper into the overall topic of flexibility in contracting, we will conclude that 
branded contracting greatly promotes flexibility by giving contract users a range of efficient, 
accessible contracting options based on terms that predictably reflect the values of 
contracting parties--rather than employing either one-size-fits-all standardized agreements, or 
default state legal rules. Branded licensing and branded contracting offer potentials for 
introducing flexibility without sacrificing stability; for preserving efficiency through 
competition, as brands could compete with one another for adoption (and potentially fees); 
and for finding a more equitable distributional balance by reducing somewhat the needed 
sophistication involved in contracting. 
                                                 
16
 For further discussion on visual communication of contract terms, see in this volume Barton 
Thomas D., Haapio Helena, and Borisova Tatiana, Flexibility and Stability in Contracts. 
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3. Branded Licensing of Intellectual Property 
 
3.1. Introduction to Chapter 3  
 
Branded contracting may be on the horizon, inspired in part by the various “community” 
practices among intellectual property creators and licensees as described in this Part III. The 
vision for possible branded contracts outlined above has been largely from the perspective of 
those who use contracts in either consumer or business settings—the potential adopters of a 
particular “brand” of contract. In Part III, by contrast, we describe the history of branded IP 
licensing largely through the eyes of the communities that created the brands. To extend the 
analogy suggested above, we now consider branded agreements from the perspective of those 
who produce and distribute the eggs rather than those who might buy them. Described below 
are examples of how various communities came to define and protect the meaning of labels 
like “free range” and “organic” that appear on the cartons—and even regulate how the eggs 
might be eaten. 
 
Considering the perspectives of both brand creators and brand adopters is essential for 
understanding and assessing the prospects and the potential limitations of branded contracting 
that will be considered in Part IV and the Conclusion of this article. As will become apparent 
below, the communities that have created branded IP licensing are doing far more than 
selling a product. Although they diverge in their origins and motivations, they are creating 
meanings and community identity, and may be furthering a world outlook. As a result, the 
relationship between a drafter and a user of a branded license may be more complex and 
interactive than in a typical commercial transaction.  
 
 
3.2. Background 
  
As the complexity of Intellectual Property (“IP”) law has grown, contracts have become 
increasingly important regulators for using, sharing and restricting IP both within and outside 
of the professional creator community. The contents and processes of contracts dealing with 
IP matters have become correspondingly more complex and challenging. Users and creators 
of digital contents must comply with various laws, and permissions must be sought, as 
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preconditions to most creative collaboration. This creates a need for both the users and 
producers to navigate the complexities of licensing terms and laws that are applicable to 
particular transactions. Both “standardized contracts” and “branded” practices arise out of 
this need. Standardized terms are far more common, and may be thought of as precursors to 
the branded approach. Either way, IP law requires that the contracts specify what types of 
actions can and cannot be taken regarding a particular expression, creation, or technological 
idea. Further, the scope of a right provided by IPR laws is not clear until the specific right is 
challenged and litigated in the courts. If one is to draft a contract in a proactive manner, due 
consideration must be given to all types of authorized actions and their combinations.  
 
 
3.3. Standardized Terms, Model Terms and Reputation  
 
Using standardized terms, or a model contract that a professional association recommends, is 
nothing new. Standardized terms have been used often in mass market contexts. Likewise, 
use of model clauses or terms recommended by a certain professional organization is nothing 
new. In many businesses where transactions are repeated, or if both of the contracting parties 
belong to a certain professional organization, starting a contract negotiation based on a model 
terms often saves time and drafting costs for both parties. The relationship of the immediate 
contracting (licensing) parties to the recommending association or community is illustrated 
by Figure 1. 
 
The reputation of the organization that drafts the model or standard terms is essential to 
professional organizations or reputable communities using these terms. With the drafting 
organization’s reputation and goodwill in the background, these practices gradually develop 
into branded contracting practices. Standardized terms provided by some professional 
associations such as the ICC (International Chamber of Commerce) or ORGALIME 
(European Engineering Industries Association) are used voluntarily, based on the reputation 
of the organizations. They may evolve into standardized practice by frequency of use. 
Standardized terms may be promoted by adoption of a template or a model contract that these 
professional associations draft. 
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[Figure1. Standard Terms – Community or Association Based] 
 
 
In other contexts where templates or model contracts are not used, some of the standardized 
terms are promoted through the membership agreement among the members of the 
professional organizations. A good example is the licensing principle based on the FRAND 
(“fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory”) condition in information technology 
standard-setting organizations and the communication technology sector. They may become 
standardized through their voluntary use or mandated through membership. Because of wide 
reaching membership or because of the intended function of an organization as providing 
standardization within an industry, the terms of the agreement that the organization 
recommends can gain informal or formal authority. 
 
3.4. Branded IPR Licensing 
 
In contrast to the recommendations by associations, informal standardization of contract 
terms may occur by more spontaneous paths. A set of terms may simply be perceived as 
efficient by those working in a particular context. If used often enough, these like-minded 
people may create a community of users of such terms. This usage may be formalized 
through creation of a “brand,” or identity-signifying source. They may even be protected 
through a trademark. The emergence of this identity, in which people come to associate (and 
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trust) a third-party community with representing values or outlooks on the world that they 
share, is what enables the possibility of branded contracting, as distinct from standardized 
contracts.  
 
In short, branded IP licensing describes a practice in IPR licensing of digital contents in 
which a mark, sign, word or a symbol is associated with the standard terms or meanings that 
are recommended to be used. It is controlled, in the sense that the terms of use are not drafted 
by the licensor but rather by another party or entity which has proprietary or other interests in 
the propagation of the terms of use. Thus a branded IP licensing seems to be a combination of 
flexibility with efficient standardization.  
 
What sets branded contracting or licensing apart from use of the standardized terms of an 
association is the way in which the terms of the contracts are communicated to the users of 
the contracts – visually, textually and also technically. The parties will use a symbol or 
trademark of a certain “brand” of licensing to communicate core aspects of the contract 
content but also through textual contract terms. The resulting contract need not visually 
include all of the terms that will actually govern their relationship. The content is 
incorporated by an iconic reference—the symbol or trademark of the brand chosen by the 
parties. Importantly, this background content of specific terms or meanings is intended 
legally to govern the relationship. Additionally, contract contents may also be communicated 
through software tools so that the users may implement the terms of contract technically. 
Behind the trademark or icon is a community—a community either created especially for the 
purpose of governing licenses of certain IP, or a community that has arisen for other purposes 
but whose members have taken on the task of generating a set of licensing terms that reflect 
the ideology or values of that community.  
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[Figure 2. A branded IPR license] 
 
As Figure 2 shows, a formal branded licensing often has a two-fold structure. It involves two 
sets of usage and licensing terms: first the standard licensing terms that will govern the IPR 
relationship of the immediately contracting parties, i.e. the users (C2); but secondly, a set of 
terms that regulate the use of the mark and content of the community whose branded 
licensing terms have been employed by those parties, i.e. between drafter community 
organization and the user (C1). Hence, a branded licensing communicates two different types 
of information to the users of the standardized terms: (1) information on the terms and what 
can be expected of and by the parties to the license (C2); and (2) information concerning the 
reputation of the community that is behind the brand that the mark represents (C1). 
Agreement to the specific terms of the contract is dictated by agreeing to the licensing norms 
of the background community.  
 
Furthermore, as Figure 3 below shows, the information on the specific terms that will govern 
the parties is given at two levels – a simplified version represented through iconic reference 
to a mark, and the more complex information representing the contents of the third party 
licensing terms (which may be available only at a third party website, rather than appearing in 
the particular licensing document). As to the reputation of the community behind the brand, 
that is far more general and perhaps under-articulated. But it is nonetheless real: branded 
licensing reflects the values that each “branding” community represents. Just as a contract 
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with a known company would carry a sense of the company’s image and business goals, a 
branded licensing conveys the norms and values of a community that drafted the terms of 
licenses. Thus, the trademark for the symbol represents not only the terms of the contract but 
also carries with it qualitative information about the community, i.e. the good will, just as a 
trademark for a goods or service is tied to the quality and the goodwill of the business.  
 
 
 
 
[Figure 3. The Two-Fold Structure of Branded Licensing] 
 
 
3.5. Branded IPR licenses – Practice Survey 
 
Branded IPR licensing practices may be categorized into three different types: 1. “pure” 
user-community drafted; 2. mark-holder drafted; and 3. industry association drafted. Each 
involves different levels of brand usage and may be exclusively applicable to particular 
species of IPR.  
 
3.5.1. “Pure” Community Based “Branded” Licensing – the OSI example 
 
In the “pure” community example, a pre-existing group formed for broader purposes may 
develop a shared consensus concerning certain norms about licensing, or some aspect of 
contractual exchange in which the members of the community engage. The “brand” that 
emerges may or may not be represented by a trademark, but outsiders who share similar 
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normative beliefs may adopt the licensing terms of the community group by referencing the 
group’s work. In this model, the brand is more of a byproduct of the group’s central 
activities, or a way for their members to gain control over certain usages that are crucial to 
their outlook. Eventually, general public adoption of the key terms may be possible. If that 
occurs, the branding community has in effect acted as a lobbyist or broader voice for certain 
values. 
 
This sort of branded community may suggest specific terms, or may instead specify a 
framework or set of criteria that must be met for the organization to approve a particular 
agreement drafted by outsiders and permit use of the community mark. Such an “approval” 
rather than “specification” system permits greater flexibility to the particular contracting 
parties.  
 
The “Open Source Initiative” [OSI] serves as an example of the pure community model. 
Open source licensing of computer programs has been growing steadily as an alternative 
means of distributing software. As a movement, it was originally formed around the crucial 
sentiments against distributing software in a “closed” source code. Where the source code is 
closed, the creators of the software are operating in a Permission mode. They want to control 
access to their idea, thinking that only by enclosing and selling or renting the ideas will they 
be able to ensure a return on investment. Collaborationists oppose that mentality, on grounds 
that without knowing the source code, it is much more difficult to build on the software. The 
sophistication and techniques of the software may be masked, and potentially alternative uses 
may be stifled. When both the user and producer community share a belief in open sourcing, 
the source code is disclosed or made accessible when the software products are distributed.   
 
The OSI organization was formed to standardize the usage of the term “Open” through the 
usage of a mark of approval (“OSI Approved”) to a set of licensing terms that meets the 
standards of the OSI. OSI reviews and approves license terms according to their standards. 
To bear the mark, the approved licenses need to include a certain set of conditions in the 
license agreement that meet the core meaning of an open source.
17
 
 
In addition, to use its trade mark and logo, the OSI website specifies that the user must 
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 http://www.opensource.org/docs/osd 
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comply with the trademark and logo usage guidelines.
18
 These guidelines aim to ensure that 
only those software licensing practices which meet the requirement of the definition of “open 
source” of OSI will be allowed formal use of the OSI logo.  
 
In the OSI example, the standardization of licensing terms is preceded by the evolution of 
community norms. Use of the OSI logo becomes an additional way of branding the open 
source community. In other words, the norm of open source licensing was achieved prior to 
the actual standardization of the terms and trademark usage policies. The brand is organically 
formed, based on community norms among the users. The specific open source licensing 
terms are simply codifications of those informal norms, and the trademark and logo usage 
guidelines enforce such codified norms.  
 
Users of open source licensing forms are often aware of the implications of using the OSI 
terms. On the other hand, the original OSI movement grew out of a common yet uncontrolled 
understanding of “openness.” The degree of “openness” was, and remains, controversial. For 
that reason, it was necessary to generate a common means to control the flow of the open 
source code programs, and to standardize the use of the phrase “open source code” when 
code was actually distributed. 
 
This necessity seems to apply not only the first generation open source code products, but 
also the second generation products. Second generation products may be a mixture of both 
open and close source code product, and if so it is important to determine how much code is 
actually subject to the open source licensing. Diverse licenses may claim to be “open,” in 
other words, but may fail to meet the original expectation of the open source community. The 
use of the certification mark is one means of OSI’s attempt to enforce and control the various 
versions of the open source licensing that are currently in use. Through standardizing core 
terms and then tying such usage to the certification mark and logo, OSI standardizes open 
source licensing through branding. Further, approval by OSI is a way of lending normative 
authority to the terms through the community, even while the specific licensing terms are 
drafted by the parties to the agreement.  
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3.5.2. Industry Association or Facilitator Drafted Branded Licensing 
 
Under this model, the community behind the brand maintains selective membership, and only 
members or buyers of the association’s services have access to their brand of contracts or 
licenses. Mass adoption of the terms by the public is not the intention, and may not even be 
permitted. In certain contexts, these general terms or contracts are sold as templates in the 
particular industry. The European Engineering Industries Association’s “ORGALIME” 
contracts, which pertain to tangible objects rather than IPR, are an example. In the 
engineering industry, the terms and general conditions of known and reliable industry 
associations are used often as standard terms, and are sometimes referred to as “soft law.”19  
  
 Within the IPR context, these tendencies are visible in collective IPR management, notably 
in patent pools for technological standards. Patent pooling essentially creates a community 
that has been formed purely for the purpose of cross-licensing, or to set licensing principles 
or recommendations to achieve that goal. Examples of such a closed community brand may 
be standard setting organizations such as the Organization for the Advancement of Structured 
Information Standards (OASIS) consortium,
20
 and the World Wide Web Consortium 
(W3C).
21
 Members of the Consortium participate in the standard setting activities and in 
return agree to comply with core licensing principles. OASIS, for example, requires members 
to grant licenses on Reasonable And Non-Discriminatory terms (RAND) and to use Royalty 
Free (RF) terms or other conditions.
22
 W3C similarly promotes its patent policy,
23
 and 
through its Community Contributor Licensing Agreement (CLA) imposes on its members an 
obligation to use RF terms on the standards that they contribute.
24
 
 
Industry association branding is similar to the OSI initiative in the sense that the brands of the 
OASIS and the W3C are closely linked with the ideology of open standards. They 
                                                 
19
 Whittaker Simon, On the Development of European Standard Contract Terms, 2.1 EUROPEAN 
REVIEW OF CONTRACT LAW 51 (2006). 
20
 The OASIS consortium is a non-profit consortium that promotes industry standards for security, 
Cloud computing, SOA, Web services, the Smart Grid, electronic publishing, emergency 
management, and other areas. https://www.oasis-open.org/standards  
21
 W3C is the World Wide Web Consortium that develops open standards to ensure the long-term 
growth of the Web and promote open standards principle. See their website for detail, www.w3c.org  
22
 For OASIS licensing requirements, see 
https://www.oasis-open.org/policies-guidelines/ipr#licensing_req at §10 et seq.  
23
 http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy-20040205/  
24
 http://www.w3.org/community/about/agreements/cla/  
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recommend core licensing terms and conditions for standards specifications developed under 
the Consortium. These Consortium licensing agreements depend greatly on voluntary 
adoption by the users (members) of the licensing agreement. Further, the background content 
of the standard “brand” of OASIS25 and W3C are known, but use of the sign is for the 
members only. However, unlike OSI, they do not have licensing terms approval process or a 
certification program. 
 
This type of “branded” licensing would not lead to a strong standardized contract, but only 
standardization of the principles to be used in drafting the licensing agreement. The brand 
represents and informs that certain licensing principles are adopted. The brand, however, 
does not fully stand in as the visually represented part of the contract. 
  
Further, these industry association practices need to be distinguished from the practices of 
facilitator drafted licensing. An example of this would be the W-CDMA (Wideband Code 
Division Multiple Access) patent pool for interface standards in 3G mobile 
telecommunication network products. The patent pool grouped together all relevant 
W-CDMA FDD standard essential patents from those companies joining the program, and 
coupled them within the licensing program. Currently the licensing program is administrated 
by Sipro Lab Telecom which provides licensing programs for telecommunications 
technologies, including “3GPP W-CDMA FDD Standard and ITU-T G.729, G.723.1, 
G.729.1 and G.711.1 recommendations for speech and audio coding”.26 In this case, a license 
administrator drafts the agreement and facilitates use by the IPR holders; thus licensing terms 
are indirectly standardized. They are facilitating licensing, and establish only a vehicle to 
pool the rights. Thus they fail to form the basis of a “branded” licensing practice as analyzed 
in this chapter. 
 
3.5.3. Drafter Based “Branded” Licensing – the Creative Commons Example 
 
In contrast to the pure or organic community model exemplified by OSI approved licenses, or 
the model of OASIS or W3C whereby a licensing principle rather than the terms are 
standardized, there is a third model of branded licensing. Some community or organization 
drafted licenses may strictly control the uses of the license terms by providing not simply a 
                                                 
25
 https://www.oasis-open.org/private/logos.php  
26
 http://www.sipro.com/wcdma_about.php  
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model set of terms, but also extensive legal documents that the users need to adopt. In other 
words, use of a mark signifies not simply approval of terms that may be generated by the 
particular parties, or the core licensing principles, according to the brand of the community or 
associations. Instead, the mark further entails that the parties adopt particular language of the 
branded organization and contract terms. 
  
In this model, the iconic references simplify and standardize the contracting process, but at 
the expense of level of freedom of the particularly contracting parties. Particular parties must 
adopt the texts that the organization provides, even though some level of choice may be 
maintained by the brand offering different modules of licensing terms. Regardless of the 
variety of modules available, here the brand is created so that a community can be created 
through collective usage of the branded terms. The brand forms a key core of the idea of the 
community, rather than an offshoot of other activities, and the use of the brand is crucial. 
General public adoption of the key terms may well be the explicit goal of the branded 
community.  
 
One good example of brander-drafted contracts is Creative Commons. Creative Commons is 
a movement that was first initiated by Lawrence Lessig as an explicit reaction to 
Permission-style closed and “all rights reserved” copyright licenses whereby right holders 
reserve all rights to the copyrighted contents. A license granted under this Permission model 
has an inflexible and unitary character that disenfranchises a user of the contents; users are 
relegated to the role of mere passive receiver of contents, with broad restrictions in their use 
of the work. Under such terms, creative and transformative uses that would otherwise be 
allowed under the law may be prohibited through contracts. 
 
“All rights reserved” restrictive licenses seem to reflect a fear of an uncontrolled future such 
as we have analyzed as one source of contract inflexibility. The concern is that more lenient 
licensing conditions could lead to the loss of rights and future profitable use of the works. 
The result, however, is a rigid, complex contract that reserves rights in an attempt to restrict 
or eliminate that possible future. Creative Commons starts from a more flexible premise: that 
the right holders may grant a “some rights reserved” license that protects future profitable 
commercial uses of the works for the right holders, but without the complexity of “all rights 
reserved” contracts.  
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Each Creative Commons license is explained and available in three different forms in what 
they call three layers directed at different readers – the general public (“human readable”); 
computers (“machine readable”); and the actual license terms (“lawyer readable”). Aside 
from the obvious joke that the lawyers are not human, each layer explains the same licensing 
terms in ways that are simple (“human readable”), codable (“machine readable”), or legally 
binding.  
 
Users of the license are also guided through easily understandable questionnaires that aim to 
help the users select the correct license. The current versions (3.0) of the Creative Commons 
licenses have the following features (overleaf), with shorthand information attached to each 
of them:  
 
 
[Figure 4. Types of Creative Commons Licenses]
27
. 
 
 
The understanding that a license may be at once Collaborative and Permission-oriented forms 
the legal and normative core of Creative Commons. While acknowledging that an intellectual 
“commons” may be constructed through private licenses, normatively Creative Commons 
seeks to create a less Permission-based and more Collaborative basis for sharing copyrighted 
contents. 
 
3.6. Theory: Branded Licensing or Contracting as Movement to a “Semi-Commons” 
 
Community based branded licensing or contracting has theoretical implications for 
understanding both property and contracts. In the IPR context, branded licensing converts IP 
                                                 
27
 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/  
“(1) Attribution 3.0, 
(2) Attribution-NoDerivs 3.0 
(3) Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 
(4) Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 
(5) Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0, and 
(6) Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0” 
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to a kind of intellectual commons that is subject to a set of entry rules. Rather than a single 
enclosure “owner” who dispenses individualized entry Permissions, and rather than a fully 
Collaboratively shared commons, branded licensing creates a subunit of community and 
commons that allows Collaborative usage, but only for the members of the community, and 
only according to particular rules.  
 
The term “commons" as used in the branded licensing context is only a metaphor. The 
resources of a branded community are not actually and legally held in a commons; rather they 
are an aggregation of private rights where the right holders choose not to exercise their rights, 
or have granted rights of use to the members of the entire community. In a strict sense, even 
the “pure community” based branded licensing cannot create a positive commons 
arrangement. A true “positive commons” would require a single and uniform right over the 
common pool of resources to be created and communally held, and where any additional use 
of the resources would thus require consent from each member of the community.
28
 Such 
individualized consent is infeasible for any large commons. But we note that in a modern 
democratic society, intellectual property law created through a legitimate legislative process 
can be understood as a sort of proxy for gathering consents from all of the members of the 
community.  
 
A “negative” commons, in contrast, would be one in which no resources are understood as 
being subject to initial commonly held entitlement. Resources are instead available to be 
captured, and then brought under private property ownership without seeking any consent or 
approval. In the intellectual property realm, a negative commons would be a regime in which 
individual intellectual property right could be claimed over all previously unclaimed 
intellectual creations and innovations. In a negative commons, there would be no such idea as 
“the public domain” where no rights may be asserted.  
 
Both positive and negative commons fail to describe accurately the commons that the 
                                                 
28
 A resource that is initially owned by no-one, so that individual use depends on no-one’s consent, is 
a “negative” commons. If ownership is shared by a community and individual use depends on the 
consent of all, that is a “positive” commons. We use the concept of positive commons as 
distinguished from negative common as it appeared first in Drahos Peter, A PHILOSOPHY OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1996). See also Drahos Peter, Freedom and Diversity: A Defence of the 
Intellectual Commons, in Reddy P. L. Jayanthi, CREATIVE COMMONS: INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES 50-57 (2008). For similar concepts see Benkler Yochai, The Political Economy of 
Commons, 4.3 THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR THE INFORMATICS PROFESSIONAL 6 (2003). 
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branded licensing aims to promote. If positive commons is an ideal of how property regimes 
of intellectual resources should be arranged based on the original position that all knowledge 
is part of a community, then negative commons is actually a more accurate description of the 
current system of intellectual property rights.  
 
A better analogy for the commons of the branded community might be a “semi-commons:” 
the resources of a club or gated community, in which the entry fee is the agreement to use 
only a particular type of licensing. Essentially, the branded community moves consensually 
from protecting IPR strictly by Permission, to a mid-way point between Permission and 
Collaborative models. Thus it comes close to the protection of IPR through “liability rules” in 
which anyone may have access to the resource so long as they pay the property owner a form 
of compensation (which here may be advancement of the point of view or values of the 
drafting or approving community).
29
 
 
Converting the ideal of intellectual commons into a Permission-based gated community or 
club may create both an ideological and a theoretical dilemma. An intellectual commons as a 
positive commons includes all of the community members. No community members may 
require permission from each other to use the resource, as every member of the community 
already possesses the right of use as a right holder of the commons. In contrast, any person 
who takes a resource out of the commons to create an individual right would need a consent 
from the community. By gating the community, a Permission quality is inherently added to 
the Collaborative commons, regardless of how liberally the permission is given. Thus the 
norm of property arrangement, at least to this extent, changes from positive commons to 
negative commons. Subjecting the intellectual commons to licensing requirements means that 
private rights become the norm. The subject matter under these pooled commons is, in 
principle, subject to private appropriation and any unclaimed subject matters are considered 
res nullius, which may be claimed. If the goal is the creation of non-propertized commons, 
creation of gated community falls short. It may create open access, but that access is 
nonetheless based on propertization and Permission.
30
  
                                                 
29
 Calabresi, supra note 2, applied by Reichman in Reichman Jerome H., Of Green Tulips and Legal 
Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 1743 (2000); 
for its importance in contracting, see Merges, Robert P. Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual 
Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 California Law Review 1293 (1996). 
30
 Elkin-Koren Niva, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a 
Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW 375 (2005). 
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On the other hand, since an intellectual commons or information commons presupposes the 
concept of community, creation of an IPR club as a community may realistically provide the 
precondition for creating a small scale intellectual commons that is subject to (and 
encourages) sharing. A sustainable commons regime has preconditions, one of which is 
satisfied by the gated community analogy: a tightly knit community where the boundary, use, 
measurement, and members entry to the commons is closely monitored, and regulated by 
well understood norms.
31
  
 
Not all branded licensing “clubs” create such a community of common values. The OSI pure 
community model is the strongest candidate. This community develops well understood 
norms, and the members participate in the drafting of the terms of licensing agreements as 
well as use them. This IP club is closer to the small scale commons. The “brand” of this 
community may be controlled and well understood by the users as part of broader norms. But 
when those terms are used outside of the drafting community, those broader community 
norms may be disregarded or break down. At that point the IP club becomes exactly what it is 
– a club.  
 
The second type of branded community—the drafter based organization like Creative 
Commons--follows the opposite course of action. Since the contract terms are drafted for the 
very purpose of creating a community, it is only in the use of the terms—the “initiation” 
--that membership is created. The community is the licensing terms themselves. The only 
condition to entry is the requirement to use the terms of the IP club. No separate set of norms 
guides the behavior of the members of the community; its users (and hence members) have 
diverse various interests and motivations for being part of this community. If open source 
code is the code of ethics for the community for OSI, not all users of Creative Commons have 
common coherent norms before they start to use the license. When the license is used, 
however, a community norm of “some rights are reserved” is formed since none of the 
Creative Commons licenses allow users to reserve all aspects of copyright.  
                                                 
31 
See Hess Charlotte & Ostrom Elinor, Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a 
Common-pool Resource, 66 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 111 (2003). See also Reichman 
Jerome H. & Franklin Jonathan A., Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling 
Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 
LAW REVIEW 875 (1999); Rose Carol M., Expanding the Choices for the Global Commons: 
Comparing Newfangled Tradable Allowance Schemes to Old-fashioned Common Property Regimes, 
10 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM 45 (1999). 
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As a result, errors in matching the contract terms with the intended usage are unavoidable, 
since the users of the terms likely had no part of their drafting. They also share no prior 
common normative understanding. Furthermore, if the mark that is associated with the 
licensing term is such that it creates a separate meaning beyond the licensing terms, this in 
turn will lead to more confusion. Just as confusion or disappointment is generated in a 
consumer when the good will that a trademark represents does not match the product quality, 
mismatching of the licensing terms and the brand will create confusion and disappointment. 
The possibility of the mismatch increases if the users do not fully comprehend the norms of 
community that the licensing agreements aim to create or respect. But there is no other source 
for such norms than the licensing terms themselves: the norms of behavior in the potential 
community can only come from the terms of licensing agreement itself.  
 
 
4. Benefits and Challenges of Branded Licensing or Contracting  
 
4.1. Benefits 
  
Branded licensing promises much of the economic efficiency gained through standardization, 
but with less of the adhesive contract qualities. Branding allows users to bargain realistically 
about the type of contract they wish to use, based on the templates. The templates provide 
reduced complexity and easy access to the materials, which serves many functions. 
Management, or even consumers, can be brought into the contracting process at a much 
higher level of engagement, while keeping transaction costs low.  
 
Sellers as well as buyers can gain from the efficiencies and choices made available by 
branding. In the case of licensing, for example, the branding tools can enable easy 
agreements about distribution of IPR materials. This is a distinct advantage, for example, to 
firms that provide services that allow users to distribute their contents on the Internet (such as 
YouTube or Flickr). Those firms benefit if the process of gaining permission and distributing 
can be so simple that even those who use mobile phones or Blackberry can easily attach 
contract terms when they share their contents and media files.  
 
Branded licensing may also transcend a traditional dilemma faced by contract drafters: the 
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tension between simplicity of terms and attention to legal detail. Although many (rightly) call 
for contracts to be written in more accessible ways, if those efforts result in overly 
simplifying the legal contents of an exchange or relationship, other problems are created. 
Simplification in contracting is therefore often viewed with caution. Although simplified 
information is useful to manage the complexities in contract terms, the fine print in contracts 
often safeguards important risks and may create significant obligations that cannot be 
ignored.  
 
There seems a genuine trend to remove unnecessary complexities from IPR licensing and 
other contract documents.
32
 In e-Commerce and mobile commerce, the need to simplify 
contract terms in a visual manner seems to be felt more urgently, both in commercial as well 
as consumer contracts.
33
 On the other hand, to function as a valid and useful form of 
contract, most contracts for innovation need to provide an adequate level of certainty for both 
parties to the contract. The beauty of branded contracting is that even though the contract is 
simplified from the user perspective, from the legal perspective it can continue to be fully 
inclusive and detailed. The documents behind the mark or sign can be comprehensive, 
although as discussed below the more sophisticated those background documents, the more 
dependent branded contracting is on maintaining trust between the drafters at the branding 
community and those who ultimately adopt the brand for use in their contracts. 
 
 
4.2. Challenges  
 
4.2.1. Evolution of Meaning 
 
One of the challenges of branded contracting lies with the fact that a “brand” may end up 
misleading the users of the licensing. As with the standardized consumer contract of 
                                                 
32 For example, a lean contracting or a “pathclearer” approach represents some of these trends. For an 
agenda for lean contracting, see IACCM, LEAN CONTRACTING: What Might It Look Like And Why 
Does It Matter? IACCM November News Letter (2006), available online 
http://www.iaccm.com/news/contractingexcellence/?storyid=289, last accessed 28 June 2013. For a 
pathclearer approach, see, e.g., Weatherley Steven (2012), Pathclearer and Legal Risk Mapping: 
Cutting through the Contract Jungle, available online http://plc.practicallaw.com/0-519-1805, last 
accessed 28 June 2013. 
33
 Henschel Rene F. & Cleff E.B., Information requirements and consumer protection in future 
M-commerce: textual information overload or alternative regulation and communication?” 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTERCULTURAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 58 (2007). 
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adhesion, a branded licensing is meant to be used in mass and thus is directed to a general 
audience or a large subset of the public like “technology users.” A brand is represented by a 
trademark or sign that distinctively designates or represents the quality of a product or a 
service. These signs could create confusion unless users can adequately understand from the 
signs or marks what the underlying terms of usage will say or the level of protection they will 
provide.
34
 Yet marks or signs can evolve in their meaning or social perception. Through 
usage, a mark or a sign may acquire other meanings beyond their original function that may 
originally have notified or informed the consumer. Such evolution may be positive, especially 
if it represents improvements in tangible products or services. Or the evolution may be 
negative, either by degrading the quality from what was previously connoted by the brand or 
by creating legal confusion.  
 
A related problem could arise from “version control.” Different versions of licensing terms, 
for example, are inevitable in a dynamic industry like software development or in any 
industry that may need to take different user segments into account. The users of a licensing 
agreement, for example, may have different needs regarding permission for commercial uses, 
research uses, or simply for private uses made in public, like blog posts. Furthermore, users 
may be segmented into different geographical jurisdictions, especially in IP where there are 
no uniform transnational laws that govern all transactions in a given item. Some terms will 
need to be adjusted to different local laws, beyond a simple linguistic translation.  
 
4.2.2. Trust 
 
Finally, the generalized issue of trust should be emphasized: branded licensing or contracting 
will work only as well as contracting parties trust that their basic interests are well 
represented or protected by the terms drafted by individuals associated with a particular 
brand. As suggested above, the more detailed and comprehensive those background 
documents, the more vital is the trust between the branding community and those who choose 
to use the brand. Making this even more difficult is that to be commercially viable, the brand 
will very likely employ a general disclaimer that insulates the brand from liability for deals 
that somehow go bad among users who adopt and use the branded contract. Were the brand 
                                                 
34
 See, e.g., Chang v. Virgin Mobile USA, LLC, 2009 WL 111570 (N.D.Tex. January 16, 2009) 
(Flickr photograph of a minor, using a CC Attribution license which fundamentally allows 
commercial use, but which did not address the issues of privacy of the subject of the photograph). 
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to be required to examine the efficacy of transactions, or even to monitor how the brand 
clauses are interpreted in the hands of various users, much of the economic efficiency of 
branded contracting would disappear. Hence prospective users of a brand would no doubt 
encounter a significant disclaimer from the branding community just at the time that the user 
is being asked to trust that the brand community is in solidarity with the users’ interests.   
 
How can this trust be created and preserved, especially in the many contexts in which users 
will not necessarily have any creative or formulating connection to the community that 
created the brand? As a brand develops it may go in directions that seem a betrayal to groups 
that may previously have endorsed the use of a brand and has formed the community. Norms 
that did not pre-exist start to form, creating expectations from the community of the users. 
For example, when Creative Commons issued CC license version 2, the Free Software 
Foundation denounced the terms and discontinued their support for the Creative Commons 
community.
35
  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Communities of every sort face the possibility that their resources will be abused. In 
response, they may follow either a Permission-based or Collaborative approach. Those who 
fear exploitation or a corruption of community resources or values through open use will feel 
a strong impulse toward Permission culture. Those who see outsider adoption of their 
community resources or outlook as opportunities for growth and development will lean 
toward Collaborative culture. Branded licensing or contracting offers the possibility of 
melding aspects of both approaches, in different mixtures that may suit different 
communities. The idea is broad enough to appeal to communities with different histories and 
goals. The terms by which a community may permit use of its trademark or sign, and of its 
underlying contract documents, should be thoughtfully considered within the community. 
 
So also, companies adopting any of these models of branded contracting need to assess 
carefully why certain pre-existing branded terms are to be preferred over others, and whether 
the norms of the branding community should be supported. Companies must remain mindful 
                                                 
35
 Stallman Richard M., Fireworks in Montreal, FSF Blogs, (2005), available online 
< http://www.fsf.org/blogs/rms/entry-20050920.html>, last accessed 28.June 2013. 
Promoting Contract Flexibility through Trademarks 
277 
that the drafters of the contract will likely not be liable for negative consequences from the 
use of their contracts. They must also remember that the contract contents will evolve 
through new versions--and possibly changing values--at the branding community. Finally, 
companies should be aware that decisions between competing brands could have symbolic, 
cultural, and goodwill effects at the adopting company, as well as legal and business 
consequences. With all that said, however, branded contracting may have an iconic future.  
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